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This study reports on the experiences with a diversity of cases of rights-based
benthic and finfish fisheries management regimes from the Latin American region. 
Each case specifies the main attributes of the access rights (in a broad sense, including
 privileges), whether formal or informal: (i) how the rights are conferred and upheld;
 (ii) exclusivity of participation in the fishery; (iii) duration of the rights conferred; 
(iv) security or quality of the title conferred by the rights; (v) transferability, divisibility 
and flexibility in the use of the rights; and (vi) actual rights enforceability and corresponding 
compliance with use rights limitations. The study also reports on aspects of the harvest 
strategies in place, including: (i) fishing methods and gear; (ii) when fishing 
is authorized to take place; (iii) harvest controls; and (iv) monitoring.
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Preparation of this document
The request for an overview of rights-based management in Latin American fisheries 
emanated from the 2010 Latin America and Caribbean regional consultative meeting 
on securing sustainable small-scale fisheries: bringing together responsible fisheries and 
social development, held from 20 to 22 October in San José, Costa Rica. The workshop, 
attended by participants from 15 countries and 22 national, regional and international 
organizations and agencies including Divil Tociety Prganizations and Oon-governmental 
organizations, concluded that there was a need to promote small-scale fisheries in the 
region and secure their access to resources. The present document responds to the 
workshop’s request to make available information on how various fishing rights systems 
in the region are performing and their impacts on the livelihoods of small-scale fishers 
and communities. Many countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region support 
the development of local level co-management and community-based management 
regimes that include in some cases well-developed rights-based systems. The present 
document seeks to present an overview of the experiences on these systems in the region 
to facilitate knowledge dissemination and cooperation and to provide recommendations 
and best practices to inform, inter alia,  the implementation  of the Voluntary Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forestry in the 
Context of National Food Security (VG-Tenure) as well as  the Voluntary Guidelines 
for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and 
Poverty Eradication once they are  approved by the Committee on Fisheries.
Some of the case studies in the present document were originally prepared for the 
FAO Workshop on Governance of Tenure for Responsible Capture Fisheries held on 
4–6 July 2011 in Rome. The objective of the workshop was to generate inputs 
and guidance on the contents and process of developing a fisheries sector specific 
implementation guide for the implementation of the VG-Tenure.
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Abstract
This document aims to provide a better understanding of the wide range of rights-
based fisheries management systems in Latin-America. Rights-based management 
in the Latin American region is evolving, thus creating a wide diversity of schemes 
responding to local fisheries contexts, and institutional, resource and ecosystem 
dynamics and governance capacities. The document has been developed in two 
parts. Part I (edited and co-authored by Jose Maria Orensanz) presents case  studies 
of fisheries targeting sedentary resources while Part II (edited and co-authored by 
Juan Carlos Seijo) presents case studies of industrial and small-scale finfish fisheries 
in the region  The  case studies presented in Part I include the following regimes: 
(i) limited entry or moratoria combined with a total allowable catch; (ii) catch shares; 
(iii) territorial-use privileges; and (iv) territorial communal rights by [customary? and 
indigenous users). Case studies of finfish fisheries include the following:  (i) individual 
vessel quotas combined with spatial quota allocation rights; (ii) individual fishing 
quotas; (iii) rights of access to particular fishing areas or territories; and (iv) individual 
effort quotas. Each case specifies the main attributes of the access rights (in a broad 
sense, including privileges), whether formal or informal: (i) how the rights are conferred 
and upheld; (ii) exclusivity of participation in the fishery;(iii) duration of the rights 
conferred; (iv) security or quality of the title conferred by the rights; (v) transferability, 
divisibility and flexibility in the use of the rights; and (vi) actual rights enforceability and 
corresponding compliance. The study also reports on aspects of the harvest strategies 
in place, including: (i) fishing methods and gear; (ii) when fishing is authorized to take 
place; (iii) harvest controls; and (iv) monitoring.
Orensanz, J. M. & Seijo, J. C. 2013.
Rights-based management in Latin American fisheries.
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Executive summary
This study reports on a diversity of cases of rights-based benthic and finfish fisheries 
from Latin America. For benthic fisheries, Part  I of this technical paper documents 
management experiences including: (i) limited entry or moratoria combined with a total 
allowable catch (TAC) in the Galapagos Islands sea cucumber fishery, and in the sea urchin 
and Juliana clam fisheries of Chile; (ii) catch shares in the diving fisheries for scallops from 
San José Gulf (Argentina) and for the loco snail in Chile (a system now defunct), and the 
Patagonian scallop industrial fishery (Argentina); (iii) Territorial use privileges based on sea 
bed tracts in Chilean territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs, “AMERBs”), concessions 
from central Baja California (Mexico), “predios” of sustainable use in Mexico, and 
concessions for seaweed extraction in Argentine Patagonia; (iv) individual use privileges 
over fishing “campos” in spiny lobster concessions of Punta Allen (Mexico), “marcas” 
in the Juan Fernández lobster fishery, and “parcelas” in Chilean algal harvests; and 
(v) territorial communal rights (traditional and indigenous users) in the Seri Indian fishery 
of Mexico, Brazilian Reserva Extrativistas, and the piangua fishery of Colombia’s Afro-
American communities. For finfish fisheries, Part II presents rights-based management 
study cases for: (i) individual vessel quota (IVQ) management of the anchovy 
(Engraulis ringens) fishery of Peru; (ii) individual stakeholder quota management of the 
hake (Merluccius gayi gayi) fishery of Chile; (iii) community territorial use rights in the 
Gulf weakfish (Cynoscion othonopterus) fishery of the Gulf of California, Mexico; and 
(iv) individual effort quotas (IEQs) for artisanal communities in the multispecies fishery 
at Coiba National Park, Panama.
Each case specifies the main attributes of the access rights (in a broad sense, including 
privileges), whether formal or informal: (i) how the rights are conferred and upheld; 
(ii) exclusivity of participation in the fishery; (iii) duration of the rights conferred; 
(iv) security or quality of the title conferred by the rights; (v) transferability, divisibility 
and flexibility in the use of the rights; and (vi) actual rights enforceability and 
corresponding compliance with use rights limitations. The study also reports on aspects 
of the harvest strategies in place, including: (i) fishing methods and gear; (ii) when fishing 
is authorized to take place; (iii) harvest controls; and (iv) monitoring.
For fisheries targeting benthic organisms, main findings for the major categories of 
privileges or rights were:
rLimited entry. A moratorium on the number of participants (boats and/or fishers), 
possibly combined with a TAC, often has been the first reaction to symptoms of 
overfishing. Moratoria are, in principle, a short-term instrument that should evolve 
into formal limited-entry systems with specified entry/exit rules, a form of “non-
quantitative access rights”. In practice, closed registries tend to become frozen, which 
results in an informal market for the privileges of registered but inactive fishers and a 
distortion of fishing effort statistics. 
rCatch shares. Catch shares have fared better in situations where there are few 
participants, whether the shares are granted to individual coastal gatherers, small-scale 
boat-owners or industrial vessels. In limited-entry systems (with or without catch 
shares) where the fishing units are small boats (typical of commercial diving), whether 
access privileges are vested on individual fishers or boats has significant implications for 
management. The dynamics (entry, mobility, ageing, attrition and exit) of fishers and 
boats are very different. Fishers are generally more transient than boats, and often move 
across jurisdictional boundaries. Systems based on catch shares granted to individual 
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fishers have failed when the number of participants is large, mostly because inflated or 
outdated registries and poor enforcement have frustrated effective implementation.
rTerritorial use privileges typically consist of concessions to fishers organizations, such 
as Mexican cooperatives and Chilean “sindicatos”, for the use of specific resources 
in tracts of seabed (TURFs). Differences in design have significant management 
implications. In the case of Chilean AMERBs, the tracts are relatively small, leaving 
variable extensions of background areas where fishing for key target species is 
nominally banned, but regulations are unenforceable. The result has been severe 
depletion of valuable resources (e.g. loco snails) in background areas and an illegal 
market for small, sublegal shellfish. Mexican cooperatives from central Baja California, 
instead, have concessions over extended tracts contiguous with each other, so that there 
is no unclaimed background territory. This system has been very successful on most 
accounts. Overall, TURFs have fared better in cases with a long history of collective 
territorial appropriation, informal in its beginnings, than in systems introduced de 
novo by design. Moreover, they have been more effective in cases where the tracts are 
close to fishing communities, particularly in rural areas, which facilitates vigilance and 
deterrence of intruders.
r Individual privileges for access to fishing spots, a particular form of TURF, are 
as a rule regulated by some form of customary marine tenure. These systems are 
typically associated with interception gear, such as traps or attraction devices. Informal 
individual privileges are usually tradable under a variety of arrangements (monetary 
or else) and can be inherited. The “parcela” system of algal harvesting from Chile is 
based on resources with a high turnover rate, and privileges may be temporary and 
re-assigned through a lottery. Informal customary marine tenure systems are the result 
of a protracted process of adaptive adjustment. Formalization of customary systems 
poses significant risks because, in the absence of effective feedback, formality can be a 
straightjacket for systems whose resilience is conditioned on their adaptiveness.
rTerritorial communal rights granted to traditional and indigenous users are 
different from all of the preceding because access rights to fishing are usually only 
part of a broader package. Restitution of rights is always accompanied by significant 
devolution of management authority. This results in two-tier governance systems, in 
which some decisions are made at the national level (e.g. “bounding” the community), 
while rules for the access to resources or benefits by individual members are decided 
within the community. Issues of legitimacy raised by the definition of “community” 
can be very complex. Moreover, the granting of exclusive communal rights may be in 
conflict with national legislation.
The main attributes of the rights-based systems in place for the finfish fisheries 
reported in this study are the following.
For the IVQ system in the anchovy (Engraulis ringens) fishery of Peru, exclusive 
rights are granted for ten years with a contract warrant to industrial vessels targeting 
anchovy for indirect human consumption outside the five-mile limit allocated to 
artisanal vessels. There is no transferability of rights independent of the vessel unit, and 
divisibility is allowed to substitute capacity of individual vessels removed from fishing. 
For the individual stakeholder fishing quota of the common hake (Merluccius gayi 
gayi) fishery in Chile, the current fishery law in operation allocates 5 miles from the 
coast for exclusive use of the artisanal fishing. In addition, the common hake fishery is 
declared in full operation and a limited-entry scheme is in place for both industrial and 
artisanal. A maximum catch limit per stakeholder MCLS is also in place. By law, a TAC 
must be defined annually to assign 35 percent for the artisanal sector and 65 percent for 
the industrial one. Rights are renewable on a yearly basis, and the State guarantees the 
right to a fraction of the total TAC, subject to biomass accessibility. Rights are non-
transferable and non-divisible. With the community territorial use rights of the Gulf 
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weakfish (Cynoscion othonopterus) of the Gulf of California, Mexico, exclusive territorial 
fishing rights with limited entry are granted for two years to a coastal community with 
limited entry. Security is provided by fishing title rights for the period covered by the 
fishing licence. In this Mexican fishery, rights are non-transferable and non-divisible. 
For the multispecies fishery at Coiba National Park, Panama, exclusive fishing rights are 
granted, through IEQs, to fishers of 47 small-scale boats. Rights are granted for one year 
with the possibility of renewability. These rights are secure rights as long as there is full 
compliance with regulations of the Coiba National Park. Transferability or divisibility 
of these rights is not allowed. 
The study also explores and discusses the following questions: How can the property 
rights systems illustrated in the case studies improve the incentives for stewardship, 
conservation and sustained profitability? What sorts of distributional implications are 
there in each of the rights-based finfish fisheries reported? What sorts of operational 
requirements do the different types of property rights documented demand in terms of 
research, enforcement, administration and actual fishing operations?
The diversity of rights-based management schemes reported for benthic and finfish 
fisheries in Latin America seems to respond to: (i) local fishery contexts; (ii) institutional, 
resource and ecosystem dynamics; and (iii) governance capacities in place. At this stage 
of establishing rights-based schemes in Latin America, a commonality found in virtually 
all study cases is the non-transferability of formal privileges. It seems to reflect the 
concerns for potential concentration of fishing rights in a few hands were transferability 
introduced. In many of the cases discussed, non-divisibility of rights is also specified. 
In contrast, informal access privileges are effectively transferable and divisible in some 
customary tenure systems where sea bed resources are targeted. Enforcement and 
compliance continues to be a challenge for many of the cases reported, particularly 
in artisanal fisheries. Community self-policing in fisheries with a limited number of 
participants seems to facilitate compliance with regulations and granted rights. Because 
of the relatively short time span in which the reported formal right-based systems have 
been in place, the sustainability performance of most of them cannot yet be properly 
assessed. The main exceptions are spiny lobster fisheries from Mexico (Baja California 
and Quintana Roo) and Chile (Juan Fernández Islands), in which sustainability has 
been achieved through a long history of informal access arrangements preceding 
(or coexisting with) more recently established formal privileges.
PART I
Latin American rights-based fisheries 
targeting sedentary resources
J.M. Orensanz, Ana Cinti, Ana M. Parma, Lorena Burotto, 
Silvana Espinosa-Guerrero, Eloy Sosa-Cordero, Cristián Sepúlveda 
and Verónica Toral-Granda
31. Introduction
The assessment and management of fisheries targeting sea bed resources pose many 
specific problems, largely related to the sedentary nature of benthic organisms 
(Orensanz and Jamieson, 1998). In this context, “sedentary” means that the spatial 
scale of individual movements is small as compared with the operating scale of 
the fishing process. As perceived by fishers, the spatial structure of the target 
populations is persistent in time (resources are “viscous”). Invertebrates that crawl 
over the sea bed, such as crab and lobsters, are sedentary by those standards. The 
sedentary nature of the resources favours harvesting strategies and tenure systems 
that emphasize the spatial dimension. More localized forms of governance and 
exclusivity of access to delimited territories offer a suitable alternative to the classical 
command-and-control approach, by creating incentives for fishers to protect their local 
resources and to participate in their management (monitoring, assessment, decision-
making and enforcement).
Fisheries targeting benthic resources range from coastal gathering along the seashore 
to sophisticated offshore industrial operations. Here, that diversity is illustrated with 
a selection of fisheries from Latin America. Most of them are small-scale fisheries 
(sometimes called S-fisheries [Orensanz et al., 2005]), but one (the Patagonian scallop 
offshore fishery) is fully industrial. Selected cases of Latin American small-scale 
fisheries have been reviewed before by Castilla and Defeo (2001), Defeo and Castilla 
(2005) and Orensanz et al. (2005). These fisheries often target one or a few species, and 
their products are generally destined to affluent consumers, frequently exported. In that 
sense, they differ radically from the usual cliché of the artisanal fishery (multispecific 
and subsistence-oriented).
The fisheries considered span a diversity of forms of access and tenure, from limited 
entry combined with a total allowable catch (TAC) to territorial use privileges and 
rights, and include both formal and informal management systems. After introducing 
a selection of illustrative cases, several transversal issues across systems are discussed 
and the following questions addressed: (i) how the different access regimes may affect 
the incentives for stewardship, conservation, sustained profitability and equitable 
distribution of benefits; and (ii) the implementation requirements of the tenure systems 
regarding scientific/technical support, enforcement and administration.
CONVENTIONS
The account of each of the main cases considered is supplemented with a “case table” 
and a composite figure. In addition, the Annex provides information about agencies 
and legislation pertinent to each case.
In the case of Chile, the “traditional” political division is used: Regions I–XII 
(numbered from north to south). Two of these were recently subdivided, but historical 
fishery data are only available for the old regions. 
CASE STUDIES
As a rule, small-scale fisheries in Latin America started as open access within national 
jurisdictions, supplying domestic markets. A good example is the pepitona clam (Arca 
zebra) fishery from Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (Lodeiros et al., 2012), one of 
the largest clam fisheries in the world, which supplies a significant canning industry. 
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TABLE 1
Case studies (includes cases that are fully developed and some that are addressed in general sections for 
comparative purposes)
Tenure 
system
Case Management 
jurisdiction
Registration 
region
Territory for 
exclusive use of 
target resources
Access privileges 
vested on
Open 
access
Pepitona clam fishery, 
Sucre State, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of)
Shelf between 
Sucre and Nueva 
Esparta (Margarita 
I.) States
NA NA NA
Moratoria 
and total 
allowable 
catch (TAC)
Galapagos Islands 
sea cucumber fishery 
(Ecuador)
Galapagos Marine 
Reserve (GMR)
GMR GMR Individual divers and 
boats
Sea urchin fishery of 
Regions X–XI (south 
Chile)
Chile Regions 
X–XI
Regions X–XI, 
contiguous zone 
Individual fishers
Juliana clam fishery 
(Chile)
Chile Region X Fishing grounds Individual fishers and 
boats 
Catch 
shares
San José Gulf scallop 
diving fishery 
(Argentina)
Chubut Province, 
inshore
Zone I 
(Madryn)
San José Gulf Boat owners
Chilean loco fishery, REB 
(1993–98)
Chile Region Region Individual divers
Individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs) in the 
Galapagos Islands sea 
cucumber fishery (2001)
GMR GMR GMR Individual divers and 
boats
Patagonian scallop 
industrial fishery 
(Argentina)
Shelf under 
federal jurisdiction 
Federal Designated fishing 
grounds (change 
annually)
Industrial vessels
Mussel gathering in El 
Riacho (Argentina)
Chubut Province, 
inshore
Zone I 
(Madryn)
Sector of tidal flats 
and rocky reefs
Individual coastal 
gatherers
Beach clam fishery of 
Uruguay
Uruguay Sector of beach Individual coastal 
gatherers
Territorial 
use 
privileges: 
sea bed 
tracts
Chilean AMERBs Chile Region AMERBs Fishers organizations
Concessions from central 
Baja California (Mexico)
Mexico Variable Area of concession Fishing cooperatives
Predios of sustainable 
use, Gulf of California 
(Mexico)
Mexico Region Predios Juridical entities 
(companies, 
cooperatives) or 
individuals
Concessions for seaweed 
extraction in Chubut 
Province (Argentina)
Chubut Province, 
inshore areas and 
coastal zone
Area of concession Individuals or 
commercial firms
Territorial 
use 
privileges: 
fishing 
spots
Lobster concessions of 
Punta Allen (Mexico)
Mexico Landing 
port
Concessions, but 
see cell to the right
Two-tier system: 
formal privileges 
vested on 
cooperatives; 
informal access 
rights to campos by 
community members
Lobster fishery of Juan 
Fernandez Archipelago 
(Chile)
Chile Juan Fernández 
Archipelago, but 
see cell to the right
Formal privileges 
vested on registered 
fishers; informal 
access rights to 
“marcas” held by 
community members
“Parcela” system of algal 
harvests (Chile)
Chile Region Stretch of coast, 
but see cell to the 
right
Two-tier system: 
access privileges over 
stretches of coastline 
appropriated 
by communities 
(customary tenure) or 
formally allocated to 
fishers organizations 
as AMERBs; the 
two may overlap. 
Within communities, 
access privileges are 
variously allocated to 
groups, families or 
individuals 
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The products of these fisheries eventually found acceptance in more lucrative markets, 
including tourists, affluent urban consumers, exports, or industrial supplies (mostly 
in the case of algae). In many cases, demand, mostly from far-east countries, grew 
rapidly starting in the 1970s. The result was the explosive development of export-
oriented fisheries targeting a variety of resources, ranging from sea urchin and loco 
snails in Chile (Castilla et al., 1998; Moreno et al., 2007), to sea cucumbers in Ecuador 
and Mexico (Reyes-Bonilla and Herrero-Pérezrul, 2003; Toral-Granda and Martínez, 
2004), to, more recently, geoduck clams in Baja California, Mexico (Calderón-
Aguilera et al., 2008). Explosive development led to recurrent crises, some collapses, 
and frequently to draconian measures (such as complete closures) at a high social and 
economic cost to fishing communities. Crises prompted management reforms, among 
them access regulations (for examples, see Orensanz et al. [2005]). In other cases, 
access regulations evolved spontaneously (customary marine tenure) or were formally 
introduced when a fishery developed in response to market opportunities, under the 
oversight of a fisheries authority.
The selected cases were classified according to a typology that captures the main 
axes of the observed diversity (Table 1); including limited entry combined with a TAC, 
catch shares, territorial use privileges, and rights restored to communities of traditional 
users or indigenous peoples. Access regulations include cases of catch-, effort- 
and territorial-based privileges or rights of access (Charles, 2009). Here, the term 
“catch shares” is used in a narrow literal sense, meaning shares of a catch quota.
Tenure 
system
Case Management 
jurisdiction
Registration 
region
Territory for 
exclusive use of 
target resources
Access privileges 
vested on
Territorial 
communal 
rights 
(traditional 
and 
indigenous 
users)
Seri Indian benthic 
fishery (Mexico)
Mexico Sea adjacent to 
Tiburón I.
Community
Brazilian RESEXs Brazil RESEXs Community 
Chile’s EMPCO Chile Territory Community
Piangua fishery, 
Colombia’s Afro-
American Communities
Colombia Collective 
entitlements 
(territories of 
community 
councils)
Community
Continued
72. Limited entry or moratoria 
combined with a TAC
CASE 1: THE GALAPAGOS ISLANDS SEA CUCUMBER FISHERY (ECUADOR)
The Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR, Figure  1:A) includes the Galapagos Islands, 
an archipelago of more than 130  islands and inlets about 1  000  km off the coast 
of Ecuador, and its surrounding open ocean (Toral-Granda, 2008). Commercial 
diving within the GMR expanded rapidly in the early 1990s, when depletion of sea 
cucumber grounds off mainland Ecuador prompted fishers to move to the islands 
lured by the rapid development of a new lucrative, export-oriented sea cucumber 
(Isostichopus fuscus) fishery (Toral-Granda and Martínez, 2004). Commercial divers 
also target spiny lobsters (Panulirus penicillatus and P.  gracilis) and a variety of 
minor resources (slipper lobsters, octopus, snails and whelks). Concerned by the 
explosive expansion of the fishery under open access, the central government banned 
sea cucumber extraction in 1992, but illegal fishing continued until 1994 when an 
experimental fishery was allowed (Castrejón, 2011). The catch in the experimental 
season was estimated at 6 million sea cucumbers, more than 10 times the allowed quota 
(Figure 1:B). After this failed experiment, the fishery was closed for five years, a period 
of escalating conflict between fishers and managers. In 1995, the Galapagos National 
Park (GNP) and the Charles Darwin Foundation (CDF) were blockaded by angry 
fishers who demanded a sea cucumber opening (Powell and Gibbs, 1995; Shepherd 
et al., 2004).
A comprehensive management plan for the reserve was urgently needed, not only to 
regulate fisheries but also to control demographic growth, tourism and development. 
To that end, a participatory process was established that culminated with the passing of 
the Galapagos Special Law in 1998, a legal instrument that gave exclusive access to the 
fishery resources to the artisanal fishers from the islands (Table 2). A Management Plan 
for the Marine Reserve, approved in 1999, introduced zoning and a comanagement 
system that involved both local and national stakeholders (Toral-Granda and Martínez, 
2004; Baine et al., 2007). At the local level, the Participatory Management Board (PMB) 
includes artisanal fishers cooperatives, the Galapagos Chamber of Tourism, naturalist 
guides, representatives of the science, education and conservation sectors (the Ministry 
of Education, non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and any other group involved 
in conservation), and the Directorate of the Galapagos National Park. At this level, all 
decisions involving activities within the reserve must be made by consensus. The CDF 
provides scientific support for management and informs the decision-making process. 
However, decision-making power is retained by the national stakeholders, represented 
in the Autoridad Interinstitucional de Manejo (AIM). The latter normally ratifies 
decisions made by consensus at the PMB (Heylings and Bravo, 2007). The GNP is in 
charge of implementation and enforcement.
These included a catch quota, a fishing season (about two months), a minimum 
legal size, closed areas, and a requirement that fishers and boats had a licence to fish. A 
monitoring programme of the catches and a participatory survey of the sea cucumber 
stock, before and after the fishing season, were implemented and used by scientist of 
the CDF to provide management advice (Toral-Granda, 2008). Fishing licences, valid 
for two years, are personal and non-transferable, and allow fishers to harvest any 
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resource within permitted areas of the reserve. Annual fishing permits are vested on 
the boats, and can be transferred together with the boat as long as the new owner has 
a fishing licence.
Many factors contributed to impair the management system, making many of 
the regulations ineffective (Hearn, 2008; Toral-Granda, 2008). Catch quotas were 
negotiated at the PMB and decisions largely ignored the technical advice provided by 
the CDF, which was considered highly uncertain and not impartial. In 2002, following 
a failed attempt to establish an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system in 2001, 
no quota was established and the catch reached a maximum of more than 8 million 
sea cucumbers (about 1 660 tonnes, fresh weight). The minimum legal size, which is 
smaller than the size limit recommended, is hard to enforce owing to the plasticity of 
the sea cucumbers (Toral-Granda, 2008). Finally, poaching in closed areas has been a 
recurrent problem (Murillo and Reyes, 2008; Castrejón, 2011).
The decision-making process also had some structural problems (Bustamante 
et al., 2005). Because decisions are not made locally but at the AIM, stakeholders 
often bypassed the PMB to lobby at the higher level of the AIM, which weakened 
the participatory process. Prior to 2006, when the PMB appointed a Technical 
Committee, there was no clear separation between science and management, as the 
CDF (primary provider of technical support) had a conservation advocacy role. This 
fuelled recurrent friction between fishers and scientists, as the former mistrusted the 
CDF’s real intentions. No incentives to the industry were in place to transform the 
gold-rush mentality that marked the origins of the fishery. Instead, owing to the large 
income generated by the sea cucumber fishery in the early 2000s, the PMB was used as 
a political platform by representatives of the fishers. Fishing cooperatives are poorly 
organized, do not provide any support or benefits to members, and are rather seen 
as a source of conflict, their leaders being perceived as too politicized and detached 
from their constituencies (Hearn, 2008). The legitimacy of the associations was further 
distorted by a requirement that, in order to obtain a licence, fishers had to be members 
of one of the four existing fishers cooperatives (Defeo, Castilla and Castrejón, 2009). 
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FIGURE 1
Galapagos Islands sea cucumber fishery, Ecuador
Notes: (A) Zoning of the Galapagos Marine Reserve; red: areas available for harvesting, other 
colours: fishing not allowed under different protection regimes. (B) Historical series of landings of 
sea cucumbers (bars), and total allowable catches (dots). (C) Number of artisanal fishers registered 
with the Galapagos National Park (*), and number of fishers that were active in the sea cucumber 
fishery (dots).
Sources: (A) modified from Bustamante et al. (2005), their Figure 3, with permission. (B) and (C) 
based on Murillo and Reyes (2008).
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The expectation behind this requirement was that the cooperatives would themselves 
control access, preventing an excessive growth of the fishing sector (Castrejón, 2011). 
This expectation did not materialize, and the number of registered fishers grew 
from 457  in 1997 to 1 059  in 2002 (Murillo and Reyes, 2008). This requirement was 
eliminated in 2008.
A moratorium on the issuing of new fishing permits (excepting sons and daughters 
of fishers) was established in 1998, but the measure was not implemented until 2002, 
three years after the opening of the sea cucumber fishery. By then, the membership 
of the cooperatives was already inflated (Figure 1:C). Many of the people that were 
incorporated to the registry between 1999 and 2002 were newcomers, with no 
connection to the participatory process that in the end granted them exclusive rights. 
Their main motivation was to benefit from the alternatives promised as compensation 
for the closing of areas as part of the zoning plan (Castrejón, 2011). In recent years, the 
number of active fishers has been less than half the number in the registry, but there 
are no legal means to terminate inactive licences; as a result, the moratorium has had 
TABLE 2
Case 1: Galapagos Islands sea cucumber fishery (Ecuador)
Main attributes of the access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
By law, access to fisheries resources within the Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR) are 
conferred to individual artisanal fishers, resident of Galápagos, who must exert the 
activity directly, and for whom fishing is the main source of income. Fishers must be 
registered with the administration of the Galapagos National Park, and must have a 
fishing licence (PARMA). Boats must also be registered and have a fishing permit. Both 
registries have been closed since 2002.
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
Access to all fishing resources in the GMR is exclusive to artisanal fishers resident from 
Galapagos. 
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Fishing licences (PARMAs) vested on the individual fishers are valid for two years; fishing 
permits vested on boats are annual. 
Security or quality of the 
title conferred by the rights
Fishing licences are renewable. Individuals are removed from the registry when they have 
not renewed their PARMA in two consecutive years, or when artisanal fishing has not 
been their main source of income for four consecutive years.
Transferability of the rights Fishing licences (PARMAs) are non-transferable; fishing permits can be transferred 
together with the boat.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Fishing rights are individual and fishers fish in a competitive way. Only in 2001 was a 
system of individual transferable quotas used, which was considered a failure. 
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
Fishers must follow harvest regulations, including spatial and temporal restrictions. 
Fishing areas are restricted by the zoning plan of the GMR, and also by temporary 
closures.
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations
Enforcement from land and using fast patrol boats is conducted by the Galapagos 
National Park, in collaboration with the Ecuadorian navy. Poaching in closed areas 
has been a recurrent problem, leading to confrontations between control agents and 
offenders. Depletion of Isostichopus fuscus has led to illegal fishing of other prohibited 
sea cucumber species. 
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Diving is the only fishing method allowed. The fleet is composed of small (< 10 m) 
wooden boats (“pangas”) or fibreglass fast boats (“fibras”) that work from larger (up to 
18 m) mother boats (“botes”). Boats are equipped with air compressors. By law, artisanal 
boats cannot exceed 18 m, and 250 hp.
When fishing is authorized 
to take place
Fishing season lasts two months (15 June–15 August).
Harvest controls A threshold density of 11 sea cucumbers per 100 m2 must be attained on the west of 
Isabela Island as a condition for opening the fishery. Annual total allowable catches 
are established as a fraction of annual estimates of abundance obtained from a direct 
participatory survey of fishing grounds conducted in April. Minimum size limits are 20 cm 
for fresh and 7 cm for dried sea cucumbers. Temporary closed areas may be established 
owing to low density or high abundance of juveniles, in addition to those defined by the 
zoning plan of the GMR.
Monitoring Population surveys are conducted before and after the fishing season. The fishery is 
also monitored at landing sites and occasionally by patrol boats that sample catches 
and record information on effort and fishing locations. An annual report is prepared on 
the status of the stock and the fishery based on a set of pre-agreed indicators. Results 
of assessments are discussed at participatory workshops. Based on average density, the 
stock is classified as in critical condition (< 0.11 m2), recovering (0.11–0.209 m2), or healthy 
(≥ 0.21 m2).
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no effect on fishing effort control. The registry for boats was also closed in 2002, but 
the number of boats registered (446) exceeded the maximum established (300 boats, 
Castrejón, 2011). To reduce the size of the fleet, groups of small “pangas” are allowed 
to be replaced by larger speedboats, but not by a large mother boat. In order to provide 
an alternative livelihood and reduce overcapacity, registered fishers have been allowed 
to exchange their fishing permit for a highly coveted tourism licence (otherwise 
impossible to obtain). Contrary to its intent, this policy, together with rumours that a 
buy-back programme might be introduced, attracted opportunistic newcomers to the 
fishing sector (Hearn, 2008).
Failed attempts to regulate the fishery, together with reduced recruitment (Hearn 
et al., 2005), resulted in dwindling stocks and catches that fell short of the allowed 
quotas (Figure 1:B, Toral-Granda, 2008). In the early 2000s, both spiny lobsters and 
sea cucumbers were the focus of a series of long-lasting conflicts between the GNP and 
fishers who were unhappy about the management regime (Toral-Granda, 2008). The 
sea cucumber fishery was closed in 2006, after less than half the TAC was harvested in 
the 2005 fishing season.
A new participatory process was initiated in 2006 to conduct an in-depth review 
of the fisheries comanagement system. A Technical Committee was established 
to formulate a more effective management model (Castrejón, 2011). The Fisheries 
Chapter of the Management Plan for the GMR was approved unanimously by the 
PMB and AIM in January 2009 (CTM, 2009). It specifies management goals, harvest 
controls, indicators and monitoring strategies, and a regular process of management 
reviews and adaptation. Specific goals for the sea cucumber are the biological and 
economic rebuilding of the fishery and improving the quality of life of fishers and 
their families, while strengthening governance (fishers’ participation and institutional 
capacity for comanagement). The plan defines a decision rule for the re-opening of the 
fishery based on a minimum density threshold (11 sea cucumbers per 100 m2 on the 
west side of Isabela Island). The sampling plan for annual monitoring was redesigned 
in order to provide more reliable estimates of density and biomass on which to base 
the decision of whether to open the fishery, and the determination of the annual 
TACs (Wolff, Schuhbauer and Castrejón, 2012). Based on this rule, the fishery was 
kept closed in 2009 and 2010, and re-opened in 2011 with a quota of one million sea 
cucumbers. Although not all aspects of the Fishery Chapter have been implemented, 
the development of a strategic plan that contemplates mechanisms for participation 
and a schedule for revisions has reduced conflicts and created a more collaborative 
environment. Concrete actions for improving enforcement were also delineated in 
the Fisheries Chapter, an aspect that would be critical for the success of the new 
management plan. Above all, the revamping of the system of licences that protects the 
rights of the active fishers seems to be a first, necessary step to improve ecological and 
institutional sustainability in this fishery.
CASE 2: THE SEA URCHIN FISHERY OF THE LOS LAGOS AND AYSEN 
REGIONS (SOUTH CHILE)
The sea urchin (Loxechinus albus) fishery of southern Chile contributes more than 
half of the world’s supply of sea urchin roe (Moreno et al., 2007), providing for the 
livelihood of hundreds of artisanal divers and their families, and fuelling a significant 
export-oriented industry. Almost half of the national production comes from fishing 
grounds located in a remote and largely unpopulated maze of islands, fjords and 
channels in the Los Lagos and Aysen Regions, spreading over four degrees of latitude 
(42–47°S) (Figure 2:B). Prior to 1975, catches were small and they were sold at local 
markets for fresh consumption. The fishery expanded rapidly in the 1980s in response 
to an increase in demand from Japan, first in the Los Lagos Region, and gradually 
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moving south to the lightly populated Aysen Region, as grounds around Chiloe Island 
became depleted (Moreno et al., 2007). In the last 25 years, combined landings from the 
two regions have fluctuated around 20 000 tonnes (Figure 2:A).
Fishing units include “lanchas” (12–15 m long, with a small cabin, Figure 2:D) and 
boats (8–10 m long). Much of the fishing takes place in remote areas that are too far from 
the ports to allow daily commutes (Figure 2:B). Groups of 10–20 boats are organized 
into “faenas” by operators that tow or lead them to temporary camps, from which 
they move to adjacent fishing areas (Figure 2:C). Operators provide services through 
mother boats (“lanchas de acarreo”), typically 15–25 m long, which transport supplies 
from the nearest harbour to the faena, and the catch from the faena to processing 
plants. Fishers are required to be registered in only one region, for specific resources 
(Table 3). The registry for sea urchin has been closed since 1995. A survey conducted 
in 2004 found that of the 3 731 and 514 divers registered in the Regions of Los Lagos 
and Aysen, respectively, only 639 and 288 were active sea urchin fishers (Moreno et 
al., 2007). The size of the fleet has decreased since 2005, from 700–833 in 2002–05 to 
an average of 500 boats in 2009-2011 (N. Barahona, Instituto de Fomento Pesquero 
[IFOP], personal communication). In addition to the fishing force, the fishery employs 
about 2 800 people (Molinet et al., 2008) in 17 processing plants located in the Los 
Lagos Region (Pupelde, 2011). The processors, many of whom depend on a steady 
and orderly supply of sea urchin roe, have a substantial role in discussions about the 
management of the fishery.
Since 2002, the fishery has operated under a special legal regime known as Pesca de 
Investigación (Research Fishery, suspended in 2011), aimed at improving monitoring 
of fishing operations. In the case of the sea urchin, its main motivation was to collect 
information on active participants (fishers, boats and tender boats), and their region 
of origin. The expectation was that the list of active fishers would be “cleaned” and 
completed in a few years, providing criteria for granting access privileges thereon. The 
approval of the management plan in 2005 included a limited-entry programme, clear 
access rules, and monitoring of effort with participation of the fishers’ federations. 
It was seen as a first step towards the introduction of stewardship incentives. In 
reality, the fact that the Artisanal Registry had been closed, together with certification 
requirements for divers, betrayed the purpose of the Research Fishery regime. Many 
active divers could not enrol in the Research Fishery because they were not certified. 
The closing of the registry resulted in a substantial, yet uncertain, fraction of divers 
and fishing effort not being accounted for in the fishery statistics, with a consequent 
distortion of some of the key monitoring indicators.
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FIGURE 2
Sea urchin fishery of the Los Lagos and Aysen Regions, south Chile
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Notes: (A) Landings, 1960–2011. (B) Fishing locations recorded in IFOP’s port sampling 
programme. (C) Trips originating from the “faena” of Isla Lemu, October 2005, data 
logger and observer data; red dots indicate fishing locations. (D) Fishing boat equipped 
with compressor and hookah.
Sources: (A) SERNAPESCA; (B) C. Molinet; (C) Molinet et al. (2008), their Figure 2.18; 
(D) N. Barahona, IFOP.
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CASE 3: THE JULIANA CLAM FISHERY (CHILE)
The Juliana clam (Tawera gayi) is distributed in the Interior Sea of Chiloe (Region X), 
where it forms extended, high-density beds. This species was not commercially 
exploited before 1989, partly because its maximum size is below a minimum size limit 
that applies collectively to several clam species (5.5 cm). Following an initial assessment, 
the fishery opened in 2001–04 under a Research Fishery regime (see Case 2), which 
included a TAC and an ad hoc registry of participating “extractive fishing units”, 
each composed of a boat and its crew (1–5 divers, an assistant and a skipper). In that 
period, landings fluctuated between 4 000 tonnes and 4 200 tonnes; the fishery involved 
219 boats and 365 fishers, and catches were landed in three main ports either directly or 
through mother boats. About 11 plants process the product, which is exported frozen 
(≈80 percent) or canned, mainly to Spain (SUBPESCA, 2012).
In 2007, the fisheries authority introduced an advisory committee with representation 
of the public and private sectors, including divers, boat owners, intermediaries, 
processors and public entities. This contributed to building trust and facilitated 
collaboration between the different sectors. Because enrolment for the Research 
Fishery was done in the small villages located on the islands, implementation of the 
regime gave de facto exclusive access to local fishers, thus eliminating conflicts with 
outsiders coming from distant urban centres. Fishers shared their knowledge about 
the distribution of the resource, which was used to expand the area surveyed and 
the number of beds included in the annual estimation of abundance (the basis for the 
TAC). Landings increased as a result, reaching about 9 000 tonnes in 2010. In response, 
the fisheries authority declared the fishery as “fully exploited”, a different status 
recognized by the Chilean Fisheries Law. Under this regime, access is granted to all 
TABLE 3
Case 2: Sea urchin fishery of Los Lagos and Aysen Regions (south Chile)
Main attributes of the access regime
How the rights are conferred and upheld Individual fishers must be registered in a regionalized species-specific 
Artisanal Fishery Registry. Registry for sea urchin has been closed since 1995. 
In addition, fishers must enrol annually for the Research Fishery, a legal 
regime under which the sea urchin fishery has operated since 2002.
Exclusivity of participation in the fishery Enrolled fishers have exclusive legal access to the fishery. Sea urchins are also 
targeted within territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs), but that is a very 
small fraction of the landings, which is destined to the domestic market.
Duration of the rights conferred NA
Security or quality of the title conferred 
by the rights
Fishers from Region X can fish in Region XI through an agreement between 
the two regional governments. The terms of the agreement are revised 
every three years. Security of access for fishers from Region X is pending on 
continuity of this agreement. 
Transferability of the rights Non-transferable.
Divisibility of the rights assigned NA
Flexibility in the use of the rights Fishers are allowed to fish until the total allowable catch (TAC) is reached 
under a competitive system. The TAC is subdivided in macroregions.
Enforceability of rights and compliance 
with use-rights limitations
Port samplers register a number of divers substantially larger than the 
number enrolled for the Research Fishery. This is a result of the closure of the 
Artisanal Fishery Registry – many active fishers are not in the Registry and 
therefore cannot sign up for the Research Fishery. 
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Sea urchins are exclusively extracted by diving.
When fishing is authorized to take place Fishing season lasts two months (15 June–15 August).
Harvest controls Annual TACs decided by the Comisión de Manejo de las Pesquerías 
Bentónicas de las Regiones X y XI (COMPEB). A report of indicators is 
presented by the Technical Advisory Group but no formal rule is in place for 
setting the TAC. Minimum size limit reduced to 60 mm in 2011, from the 
70 mm size limit established in 1986. Fishery is closed in the reproductive 
season, from 15 August to 30 November.
Monitoring Catches are monitored through a port-sampling programme conducted by 
the Instituto de Fomento Pesquero (IFOP). A private consultant is contracted 
out to control access to the Research Fishery. 
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fishers registered in the region, in this case all fishers registered for Juliana in Region X. 
This contrasts with the exclusive privileges previously allocated to the local fishers who 
were active in the development of the fishery. When the registry for Juliana was closed 
in 2011 (Table 4), more than 3 000 divers were registered. Paradoxically, a change in 
legal status that was meant to prevent further growth of the fishery and fishing power 
may allow the entry of many more fishers than were active in the development phase. 
This may be prevented if a management plan were approved, which would formally 
recognize the Juliana fishery as a unit within the larger Region X, and define a specific 
limited-entry regime for it. Management plans are contemplated in a new fisheries act, 
to be implemented in 2013.
LIMITED ENTRY OR MORATORIA COMBINED WITH A TAC – RECAP
A moratorium on the number of participants (boats and/or fishers), possibly combined 
with a TAC, has often been the first reaction to symptoms of overfishing in Latin 
American fisheries targeting valuable sea bed resources, as exemplified here with the sea 
urchin fishery of south Chile (Case 2) and the sea cucumber fishery of the Galapagos 
Islands (Case 1). Implementation of moratoria requires a registry or cadastre. When 
these are first compiled, it is easy for prospective entrants with no history in a given 
fishery to gain access to them. Once closed, registries are difficult to update. Moratoria 
are, in principle, a short-term instrument that should evolve into formal limited-entry 
systems with specified entry/exit rules, one of the forms of “non-quantitative access 
rights” identified by Charles (2009, his Figure 10.1). In practice, closed registries tend 
to become frozen, which results in a distortive informal market for the privileges of 
registered but inactive fishers. The third case considered here (the Chilean Juliana clam 
fishery, Case 3) is unusual in that it started as a regulated fishery under a special formal 
regime (“Research Fishery”) and peculiar circumstances (enrolment of local fishers). 
TABLE 4
Case 3: Juliana clam fishery (Chile)
Main attributes of the access regime
How the rights are conferred and upheld Fishers must be registered in a species-specific regionalized Artisanal Fisheries 
Registry, which was closed in 2011. Until 2011, the fishery operated as a 
Research Fishery. In order to participate, each extractive unit (fishers and 
boat) had to enrol with a private consultant firm in charge of monitoring the 
fishing operations.
Exclusivity of participation in the fishery Under the Research Fishery, only local fishers had access to fishing. 
Duration of the rights conferred Enrolment in the Research Fishery was annual.
Security or quality of the title conferred 
by the rights
Suspension of the Research Fishery and declaration of the fishery as “fully 
exploited” in 2011 opened legal access to all fishers registered for Juliana in 
the Artisanal Fisheries Registry. 
Transferability of the rights Privileges are non-transferable.
Divisibility of the rights assigned NA
Flexibility in the use of the rights There is a monthly limit of extraction in addition to the global total 
allowable catch (TAC).
Enforceability of rights and compliance 
with use-rights limitations
Good enforceability.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Hookah diving. Boats from 9 m to 15 m long, with 40–220 hp motors; can 
operate with 1–5 divers.
When fishing is authorized to take place All year round.
Harvest controls Annual TACs are established as a fraction (15–20 percent) of annual estimates 
of exploitable abundance obtained from a direct survey of fishing grounds. 
Minimum size limit is 27 mm. 
Monitoring Skippers required to complete a logbook, including information about the 
crew, size and origin of catches, and diving effort. Landings are monitored 
through a port-sampling programme conducted by a private consultant firm. 
A direct survey of fishing grounds is conducted annually with participation of 
the commercial fleet. 
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Paradoxically, formalizing limited entry under the provisions of an inflexible piece 
of legislation threatened the sustainability of the fishery by expanding the number of 
prospective legal entrants.
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CASE 4: THE SAN JOSÉ GULF SCALLOP DIVING FISHERY (ARGENTINA)
A commercial diving fishery targeting mostly scallops (Aequipecten tehuelchus) 
developed in San José Gulf (Chubut Province, Argentina) in the 1970s (Orensanz et 
al., 2007). The San José Gulf is an oval-shaped basin (817 km2) with a mean depth of 
30 m, connected to the larger San Matías Gulf through a narrow mouth (Figure 3:A) 
(Amoroso et al., 2010). The fishery takes place within an ecologically sensitive area 
of special significance for conservation. The San José Gulf was declared a provincial 
marine park in 1974 and since 2001 it has been part of the Natural Protected Area 
Península Valdés, which comprises the whole peninsula and neighbouring coastal 
areas. The region was declared a Natural World Heritage Area by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1999. 
The fleet consists of 21  fibreglass boats, 8–10  m long , equipped with outboard 
or inboard motors, compressors and hookah; most operate with two divers. Boats 
are launched from sandy beaches with the help of tractors (Figure 3:G). The fishery 
involves about 80  people directly (crew members, boat owners, tractor drivers) and 
≈150 people indirectly in processing plants. 
The harvest of tehuelche scallops started as a boom-and-bust dredge fishery in the 
San Matías Gulf in late 1960s (Orensanz, Pascual and Fernández, 1991; Ciocco et al., 
2005), to supply a demand created by a decline in scallop landings from the Georges 
Bank, Canada (Caddy and Lord, 1971). After four years of intensive dredging (1969–
1972), which unselectively removed scallops as well as the top shelly substrate on 
which spat settle, the fishery collapsed. A decade of virtually no recruitment followed. 
The San José Gulf suddenly became attractive for commercial dredging. The fisheries 
administration of Chubut Province, fearing that the story of the adjacent Río Negro 
Province would repeat itself in Chubut, banned dredging in San José Gulf for two years 
(1974–75) out of concerns about the impact of dredging on the grounds. Commercial 
diving was developed as an economically viable alternative in 1976 (Figure 3:F), and 
dredging has been effectively banned ever since (Orensanz et al., 2007). Although 
scallops have historically been the backbone of the fishery, other resources (mainly 
mussels and clams) have played an important complementary role allowing continuity 
and diversification of fishing activities. 
The scallop diving fishery operated with minimum regulations (a size limit and a 
fishing season) for 20 years. The fleet expanded (to about 40 boats, many unlicensed) 
in the mid-1990s under a licence system that did not put a cap on effort (Figure 3:E) 
(Orensanz et al., 2007). The fishery collapsed in 1995, and remained closed for three 
years (Figure  3:D). After reopening in 1999, the provincial fisheries administration 
created a technical advisory committee with representation of the local fishers’ 
organization (Asociación de Pescadores Artesanales de Puerto Madryn [APAPM]), 
scientists from a federal institute (Centro Nacional Patagónico [CENPAT]), and staff 
from three government branches: fisheries, tourism and protected areas. The committee 
recommended the implementation of a limited-entry programme that privileged fishers 
with a history of participation in the fishery. A de facto moratorium has been in place 
since 2001, capping the number of boat permits at 21 (Figure 3:E and Table 5).
Permits are annual, renewable, non-transferable, and vested on boat owners. They 
grant exclusive privileges for extraction of molluscs by commercial diving within 
the gulf, where industrial fishing is not allowed. Each permit holder can own and 
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operate only one boat; the permit holders recruit their teams from a pool of divers 
and deck-hands who do not hold a permit. A provincial registry of artisanal fishers 
has been established to document participation of all crew members. Scallop harvests 
are currently regulated through a TAC, a minimum legal size (60 mm) and a season. 
Scallop surveys (Figure 3:A) are conducted annually with participation of fleet units, 
scientists and technical staff from the provincial fisheries administration. Results are 
discussed in joint meetings, and an annual TAC is agreed upon, which is divided up in 
equal shares among permit holders. While quota shares are formally non-transferable, 
in practice they are leased under a variety of ad hoc arrangements. The harvest of other 
resources (clams, mussels, snails, etc.) is virtually unregulated. 
FIGURE 3
San José Gulf fisheries, Argentine Patagonia
Notes: (A) San José Gulf, showing the transects used in annual scallop surveys. (B) Detail of 
the El Riacho tidal flats, showing the location of intertidal mussel beds. (C) One of the vehicles 
used to collect the catch from the flats. (D) Scallop landings from the diving fishery, 1970–
2011. (E) Number of boats participating in the scallop fishery. (F) Commercial diver harvesting 
scallops. (G) Fishing unit, including the tractor used to manoeuvre the boat on the beach.
Sources: (B) Santa Ana (2004); (C) L. Loto; (F) J. Signorelli; (G) P. Oroquieta.
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A new comprehensive management plan was drafted based on input received from 
a series of meetings between managers, fishers and technical advisors. The plan was 
legally adopted at the end of 2011 and is yet to be implemented. Among the most 
controversial aspects during the drafting of the plan were the exit/entry rules of the 
limited-entry programme. Although the provincial Artisanal Fisheries Law passed in 
2001 requires permit holders to be active fishers, this regulation was never enforced. 
This has been a source of conflict because, while some permit holders are inactive, some 
long-term divers who regularly participate in the fishery have been denied permits. The 
conditions to grant or deny permit renewals and to re-assign permits were established 
in the new plan. Recording of violations and documenting active participation of permit 
holders and crew members are still unresolved aspects in terms of implementation. 
Some novel mechanisms for involving peers in the documentation of participation by 
fishers were suggested. Weak enforcement of quotas and legitimacy of permit holders 
have been the most persistent problems in the management of the fishery.
TABLE 5
Case 4: San José Gulf scallop diving fishery (Argentina)
Main attributes of the 
access regime
How the rights are 
conferred and upheld
Permits are granted to boat owners who receive an equal share of the scallop total allowable 
catch (TAC). The fishery is subject to limited entry (21 permits); entry/exist rules have recently 
been formalized. Permit holders must be registered, active fishers (physically onboard), 
with at least three years of residence in the province, and comply with administrative 
requirements (e.g. tributary, maritime authorizations). Each permit holder can operate 
only one boat and hold only one commercial diving permit. The permit holders can hold 
permits for other small-scale fisheries (beach seining, coastal gathering) but not for industrial 
fisheries. Crew members (other than permit holders) are registered but do not have access 
rights. Non-renewed permits can only be reassigned to active registered fishers, selected by 
history of participation in the fishery. Declared heirs have priority in case of death. 
Exclusivity of participation 
in the fishery
Permit holders have exclusive rights for commercial diving for scallops and other molluscs 
in the San José Gulf. Diving and coastal gathering are the only methods permitted for 
harvesting molluscs; no industrial fishing is allowed within the gulf.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Permits are annual, renewable, and contingent on: infraction records; boats must have fished 
during the preceding season; permit holders must have participated in fishing and fulfilled 
their scallop quotas. Long-term (> 10 years) fishers do not need to be onboard but must 
provide logistic support to their boat and fishing team.
Security or quality of the 
title conferred by the 
rights
Provincial legislation defines artisanal permits as “precarious” (i.e. they can be revoked). 
However, a de facto limited entry effective since 2001 and legally adopted in late 2011 
protects fishers with an extended history of participation in the fishery.
Transferability of the 
rights
Permits are non-transferable, nor are their associated scallop quotas. There is informal 
trading of quota and use of licensed boats.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Fishing benefits are shared among crew members: divers receive 30–35 percent of the 
earnings from their own catch; assistants receive 12–15 percent of the total; the rest goes to 
the boat owner who bears operational and maintenance costs.
Flexibility in the use of 
the rights
Permits are multispecific. Boat owners can decide when to take their scallop quota, and how 
many divers to use in their team. 
Enforceability of rights 
and compliance with use-
rights limitations
Enforcement of quotas is feasible because the catch is transported to processing plants in 
urban centres, going through a control post at the narrow isthmus of Península Valdés. 
However, legal constraints, lack of coordination between agencies, and a weak judiciary 
system make enforcement ineffective. The requirement that permit holders must be active 
has not been enforced. 
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Fibreglass boats, 8–10 m long, equipped with outboard or inboard motors, compressors and 
hookah; most operate with two divers. Boats are launched from sandy beaches with the help 
of tractors.
When fishing is 
authorized to take place
Scallop fishing season from March to 15 December; extraction of other species restricted by 
red tide closures. 
Harvest controls Scallop harvest regulated through a TAC, legal size limit (60 mm) and season. The harvest of 
other resources (clams, mussels, snails, etc.) is virtually unregulated.
Monitoring Annual scallop surveys are funded by the fisheries authority and conducted with 
participation of the artisanal fleet and scientists from a research institute (Centro Nacional 
Patagónico [CENPAT]). Results are discussed in joint meetings with stakeholders, and a TAC 
is agreed based on a variable fraction of the estimated legal-size biomass. Monitoring of the 
fishery is planned but not yet implemented. 
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CASE 5: THE CHILEAN “BENTHIC EXTRACTIVE REGIME”
Perhaps the most significant case of a catch-share system in Latin American small-
scale fisheries is the Benthic Extraction Regime (REB for the Spanish term Régimen de 
Extracción Bentónica), contemplated in the Chilean legislation. Implementation of the 
REB was prompted by an overfishing crisis in the loco snail (Concholepas concholepas) 
fishery (see Case 7), historically the most important benthic shellfishery in the country 
(Stotz, 1997; Castilla et al., 1998). The REB, applied in the case of resources designated 
as fully exploited, was expected to solve the problems created by open access 
(Bernal et al., 1999). It consisted of regional TACs, split into individual non-
transferable quotas among registered divers. In 1993, following a three-year closure, 
the loco fishery was re-opened under the REB and a registration moratorium. The 
TACs were established on the basis of an analytical size-based stock assessment. 
Difficulties with enforcement and uncontrolled harvest rates led to a new crisis – by 
1998 loco abundance in some of the main traditional grounds was at a historical low 
(González et al., 2006). In retrospect, the system is viewed as a failure (Bacigalupo, 
2000; Orensanz et al., 2005).
In 1999, managers considered bringing the sea urchin fishery of south Chile 
(see Case  2) under the REB regime. A size-based model similar to that developed 
for loco snail was used to assess total regional abundance of sea urchin, using size 
composition data of the landings. Lacking spatial structure, the model could not 
capture the spatial dynamics of the stock and the fleet, nor the size/shape plasticity 
of sea urchins. Aware of these limitations, scientists abandoned the model-based 
assessments in 2001. The REB was never implemented.
CASE 6: THE PATAGONIAN SCALLOP INDUSTRIAL FISHERY (ARGENTINA)
Patagonian scallop (Zygochlamys patagonica) stocks have been targeted by an 
industrial fishery in the Argentine sector of the southwestern Atlantic shelf since 
1996 (Figure 4:A), following an experimental fishery conducted in 1995 (Ciocco et al., 
2005). Main fishing grounds are distributed offshore (90–120  m depth; Figure  4:B), 
coincidentally with a shelf-break frontal system (Bogazzi et al., 2005). The fleet is 
composed of four factory vessels (Figure  4:C) belonging to two fishing companies 
(Table  6). Gear consists of twin otter trawls (Figure  4:D). Annual catch reached 
80 000 tonnes in 2006 and 2008 (Figure 4:E; conventional conversion factor between 
meats and live weight is 7.14; CFP, 2009), making this one of the largest scallop fisheries 
in the world (Ciocco et al., 2005; Pottinger et al., 2007). Virtually all the production 
is exported to Canada, the United States of America and the European Union 
(Member Organization).
A resolution from the fisheries authority (CFP, 2008) provided a provisory 
regulatory framework for the management of the fishery, for which there is no formal 
management plan. An ad hoc advisory committee is integrated by two members of 
the fisheries authority, two from the National Institute for Fisheries Research and 
Development (INIDEP), and two from the industry (one from each company). There 
are 14  management units, with extensions ranging from 2  500  km2 to 29  000  km2 
(Figure  4:A), but not all are opened every year. An annual TAC for each opened 
unit is calculated on the basis of a dredge survey conducted by INIDEP. The TAC 
is set at 40 percent of the minimum confidence limit for the stock biomass estimate, 
although the fisheries authority raised that fraction to 50 percent in 2009–2010. Catch 
eventually obtained outside the management units does not count towards the TAC or 
the quotas. Each vessel is allocated almost 20 percent of the TAC and the State retains 
a 20 percent “reserve” quota, which has been occasionally allocated to the industry. 
Quotas are only transferable among the four participating vessels, within or between 
fishing companies, upon payment of a fee. So far, transfers have taken place only within 
Catch shares 21
FIGURE 4
Patagonian scallop industrial fishery, Argentina
Notes: (A) Southwestern Atlantic, with indication of management units (predios 1.1-
13); ZCP-AU: common fishing zone shared by Argentina and Uruguay. (B) Fishing beds 
identified by means of spatial statistical analysis of fishing intensity. (C) Fishing vessel. 
(D) Pictorial representation of fishing gear. (E) Annual landings (tonnes of frozen meats); 
the figure for 2002 includes 20 300 tonnes of tehuelche scallop. 
Sources: (A) and (E) based on data from Consejo Federal Pesquero (Argentina); (B)–(D) 
from Bogazzi (2008)
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companies. Licences are due to expire in 2014, but in the absence of a management plan 
there are no criteria established for renewal or re-assignment.
Licences are granted exclusively for the Patagonian scallop, but in 2002 the fisheries 
authority promoted the harvest of newly discovered grounds of tehuelche scallop 
(Aequipecten tehuelchus) north of 40 °S, a resource targeted further south by an inshore 
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fishery in northern Patagonia (see Case 4) (Pottinger et al., 2007; Bogazzi, 2008). The 
volume harvested that year by the industrial fleet (20 300 tonnes) was commensurate 
with the cumulative catch of the artisanal fleet over three decades; the grounds targeted 
were wiped out in one year.
The fishery was certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) in November 
2006 (Pottinger et al., 2007). It was the first industrial fishery from a developing 
country to be certified. The last surveillance report (Morsan et al., 2010) concluded that 
“no significant issues which could affect the sustainability and conduct of the fishery 
that require further investigation were identified”. Yet five years after being certified 
the fishery is still managed through executive resolutions. Collateral ecological effects 
pose serious questions (Orensanz, Bogazzi and Parma, 2008). According to Morsan, 
Barón and Gavensky (2010, p.  8), scientists familiar with the fishery indicated that 
“as high density beds have already been fished, and the bed boundaries have become 
diffuse, captains have started to request information to researchers on where to find 
high density spots”. This appears to indicate that the “rotational strategy” envisioned 
when the fishery was certified (Pottinger et al., 2007) has evolved into serial depletion. 
Those issues raise serious concerns regarding the three principles upon which the MSC 
certification is based. The certification of this fishery is interesting in the sense that it 
constitutes a test of institutional conditions required for the success of the certification 
process.
TABLE 6 
Case 6: Patagonian scallop industrial fishery (Argentina)
Main attributes of the access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
Access privileges are vested on four industrial vessels owned by two fishing companies. 
About 20 percent of the TAC is allocated to each vessel. The State retains the remaining 
15–20 percent as a safeguard, which in some years has been allocated to the fleet.
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
Exclusive for the four participating vessels.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Licences, initially granted for 10 years and renewed for 5 more years in 2009.
Security or quality of the 
title conferred by the rights
Have been highly secure so far. It is not clear what criteria or mechanism will be used for 
the renewal or re-assignment of licences after 2014.
Transferability of the rights Transferable among vessels with permits. So far, quota has been transferred only 
between vessels belonging to the same company. 
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Quota is divisible.
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
The licences are not valid for other resources. 
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations 
Fully enforced. Daily catch reports and vessel monitoring system (VMS). Virtually all the 
production is exported, which makes it traceable.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Vessels, 48–58 m long, operate with two bottom otter trawls and are equipped with 
onboard processing plants that produce frozen meats in blocks or individually quick 
frozen (IQF). Most of the catch is landed in Mar del Plata and Ushuaia, occasionally in 
Puerto Madryn. Each vessel completes 7–14 trips per year, with a duration of 20–50 days 
each. Normally, the vessels complete 40–60 hauls per day, with an average duration 
of 15.6 minutes (average distance of 1.9 km). Crews are composed of 30–34 persons, 
including 15–17 processing plant personnel (2–3 shifts per day).
When fishing is authorized 
to take place
Fishing activities run around the clock, all year long. 
Harvest controls Minimum legal size (55 mm shell height). TAC established for each of 14 management 
units at 40 percent of the lower confidence bound of its estimated commercial biomass, 
except for temporarily closed units. Fourteen “reproductive reserves” (about 4 percent 
of grounds), one per management unit. The proportion of juveniles cannot exceed 
50 percent in order to open a management unit. 
Monitoring Onboard observers (partial), VMS, daily reporting by the skipper. Annual surveys of 
scallop grounds conducted using the commercial vessels. Companies are required to 
contribute 20 days of each vessel to conduct the survey, and to cover all survey costs.
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CATCH SHARES – RECAP
Inflated and outdated registries (discussed above) and poor enforcement have frustrated 
the effective implementation of systems based on catch shares granted to individual 
fishers, particularly when the number of participants is high (Case 5). These problems 
led to the failure of a brief experiment with ITQs in the sea cucumber fishery of the 
Galapagos Islands in 2001 (Murillo et al., 2002; Toral-Granda, 2008). Illegal trading of 
individual quota by illegitimate registrants during the implementation of the Chilean 
REB (Case  5), often used to launder illegal catches, was one of the reasons for the 
abandonment of the system (Bacigalupo, 2000; Orensanz et al., 2005). Catch shares 
have fared better in cases where there are a small number of participants, whether 
the shares are granted to artisanal boat owners (Case 4), industrial vessels, or coastal 
gatherers. The latter are well exemplified by a small community of shellfish gatherers 
established in San José Gulf (Argentine Patagonia; Figure  3:A–B) and digging for 
yellow clams (Mesodesma mactroides) in Uruguay.
In limited-entry systems (with or without catch shares) where the fishing units 
are small boats (typical of commercial diving, Cases  1–4), whether access privileges 
are vested on individual fishers or boats has significant implications for management. 
The dynamics (entry, mobility, ageing, attrition and exit) of fishers and boats are 
very different. Fishers are generally more transient than boats, and often move across 
jurisdictional boundaries, particularly when fishing is one among other components of 
their livelihoods (often the case in artisanal fisheries). 
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4. Territorial use privileges – sea 
bed tracts
CASE 7: CHILEAN AMERBS
In contrast to other systems of marine territorial use rights in fisheries 
(TURF) that evolved gradually from customary tenure (Johannes, 1978; 
Christy, 2000), the Chilean system was established de novo by legislation. Historically, 
commercial diving for benthic resources developed as open access, regulated only 
by size limits and seasonal closures on some species. Until the mid-1970s, catches 
of the loco snail were sustained at less than 5  000  tonnes. A surge in international 
demand (Schurman, 1996) led to a rapid expansion of the fishery, with catches 
soaring to more than 20  000  tonnes in 1980. A drop in catch rates precipitated 
a crisis, and the fishery was closed in the entire country between 1989 and 1992 
(Figure  5:G), leaving behind a legacy of economic hardship and social unrest 
(Aviléz and Jerez, 1999). The first attempt to address the consequences of open 
access was the introduction of a licence moratorium and individual diver quotas 
in 1993 (the REB regime described above, Case  5). The Chilean legislation passed 
in 1991 also contemplated TURFs, known as AMERBs (after the Spanish term 
Areas de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos), for the management of 
artisanal fisheries, but the regulatory framework for their implementation had not 
been established. AMERBs had wide support from the fishing sector, after some 
pilot experiments conducted by fishers of some well-organized “caletas” (coastal 
locations that serve as operational bases for the local artisanal fleets), sometimes in 
partnership with scientists, showed fast recovery of depleted resources after protection 
(Castilla et al., 1998; González et al., 2006).
The precipitous failure of the loco quota system urged fisheries managers to confront 
a daunting challenge: to design a process for the implementation of TURFs where 
they had not been established by tradition. The move required replacing a system of 
individual quotas, which at the time involved more than 10  000  registered divers 
authorized to operate, with one that granted fishers organizations exclusive privileges 
to harvest benthic shellfish resources from tracts of seabed (Figure 5:C–D). The fact 
that the introduction of AMERBs was precipitated by a series of crises resulting 
from a failure to control harvest rates conditioned the design of the implementation 
process. Priority was given to the achievement of biological sustainability (San Martín, 
Parma and Orensanz, 2010), and managers were reluctant to devolve management 
responsibility to the fishers organizations. The result is a very administratively 
involved process, highly demanding in terms of the biological information that 
organizations have to provide in order to request a TURF (including a detailed baseline 
survey of the area and a harvesting plan). The regulations require that professional 
consultants be hired to coordinate the baseline study (Table 7) and the annual surveys 
conducted to determine a TAC for each target resource (Orensanz and Parma, 2010). 
The consultant has to prepare a report including estimates of abundance of the target 
species, past catches, and a harvest plan for the year, which needs to be approved by the 
fisheries authority. Other non-biological aspects related to who should receive access 
privileges were left unattended; TURFs were granted on a “first-come, first-served” 
basis provided there were not overlapping claims and no conflicts with alternative 
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uses of the territory (San Martín, Parma and Orensanz, 2010). This allocation system 
was not too problematic in central and northern Chile, where the overlap of fishing 
territories between neighbouring caletas prior to the advent of AMERBs was relatively 
small (an example from Region  IV is shown in Figure  5:B), but led to conflicts in 
other situations. In Ancud Bay (Region X) AMERBs were granted on fishing grounds 
frequented by thousands of fishers living in the city of Ancud (Chevalier, Tapia and 
Buckles, 2007). A protracted conflict resulted in some organizations renouncing their 
granted AMERBs. 
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FIGURE 5
AMERBs, Chile
Notes: (A) Chile, with indication of the north, central and south sectors of the coast; region 
boundaries as defined in the 1990s, when individual quotas (REB regime) and AMERBs were 
implemented. (B) Region IV, sector of Los Vilos: allocation of fishing effort during the REB regime 
(pre-AMERBs, 1993–97); left: spread of fishing trips originating in five caletas, right: spread of 
fishing intensity corresponding to the same caletas (identified by colour). (C) AMERBs in the area 
of Concepción (Region VIII). (D) Sign posted at the Polocué AMERB (Chiloé Island, Region X), 
indicating exclusive access privileges of the syndicate. (E) Landing of loco for a pre-arranged sale 
at Polocué, May 2004. (F) Frequency distribution of the extension of active AMERBs. (G) Landings 
of loco snails (sectors of the coast as in A), with indication of successive management regimes: 
open access, closure (C), individual quotas (IQ) and AMERBs (TURFs).
Sources: (B) modified from González et al. (2006); (F) data from SUBPESCA.
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The transition from individual quotas to AMERBs was rapid. The two regimes 
coexisted in only one year (1999), after which harvesting of loco outside the 
AMERBs was banned (González et al., 2006). After five years, more than 500 tracts 
(most of less than 250  ha) had been designated as AMERBs, 400  of them had a 
baseline study completed and 224  had an approved management plan (San Martín, 
Parma and Orensanz, 2010). In 2011, there were 769  sectors designated as suitable 
for AMERBs, 520 of which had been assigned to an organization (75 533 ha). Almost 
340 organizations involving about 23 000 people have been assigned at least one sector 
(from one to four), and as many more organizations are requesting AMERBs. Most 
AMERBs have loco as a primary target, complemented by other species (e.g. limpets, 
sea urchin, and crabs). The combined area held by each organization is highly variable, 
but in the case of AMERBs having loco as a primary resource it is usually less than 
400 ha, with an average of 243 ha per organization (SD = 480) (Figure 5:F).
TABLE 7
Case 7: Chilean AMERBs
Main attributes of the 
access regime
How the rights are 
conferred and upheld
AMERBs are granted to formal organizations of fishers (syndicates, associations or 
cooperatives). The designation of a tract as a possible AMERB is first consulted with 
various government institutions (regional fisheries councils, maritime authority, etc.). Once 
approved, the requesting organization has to conduct an ecological baseline study with 
help from a consultant. If two or more organizations request the same tract, priority is 
decided on the basis of number of members and distance from the community. Members 
have to be enrolled in a registry for any of the available resources (seaweeds, molluscs, 
crustaceans or fishes) and categories of activities (diver, diver’s assistant, finfish fisher, 
rower, or coastal gatherer). At the local level, entry to fishers organizations is controlled by 
the fishers themselves, according to rules established by each organization.
Exclusivity of participation 
in the fishery
Exclusive-use privileges are granted for specified resources within the AMERB. Although in 
principle other species can be harvested by outside fishers, outsiders are excluded de facto 
from the AMERBs for any type of activity. 
Duration of the rights 
conferred
AMERBs are initially granted for four years and are renewable. An annual fee is required 
after the first renewal. 
Security or quality of the 
title conferred by the 
rights
Grants can be revoked owing to non-compliance with the approved management plan or 
for not paying the required annual fee.
Transferability of the 
rights
Non-transferable.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Membership, participation in the harvest and other activities (maintenance, vigilance, 
etc.) and distribution of benefits are arranged by the fishers within their organizations, 
according to well-established rules. The latter vary among organizations. 
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
An annual harvest plan including a total allowable catch (TAC) has to be approved by the 
fisheries authority.
Enforceability of rights 
and compliance with use-
rights limitations
Fishers patrol their AMERBs, often around the clock, to deter poachers; physical 
confrontations with intruders are frequent. The maritime authority has been generally 
slow to react to reports of violations. Violations are reported by the “alcalde de mar”, 
a community member designated by the maritime authority who keeps track of fishing 
activities. Internal rules are usually strictly enforced and penalties can be significant (up to 
termination of membership). Generally, harvests are conducted on designated dates, with 
participation of all the members, which reduces non-compliance. 
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Most resources are extracted by hookah diving, using wooden boats 8–9 m long; each 
team is composed of 2–4 members. Coastal gathering, hand-picking of beach clams or crab 
trapping are also practised in some cases. No dredging or trawling is allowed along the 
entire coast of Chile (5 miles from shore); the ban is respected and supported by fishers.
When fishing is 
authorized to take place
Most resources have closed reproductive seasons. The timing of loco closures varies among 
regions. Keyhole limpets do not have a seasonal closure. In both cases, harvests are 
concentrated in a few days, pre-arranged with the buyers. Macha clams and scallops are 
harvested over longer periods (4–7 months), depending on weather conditions and demand.
Harvest controls An annual harvest plan is prepared by a hired consultant and approved by the national 
fisheries authority. The plan specifies a TAC for each of the target species. Size limits are 
established by the fisheries authority. 
Monitoring TACs are established based stock abundance, estimated by consultants based on diving 
surveys conducted by the fishers. A report of catches, prices and stock assessments is 
presented to the fishery authority as a requirement for the granting of the TAC.
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More than a decade after the inception of TURFs, a mixed record emerges. On 
some accounts, the system has been successful (Aviléz and Jerez, 1999; Cereceda 
and Czischke, 2001; Agüero, 2004; Defeo and Castilla, 2005). Loco abundance 
recovered within many of the tracts, leading to increased public and private benefits 
(González et al., 2006; Grafton et al., 2008). Management moved away from a reactive 
mode prompted by the recurrent crises that punctuated the history of the loco fishery. 
Fishers organizations have developed internal rules to control membership, and to 
divide the work and the profits extracted from coordinated fishing and pooled loco 
sales (Figure  5:E) (Cancino, Uchida and Wilen, 2007; Orensanz and Parma, 2010). 
However, the degree of success in achieving biological sustainability has been uneven 
(Techeira, 2012), and problems are surfacing related to broader economic and social 
management objectives (SERNAPESCA, 2005; Cinti, 2006; González et al., 2006; 
Castilla, Gelcich and Defeo, 2007; Gelcich et al., 2010; San Martín, Parma and 
Orensanz, 2010).
FIGURE 6
Macha clam fishery, Chile
Notes: (A) “Taloneras” gathering clams in the surf zone, Coquimbo Bay. (B) Commercial 
divers, Coquimbo Bay. (C) Chile, showing historical registration regions. (D) Recorded catch of 
macha clams, 1960–2011, by regions (colours as in C). 
Photo credit: J. Rodríguez.
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Experience gained from the implementation of AMERBs oriented to loco harvesting 
is not necessarily applicable to every other benthic resource. Loco is very productive, 
tends to respond rapidly to protection (partly owing to immigration from adjacent 
areas), and is relatively long-lived, which buffers interannual variability in recruitment. 
All these attributes contribute to justify investment by fishers in protecting and 
managing AMERBs where loco is the target species. Other resources appear to be 
less suited to local management. The macha clam (Mesodesma donacium) is a case in 
point. Macha is harvested in shallow subtidal waters along extensive sandy beaches 
by divers, “orilleros” and “taloneras” (Figure  6:A–B). The latter, mostly women, 
probe the substrate for the presence of macha using their heels (“talones”). Historical 
landing statistics by region indicate a highly variable resource at the local scale; catches 
tend to fluctuate out of synchrony in neighbouring regions (e.g. Regions  IV and V) 
(Figure 6:C–D). Some precipitous drops in landings can be associated with episodes 
of massive mortality caused by flooding following major El Niño events (Aburto 
and Stotz, 2013). Historically, macha fishers were nomadic, moving up and down the 
Chilean coast while tracking pulses of macha productivity (Aburto, Thiel and Stotz, 
2009). This behaviour, which buffered spatial variability, is incompatible with the 
AMERB regime, as well as with a regionalized registration policy that locks fishers into 
a single region. Most AMERBs that had macha as a target resource did not perform 
well. Out of 14 AMERBS that had completed a baseline study, only 3 remained active 
by 2009 with abundance of macha recovering. The rest were abandoned either because 
the stocks did not recover or they were depleted after a few years of exploitation.
CASE 8: CONCESSIONS FROM CENTRAL BAJA CALIFORNIA (MEXICO)
From the 1930s and up until 1992, Mexican fishers cooperatives had exclusive privileges 
to harvest the most valuable commercial benthic resources (lobster, abalone, shrimp, 
oysters, etc.) within delimited territories (Vega et al., 1997). In 1992, a legislative 
reform allowed the private sector access to these fisheries (Bourillón-Moreno, 2002). 
Under the current regime, territorial concessions can be granted to juridical or natural 
persons by the national fisheries authority (Table 8; DOF, 2007a). They last 20 years, 
and are renewable upon compliance with requirements and conditioned on evidence 
of continued productivity of the target species. Grantees are required to conduct 
annual assessments of resource abundance, to keep logbooks, and to present an annual 
harvest plan and reports of fishing activities inside the concession. A concession grants 
exclusive access and use privileges to certain species within a specified geographic area. 
Those privileges do not extend to other species, which can be harvested by outside 
fishers.
Territorial concessions held by fishing cooperatives on the Pacific coast of 
central Baja California target lobsters (Panulirus interruptus) (the primary resource), 
abalone (Haliotis spp.), turban snail (Megastraea undosa) and sea cucumber 
(Parastichopus parvimensis). The area extends from Cedros Island in Baja California 
State through Punta Abreojos in Baja California Sur State, including Guadalupe 
Island, about 250 km off the coast of Baja California (Figure 7:A–B). Ten cooperatives 
operate in the area, involving 1 174 members and 232 boats in total (Figure 7:D; Sosa-
Nishizaki, Lluch-Belda and Daume, 2011). Each cooperative is granted one concession 
located in the vicinity of a fishing community (the exception is one cooperative 
incorporated to the Federación de Cooperativas Pesqueras [FEDECOOP] in 2010). 
The concessions are clearly delimited, have an extension of the order of 500–1 000 km2, 
and are spatially contiguous (Figure  7:B) (McCay, Weisman and Creed, 2011). The 
cooperatives are grouped into a federation, founded in the 1940s (FEDECOOP, www.
fedecoop.com.mx/), which provides technical and marketing support to its members. 
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These cooperatives operate in an area of exceptional value for conservation; most of 
the fishing grounds fall inside two protected areas, the Vizcaino Biosphere Reserve 
(created in 1988) and the Guadalupe Island Biosphere Reserve (created in 2005). The 
large Vizcaino Reserve includes over 6.5 million acres (about 2.6 million ha) of islands 
and mainland and a 5 km coastal strip on both sides of Baja California (Figure 7:C), 
aimed at protecting the migratory route of grey whales and fishery resources (INE, 
2000). The Guadalupe Island Reserve is rich in species of marine mammals and birds, 
and also an important refuge for white sharks (CONANP, 2007).
FEDECOOP and its member cooperatives are politically influential and effective 
organizations, among the most successful in the country with regard to the sustainable 
use of their fishery resources. Cooperatives supply about 80  percent of the lobster 
catch in the Baja California peninsula. Landings have trended upwards in the last 
four decades, albeit with interannual variation owing to El Niño/La Niña events 
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FIGURE 7
Concessions from central Baja California, Mexico
Notes: (A) Baja California, showing the four lobster management zones (A–D) and the regions 
where concessions to cooperatives grouped in FEDECOOP are located. (B) Boundaries of the nine 
concessions under FEDECOOP. (C) Zoning of the El Vizcaíno Biosphere Reserve; shading indicates 
categories: core (dark), buffer (intermediate) and world heritage (light). (D) Number of fishers, 
boats and lobster traps in each cooperative. (E) Catch and effort, 1960–2009.
Sources: (A) and (E) after Vega et al. (2010); (C) after CONANP; (D) after Sosa-Nishizaki, Lluch-
Belda and Daume (2011).
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(Figure 7:E) (Vega et al., 2010). The cooperatives and the fisheries authority comanage 
the fishery, and collaborate in monitoring and enforcement. Although participation 
has only recently been formally required, the cooperatives have a long history of 
collaboration with various institutions (academic, governmental, NGOs) to coproduce 
information relevant for management (Ponce-Díaz, Weisman and McCay, 2009). 
In the case of lobster, fishers participate in a technical committee instituted by the 
Instituto Nacional de Pesca (INAPESCA) in 1988 (Comité Técnico Consultivo de la 
Pesquería de Langosta del Pacífico) (Ponce-Díaz et al., 2009), where assessment results 
and management recommendations (including harvest levels) are discussed before 
submision to the fisheries authority for approval. The fishery is primarily regulated 
through effort controls, attending to recent harvest history, stock size, and biological 
and economic indicators (Sosa-Nishizaki, Lluch-Belda and Daume, 2011). Workshops 
define monitoring protocols for the upcoming season, and each cooperative defines 
an annual harvest plan, which has to be approved by the Comisión Nacional de Pesca 
(CONAPESCA). In addition, there is a state-level subcommittee (Subcomité Estatal 
TABLE 8
Case 8: Concessions from central Baja California (Mexico)
Main attributes of the access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
Concessions can be granted to juridical or natural persons by the national fisheries 
authority. Each cooperative is granted one territorial concession (located in the vicinity 
of a fishing community). Cooperatives are grouped into a federation (Federación de 
Cooperativas Pesqueras [FEDECOOP]), which are politically influential and effective 
organizations.
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
Access and use privileges are exclusive to certain species within concessions. Other 
species can be harvested by outside fishers.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
20 years; renewable.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
The duration of the privilege makes it highly secure. Renewal is conditioned on evidence 
of continued productivity of the target species and compliance with requirements, 
including payment of a fee, participation in monitoring, support to authorities for 
inspection and vigilance, and re-stocking of some species (e.g. hatchery production of 
abalone seed).
Transferability of the rights Non-transferable.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Decisions on who is allowed to harvest and how benefits are distributed among 
participants are left to title holders. Cooperatives from central Baja California have 
significant autonomy for internal administration and enforcement, and have developed 
their own rules in addition to those imposed by the authority. As an example, whereas 
the government establishes the maximum number of lobster traps to be employed in 
each concession, the cooperatives decide how traps are allocated among members and 
where they are deployed.
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
High, conditioned on compliance with the annual harvest plan and regulations. 
Cooperatives develop their own internal agreements to harvest, distribute benefits and 
afford costs.
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations
The cooperatives have demonstrated an outstanding capacity for enforcing internal rules 
and for preventing poaching by outsiders. 
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Fibreglass boats, 8–9 m long with outboard motors (40–115 hp), operated by 2–3 people. 
Navigation devices (GPS, Sonda) are utilized. Traps for lobster; hookah diving for 
abalone and sea urchin. 
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
Lobster fishing season of variable duration. Since 1993, closures of management zones 
have been “stepped” in line with latitudinal variation in the reproductive season. 
FEDECOOP has agreed to close the fishery when 10 percent of the females in the catch 
have attached spermatophores, regardless of the formal date of closure established for 
the zone.
Harvest controls Regulations imposed by the fisheries authority and local rules limit the number of boats 
and traps. Lobsters have a minimum legal size (82.5 mm of cephalothoracic length), and 
catching of egg-bearing females is prohibited. Fishers and the authorities have agreed 
on the mandatory use of escape windows and biodegradable fasteners on traps. 
Monitoring Cooperatives and the fisheries authority collaborate in several monitoring programmes: 
(i) logbook programme (daily catch and effort); (ii) monthly samples of size and sex 
structure of the catch; (iii) monitoring the reproductive stage of lobster during closures. 
Market prices are monitored throughout the fishing season in order to assess the 
economic feasibility of operations.
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de Langosta de Baja California Sur, in place since 2003) with representation of lobster 
producers, fisheries and environmental authorities (Ponce-Díaz et al., 2009).
FEDECOOP cooperatives have significant autonomy for internal administration 
and enforcement, and they have developed their own rules. Whereas the government 
establishes the maximum number of traps to be employed in each concession, the 
cooperatives decide how traps are allocated among members and where they are 
deployed (McCay, Weisman and Creed, 2011). In order to participate in the harvest, 
fishers must be members of the cooperative and have had significant production 
levels in the five preceding seasons. To fulfil the monitoring requirements, each 
cooperative has its own fisheries department in charge of recording fishery information 
(Sosa-Nishizaki, Lluch-Belda and Daume, 2011).
FEDECOOP cooperatives have been very effective at enforcing internal rules and 
preventing poaching by outsiders (Ponce-Díaz, Weisman and McCay, 2009; McCay, 
Weisman and Creed, 2011). They developed an inspection and surveillance system 
for the ten cooperatives, with operational costs of about US$2.5 million per year and 
investment costs of about US$1.5 million in equipment (Sosa-Nishizaki, Lluch-Belda 
and Daume, 2011). The system is implemented through a community surveillance 
committee legally recognized by the authority. The committee also helps enforce the 
minimum legal size by checking the catch with a quality control group. In the event 
of violations by a cooperative member, sanctions may include economic penalties, 
suspensions, and even exclusion from the cooperative. 
FEDECOOP has played a role in proposing changes in fishery legislation at the 
national level (McCay, Weisman and Creed, 2011). As an example, it participated in 
the formulation of an article of the Federal Penal Code, which imposes incarceration 
penalties on those who, illegally and with premeditation, capture, process, store, 
transport, destroy or commercialize lobsters or abalone (Ponce-Díaz, Weisman and 
McCay, 2009). The federation also had a leading role in pursuing the certification of 
the lobster fishery by the MSC, which was achieved in 2004 and renewed in 2011. This 
was the first artisanal fishery from a developing country to be certified by the MSC.
CASE 9: “PREDIOS” OF SUSTAINABLE USE, GULF OF CALIFORNIA (MEXICO)
The Mexican authority for the environment, the Secretaría del Medio Ambiente 
y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT), regulates the use of species listed as “under 
special protection” independently from the fisheries authority (CONAPESCA). 
SEMARNAT has a special regime that grants exclusive access to specified resources 
within areas designated as “predios” (short for “Predios Federales Sujetos a Manejo 
para la Conservación y Aprovechamiento Sustentable de Vida Silvestre” [DOF, 2000]). 
Predios have been implemented in the Gulf of California (Figure  8:A) since 2003, 
primarily for the harvest of sea cucumbers (Isostichopus fuscus) and rock scallops 
(Spondylus calcifer) by commercial divers, with mixed results (Avendaño-Ceceña, 2007; 
Cudney-Bueno et al., 2009a; Cinti, 2010; Martínez-Tovar and Turk-Boyer, 2012).
Access may be granted to juridical (e.g. companies, fishing cooperatives) or natural 
persons for one year; contracts are renewable upon compliance with regulations, and 
transferable (Table  9). A regional management plan includes a harvest season, size 
limits, and a TAC. The latter is based on annual assessments conducted by a technical/
scientific provider (research institute, university, NGO or private consultant), which 
may or may not involve the participation of fishers. Results are reported to a technical 
committee created for each authorized resource or group of resources: the committee 
advises SEMARNAT on quotas and licence renewals. Committees may be integrated 
by government agencies (federal, state or municipal), academic institutions, NGOs, 
fishers organizations, the industry and/or other social or private stakeholders. 
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Outcomes have been more positive in predios located inside protected areas where 
enforcement is more effective (e.g. inside the Loreto Bay National Park), when fishers 
participate in resource monitoring and as part of the committee, and when there is 
external support for capacity building and for fulfilling the legal requirements of the 
system (Avendaño-Ceceña, 2007; Cudney-Bueno et al., 2009a).
In Baja California Sur State (east and west coasts) sea cucumber fishing had been 
authorized in eight predios as of 2010. One of them is located inside the National 
Marine Park of Bahía de Loreto, where fishers from several cooperatives operate 
(Reyes-Bonilla et al., 2008). Cooperatives must conform with the predio management 
plan and the management plan of the park. The park enlists supplementary inspectors 
paid by NGOs (M.T. Sanchez, personal communication), which significantly improves 
enforcement compared with predios located outside park boundaries. The sea cucumber 
committee for the state has functioned relatively well thanks to the active participation 
of the fishers and enforcement agents (including police, army, navy and customs 
agents) (M.T. Sanchez, personal communication), and the political will and support of 
participatory management by government officials (Avendaño-Ceceña, 2007; Herrero-
Pérezrul, Ponce Larios and Calderón-Aguilera, 2011). This is in sharp contrast with 
Baja California State, where predios were established for sea cucumber and Pismo 
clam (Tivela stultorum) starting in 2005 (Avendaño-Ceceña, 2007). As of 2009, about 
15–20 predios had authorization for sea cucumber extraction, most of them granted 
to individuals and only a few to juridical persons (Cinti, 2010). In the surroundings of 
Bahía de los Ángeles (and presumably in other sectors as well), compliance with quotas 
has been poor, and the resource is severely depleted (Valdéz and Torreblanca, 2008; 
Calderón-Aguilera and Herrero-Perezrul, 2011), as reflected by dwindling catches 
(Figure 8:B). As predios are the only legal way to exploit protected species, they are 
used to launder illegal catches (harvested outside predios or by unauthorized persons), 
as is also the case in other fisheries managed under fishing licence regimes in the Gulf 
of California (Bourillón-Moreno, 2002; Cinti et al., 2010). The fishing sector does not 
participate in the state sea cucumber committee (Avendaño-Ceceña, 2007). Although 
some of the predios are located inside a marine protected area (the Bahía de los Ángeles 
Biosphere Reserve; Danemann and Ezcurra, 2007), no management plan is yet in place 
and resources for enforcement are limited (Cinti, 2010), in contrast to the Bahia de 
Loreto National Park.
Predios have also been implemented in Puerto Peñasco (Gulf of California, Sonora) 
for the rock scallop fishery (Figure 8:D), one of the most significant artisanal fisheries 
in the region. Rock scallops are harvested by a local cooperative of commercial divers 
(≈12 boats, 2–3 crew members per boat). In 2000–02, fishers participated in voluntary 
efforts to rebuild local stocks through a network of marine reserves, while working 
closely with researchers from a conservation NGO (Centro Intercultural de Estudios 
de Desiertos y Océanos [CEDO]) and academy (Cudney et al., 2009a, 2009b). Initially, 
the absence of formal rights to the grounds surrounding the reserve attracted fishers 
from distant communities, leading to overharvesting and disruption of local governance 
(Cudney-Bueno and Basurto, 2009). Predios (covering 383  688  ha) were finally 
granted to the cooperative in 2006. The fishery has a comprehensive management plan 
(Martínez-Tovar and Turk-Boyer, 2012). Members of the cooperative participate in 
management conducting assessments, monitoring in cooperation with CEDO, and 
patrolling the predios. Participation of fishers in the state committee has been irregular 
owing to lack of continuity of committee meetings convened by the authority. The 
cooperative has internal rules aimed at promoting compliance with management 
requirements (e.g. participation in assessments and vigilance). Lack of government 
support for vigilance is a critical constraint. As part of the rock scallop predio overlaps 
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with the “Alto Golfo de California and Delta del Río Colorado Biosphere Reserve” 
(Figure  8:C), environmental legislation mandates that title holders must present an 
environmental impact assessment of the activities to be performed inside the reserve 
(Martínez-Tovar and Turk-Boyer, 2012). The first impact assessment of this kind 
conducted by the cooperative in collaboration with CEDO was approved in 2009.
FIGURE 8
Predios of sustainable use, Gulf of California (Mexico)
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Notes: (A) Gulf of California, showing jurisdictions. (B) Sea cucumber landings, Baja 
California State, 1990–2005. (C) Location of rock scallop predio and fishing zones, northern 
Gulf of California, showing overlap with the “Alto Golfo de California y delta del Río 
Colorado” Biosphere Reserve. (D) Quota (recommended and authorized) and catch of rock 
scallops.
Sources: (B) courtesy of L. Calderón; (D) modified from Martínez-Tovar and Turk Boyer 
(2012).
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TABLE 9
Case 9: “Predios” of sustainable use, Gulf of California (Mexico) 
Main attributes of the access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
Access privileges to shellfish resources within a specified geographic area or predio may 
be granted to juridical (e.g. companies, fishing cooperatives) or natural persons.
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
Exclusive-use privileges are for specified resources within a predio. Exclusivity is not 
extensive to other species, which can be harvested by outside fishers. 
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Predios are granted for one year and can be renewed.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
Renewal is contingent upon compliance with requirements, mainly on the basis of 
reports on activities performed inside the predios and resource assessments.
Transferability of the rights Title holders may transfer their privilege in whole or in part and receive benefits from 
it. Authorization must be solicited to the environmental authority by specifying the 
recipient, what will be transferred (all or part of the privilege) and for how long (within 
the annual granting period).
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Title holders are allowed to subcontract others to help in the harvest or other tasks; they 
may also transfer their titles to others. Contract agreements and identification of people 
involved in those agreements must be reported to the environmental authority.
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
Cooperatives can develop their own internal agreements to harvest and distribute 
benefits and afford costs; title holders are allowed to subcontract others, provided that 
the management plan and other requirements of the system are followed.
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations
Enforcement and management have been more effective (i) in predios located inside 
protected areas, where vigilance is intensified (e.g. inside the Loreto Bay National 
Park); (ii) when fishers participate in resource monitoring, vigilance, and as part of the 
technical committee (rock scallop in Puerto Peñasco, sea cucumber in Baja California 
Sur State); (iii) when external support for capacity building and for fulfilling the legal 
requirements of the system are provided (Puerto Peñasco). Enforcement by government 
agencies has been generally weak, a primary reason for failure.
Harvesting strategies Grantees must comply with a regional management plan for each species exploited 
in the predio. The regional management plans specify harvest seasons, size limits and 
guidelines for establishing catch quotas for each predio.
Fishing methods and gear Commercial divers using fibreglass boats, 8–9 m long, equipped with air compressors 
and hookahs. 
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
A reproductive closure has been established from July to September in the case of 
predios of rock scallop in Puerto Peñasco, Sonora. 
Harvest controls Sea cucumber: minimum legal size/weight is 20 cm or 400 g. 
Rock scallops: minimum legal size 13 cm (shell length), and a TAC calculated at 
10 percent of the abundance of legal-size scallops evaluated within exploitable beds 
defined by densities in excess of 5 scallops per 100 m2. The management plan also 
includes recommendations for implementation of reproductive reserves and temporary 
closure of recovery areas.
Monitoring Permit holders must keep daily logbooks and submit a report of fishing activities by 
trip, including information on catch, fishing location, who harvested the resource, 
effective fishing time, contractual conditions if the privilege was transferred, and sales 
information. Surveys of resource abundance must be conducted using methodologies 
specified in the management plan. The annual report must also include information 
on costs incurred in fulfilling the requirements of the management plan relative to the 
profits generated for the use of the predio. 
CASE 10: CONCESSIONS FOR SEAWEED EXTRACTION IN CHUBUT PROVINCE 
(ARGENTINA)
Marine benthic algae are harvested in Chubut Province (Argentina) and used 
for the production of agar-agar (Gracilaria verrucosa) and carrageenans 
(Gigartina skottsbergii) (Boraso de Zaizso, Ciancia and Cerezo, 1998). Algae are 
collected under two regimes: collecting permits and industry concessions, both non-
transferable (Table 10). Collecting permits allow only the harvest of naturally stranded 
algae, and are valid for three years. Industry concessions are granted for longer periods 
(20–30  years), and allow the harvest, commercialization and processing of algae 
cropped from natural meadows in addition to strandings. Concessions give exclusive 
access to exploitation of algae, not affecting other uses. Currently, there are three active 
commercial firms harvesting algae, one of which holds a concession over 100 km of 
coastline that produces more than 1 000 tonnes of dry algae per year.
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TERRITORIAL USE PRIVILEGES: SEA BED TRACTS – RECAP
Typically, these consist of concessions to fishers organizations, such Mexican 
cooperatives (Cases  8 and 9) and Chilean “sindicatos” (Case  7), for the use of 
specific resources in tracts of seabed (TURFs). Differences in design have significant 
management implications. In the case of Chilean AMERBs (Case  7), the tracts are 
relatively small, leaving background areas of variable extension where fishing activities 
are nominally regulated, but where regulations are unenforceable. The result has been 
severe depletion of valuable resources (e.g. loco snails) in background areas. Instead, 
Mexican cooperatives from central Baja California (Case  8) have concessions over 
extended tracts contiguous with each other, so that there is no unclaimed background 
territory. This system has been successful on most accounts. The TURFs have 
functioned better in cases where the tracts are close to fishing communities (the case 
of many caletas from Central Chile), particularly in rural areas (as in central Baja 
California). Vigilance, deterrence of intruders and enforcement are difficult where the 
TURFs are located away from fishing communities (as in much of south Chile). While 
TURFs, in general, have performed relatively well, they have fared best in cases with a 
long history of collective territorial appropriation, informal in its beginnings. Systems 
introduced by design (institutional engineering) have faced unexpected and undesirable 
implementation problems as illustrated by the Chilean TURFs (Gelcich et al., 2006; 
Orensanz and Parma, 2010; San Martín, Parma and Orensanz, 2010) and contrasts in 
the success of predios in the Gulf of California (Case 9).
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5. Territorial use privileges – 
fishing spots
CASE 11: LOBSTER CONCESSIONS OF PUNTA ALLEN (MEXICO)
Fishing cooperatives harvest spiny lobsters (Panulirus argus) along the Caribbean coast 
of Mexico, corresponding to Quintana Roo State. The three fishing cooperatives of 
Punta Allen have their lobster fishing grounds in Ascensión and Espíritu Santo Bays 
(Figure  9:A). Before 1992, fishing cooperatives were the only organizations to have 
legal access to spiny lobster resources. Although this exclusive privilege was eliminated 
in the 1992 legislation, cooperatives are, de facto, still the only organizations that have 
been granted fishing concessions in the region. This is because of their background 
and expertise as historical users, their readiness to fulfil the new requirements to 
obtain concessions and their political influence (Sosa-Cordero, Liceaga-Correa 
and Seijo, 2008). The Pescadores de Vigía Chico cooperative has a concession 
to an area of 850  km2 entirely enclosing Ascensión Bay (Figure  9:B); two other 
cooperatives (Cozumel and Azcorra) hold concessions in Espíritu Santo Bay (350 km2) 
(Sosa-Cordero, Liceaga-Correa and Seijo, 2008). Ascensión and Espiritu Santo Bays 
are located within the boundaries of the Sian Ka´an Biosphere Reserve (SKBR), 
created in 1986 and administered by a federal agency, the Comisión Nacional de Áreas 
Naturales Protegidas (CONANP), within the environmental and natural resources 
authority (SEMARNAT). The management plan for the SKBR specifies zoning of 
uses, restricting human activities related to fishing and tourism. The fisheries authority 
(CONAPESCA) is part of a different secretariat, the Secretaría de Agricultura, 
Ganadería y Pesca (SAGARPA).
Lobsters are harvested from artificial shelters (“casitas”, Figure  9:H), where they 
seek refuge during their ontogenetic migration out of the bay (Lozano-Alvarez, 
Briones-Fourzán and Phillips, 1991). Originating in Cuba, casitas were introduced 
to the Mexican Caribbean in the late 1960s. Before the early 1980s, casitas were built 
mostly with logs of a local palm tree. Palm tree cutting was banned in 1988, forcing 
fishers to introduce alternative designs built entirely of ferrocement (Briones-Fourzán, 
Lozano-Álvarez and Eggleston, 2000). Harvesting is conducted by skin-divers with 
the help of hand-nets (“jamos”). Scuba and hookah are banned by internal agreements 
(Ponce-Taylor et al., 2006; Sosa-Cordero, Liceaga-Correa and Seijo, 2008).
Landings from Bahía Ascensión have oscillated without a consistent trend in the last 
two decades, while catch per unit of effort (CPUE) has increased steadily (Figure 9:E). 
Total catch from the three cooperatives (expressed as tonnes of tails) since 1982 
has fluctuated between 105  tonnes (1987) and 31  tonnes (1994), Vigía Chico (Bahía 
Ascensión) having been always the main contributor (Figure 9:F). On average, the Sian 
Ka’an cooperatives contribute about 30 percent of the catch in the state (Figure 9:G). 
Recently, there has been an increase in the fraction of lobsters marketed alive, which 
fetch a better price. The number of fishers has been in the range of 150–160 in recent 
years, down from 240–260 in 1985–88 (Figure 9:C). The combined number of boats has 
also decreased, from 115–130 in 1985–88 to 80–85 (Figure 9:D).
Concessions are partitioned into individual campos, marine plots 
allocated to members of the cooperatives where they deploy their casitas 
(Miller, 1989; Seijo, 1993; Sosa-Cordero, Liceaga-Correa and Seijo, 2008). A survey 
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conducted in 2006 registered 101  campos in Ascensión Bay (Pescadores de Vigía 
Chico cooperative) (Figure 9:B), 84  in Espiritu Santo Bay, 45  in Cozumel and 39  in 
the Azcorra cooperative (Sosa-Cordero, Liceaga-Correa and Seijo, 2008). Each 
season, members form working teams of two to four fishers, which last from months 
to years. In 2006, there were 29  teams in Vigía Chico cooperative, 12  in Cozumel, 
and 11 in Azcorra. Not all members have a campo, but all are part of a team as this 
FIGURE 9
Lobster fishery of Punta Allen, Mexico
Notes: (A) Boundaries of the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve. (B) Boundaries of campos in Ascensión 
Bay, 2010. (C) Number of boats in the three cooperatives, 1979–2009. (D) Number of fishers, 
1979–2009. (E) Aggregated catch for the three cooperatives, 1970–2009 (bars, whole weight, 
tonnes) and CPUE. (F) Production (tail weight) by cooperative, 1982–2010. (G) Landings of lobsters 
in Quintana Roo State (total weight), by zones, showing the contribution of the Sian Ka’an 
cooperatives, 1982–2010. (H) Skin-divers taking lobsters from underneath a casita.
Source: (A) from R. Borges, O. Guzman and K.L. Cooper.
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provides access to the campos. Entry is closed except for sons of fishers. Internal 
regulations include rules for conflict resolution and penalties for undesirable behaviour 
(Sosa-Cordero, Liceaga-Correa and Seijo, 2008, their Table 3), including forfeiture of 
the boat, motor and artificial shelters to protect “campos” ownership. Fishers violating 
the closed season may face expulsion and loss of property. In at least two cases, expelled 
members went to trial, but judges upheld the internal rules of the cooperative in court 
because they had been signed by all members. In general, the fisheries authority has 
tacitly accepted the internal rules of the cooperatives.
Factors key to the success of these cooperatives have been: (i) the non-intervention 
of government in internal matters; (ii) judicial backing of the (severe) sanctions 
occasionally imposed by the cooperatives on their members; (iii) geographic isolation 
and alternative sources of employment for fishers expelled from a cooperative; and 
(iv) diversification of income through participation of members in eco-tourism. The 
fishery was certified by the MSC in 2012.
CASE 12: THE JUAN FERNÁNDEZ ARCHIPELAGO LOBSTER FISHERY (CHILE)
An artisanal rock lobster (Jasus frontalis) fishery has operated for decades in the 
Juan Fernández Archipelago (about 700  km off central Chile) (Figure  10:A). It is 
the main source of income for a small community located on Robinson Island (San 
Juan Bautista, population about 630) and a temporary fishing village on Selkirk 
Island (about 25 fishers and their families) that is occupied only in the fishing season 
(October–May). Lobster fishing is complemented by small bait fisheries for small 
pelagics (primary bait), whitefish and moray eels (secondary bait). The modern fishery 
took shape when a French company established in Robinson in 1914. Annual landings, 
recorded since 1930, oscillated around 90 tonnes a year until the mid-1960s; afterwards 
TABLE 10
Case 11: Lobster concessions of Punta Allen (Mexico)
Main attributes of the access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
The state grants territorial concessions to users, including fishers cooperatives. 
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
The cooperative has exclusive use rights over the target resources.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
20 years, renewable upon compliance with regulations and conditioned on evidence of 
continued productivity of the target species.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
Highly secure.
Transferability of the rights Concession rights are non-transferable.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Rights are fully divisible among cooperative members. While the sea bed is federal 
property, the shelters used as attracting devices are private property. The campos 
partition is justified by the need to protect property. 
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
Very flexible.
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations
Internal and federal regulations are strictly enforced by the cooperative resulting in 
high compliance.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Lobsters are harvested from artificial shelters (casitas built of ferrocement) by skin-divers 
with the help of hand-nets (“jamos”); use of gaffs has been virtually abandoned in both 
bays. Fishing boats are made of fibreglass, 6.4–7.8 m long, equipped with 40–60 hp 
outboard motors. 
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
Closed season from 1 March to 30 June.
Harvest controls Minimum legal size (13.4 cm tail length, corresponding to 74 mm carapace length). 
Catch of egg-carrying females is prohibited. A ban on scuba and hookah, originally 
imposed through an internal agreement, has been incorporated into the management 
plan. 
Monitoring Mandatory. Catch and effort have been monitored by the cooperatives, since 1975 in 
the Vigía Chico cooperative. Cooperatives collaborate actively with research projects.
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they gradually dropped to an average of 25 tonnes for the period 1975–2003, and have 
rebounded since then (Figure 10:C). The most lucrative market is the export of live 
lobsters to Spain, Italy and France, which reached about US$1  million per year in 
2006–09.
The islands were declared a National Park in 1935 and a Reserve of the Biosphere 
by UNESCO in 1977. Because of their significance for biodiversity, a number of 
conservation-oriented organizations also play a role in the governance of the fishery. 
Among them are several NGOs generally active in marine conservation, which have 
promoted fishery-related research and conservation-oriented action in coordination 
with government agencies and fishers organizations (e.g. CONAMA et al., 2011). 
Until 1960, fishers were employed by companies (“apatronados”), which in some 
cases owned the boats and gear. The apatronados regime vanished in the 1960s, and 
since 1970 all fishers have worked independently. A cooperative was formed in 1964, 
but it declined in the 1970s and was formally closed in 1980 under a political climate 
unfriendly to cooperatives.
FIGURE 10
Juan Fernández Islands lobster fishery, Chile
Notes: (A) Location of the archipelago. (B) Robinson Island, showing the “marcas” 
(individually “owned” fishing spots) tended to by five teams, 2005–07. (C) Landings, 
1930–2011. (D) Fishing boat. (E) Lobster traps. 
Sources: (B), (D) and (E) courtesy of B. Ernst; (C) data from SERNAPESCA.
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With Chile’s return to democracy, fishers organized themselves as a syndicate; three 
fishers organizations currently exist. Until recently, when a moratorium on the registry 
was introduced, there were no formal effort controls of any sort, other than gear 
type (no diving). However, an effective but unwritten sea-tenure system, established 
by tradition, has put a cap on the size of the fishing force, and regulated access for 
decades (Ernst et al., 2010a). Each fisher or fisher’s family member may “own” a 
certain number of fishing spots, known as marcas (Table 11), where lobster traps are 
deployed, one per spot (Figure 10:B). Most marcas have been discovered and claimed 
over decades, although occasionally new ones are identified with the help of echo 
sounders. A survey near Robinson and Santa Clara Islands recorded 3  762  marcas. 
Each boat, in a given season, fishes a package of marcas that include those belonging 
to the skipper, the deckhands, their family members, and/or borrowed marcas. Only 
a subset of that total (30 on average) is active at any given time. Marcas are located by 
alignments of land features; all fishers know by heart the location of their marcas, and 
of neighbouring ones belonging to others. Use and transfer of rights over marcas are 
regulated by informal, but well-established, internal rules. Marcas are not sold but can 
be transferred with a boat if the latter is sold; they can be inherited by family members, 
and are often lent to others under a variety of arrangements. In the event that fishers 
are unable to harvest in their marcas, others can do so, but the marcas return to the 
“owners” once they go back to fishing. This complex and highly structured traditional 
TABLE 11
Case 12: Juan Fernández Archipelago lobster fishery (Chile)
Main attributes of the 
access regime
How the rights are 
conferred and upheld
Access rights to fishing spots (“marcas”) are informal. 
Exclusivity of 
participation in the 
fishery
Fishers must be registered in the National Registry of Artisanal Fishers. A moratorium on 
boats and fishers was introduced in 2005.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Use rights for fishing spots are informal, duration is unspecified.
Security or quality of the 
title conferred by the 
rights
Security of access to fishing spots depends on government not introducing disruptive 
measures, such as quotas or marine reserves.
Transferability of the 
rights
Use and transfer of rights over marcas are regulated by informal, but well-established, 
internal rules. Marcas are not sold but can be transferred with a boat if the latter is sold; 
they can be inherited by family members, and are often lent to others under a variety of 
arrangements. In the event that fishers are unable to harvest in their marcas, others can do 
so, but the marcas return to the “owners” once they go back to fishing. This complex and 
highly structured traditional tenure system enjoys high compliance.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Fully divisible.
Flexibility in the use of 
the rights
High.
Enforceability of rights 
and compliance with use-
rights limitations
The marcas system is respected by fishers.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and 
gear
The fleet is composed of 50 boats, 8–11 m long and double-ended, built on Robinson 
Island and powered by 15–18 hp outboard motors (a few ones have inboard motors). Many 
boats destroyed or damaged by a tsunami in February 2010 have recently been replaced 
by fibreglass hulls, some equipped with donated 50 hp outboard motors. Gear consists of 
rectangular traps made of local wood.
When fishing is 
authorized to take place
Closed season from 15 May 15 to 30 September.
Harvest controls Minimum legal size (115 mm from the base of the antennae to the posterior edge of the 
carapace), no keeping of egg-carrying (“berried”) females. The latter was respected by fishers 
as an informal operational rule long before it was formalized.
Monitoring The fishing authority (Servicio Nacional de Pesca [SERNAPESCA]) compiles catch statistics. 
More detailed monitoring (catch, effort, sizes, etc.) has been conducted as part of five short-
term (1–2 years) projects in the last four decades. Monitoring of catch and effort was started 
in 2006 through collaboration between the fishers association and independent scientists, 
and this continues. 
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tenure system enjoys high compliance. In addition to lobster marcas, fishers identify 
locations suitable for secondary bait fishing (known as “pesqueros” or “marcas de 
pescado”): trapping moray eels and longlining for whitefish, both used as lobster bait. 
Differing from lobster marcas, access to secondary bait marcas is open and information 
about their location is not shared among fishers. Primary bait (used to catch secondary 
bait species) is a pelagic fish (“jurelillo”), not associated with marcas.
Assessments and academic inquiries conducted over the last 40 years have recurrently 
diagnosed that effort is above the optimum level, and on that basis have prescribed 
generic “solutions”: quotas, marine protected areas, closures. Those measures, if ever 
implemented, would severely disrupt the traditional tenure system and, consequently, 
fishers’ livelihoods and ultimately the sustainability of the fishery itself (Ernst et 
al., 2012). In artisanal fisheries such as these, which have afforded stability through 
traditional tenure systems, the potential risks entailed by the introduction of regulatory 
measures aimed at maximizing fishery yields may largely exceed the opportunity costs 
associated with maintaining the fishery at a suboptimal level. 
On 27 February 2010, Robinson Crusoe Island was hit by three tsunami waves, 
following an 8.8-magnitude earthquake that shook central Chile. Effects were 
devastating, but the fishery started to recover soon afterwards. The resilience of the 
fishery to the unpredictable natural disaster was a result of several factors: most of the 
members of the tightly knit local community belong to fisher families, fishers are well 
organized, and the unwritten rules of the traditional tenure system helped the orderly 
return to fishing activity (Ernst et al., 2010b).
CASE 13: THE “PARCELA” SYSTEM OF ALGAL HARVESTS (CHILE)
Traditional tenure systems for the harvesting of brown algae from the intertidal and 
shallow subtidal zones of rocky shores (Figure  11:F) have been in use and adjusted 
over generations in several sectors of the Chilean coastal zone, notably Regions  III, 
VI and VIII (Figure 11:A–B) (González et al., 2002; Ávila et al., 2005; Gelcich et al., 
2006; Araos-Leiva, 2006; Vásquez et al., 2008). These systems consist of the de facto 
allocation of use privileges over stretches of coastline, known as “parcelas” (plots, 
Figure  11:E) or “varaderos” (sites where naturally detached algae are stranded), to 
individuals (and their families), groups of families or communities (Table 12). Although 
no formal title or harvesting authorization safeguards these traditional tenure systems, 
they are generally respected by users, community members, and even by agents of 
the fisheries authority. The only requirements for legal access to algal resources are 
registration (Registro de Pesca Artesanal), and holding the corresponding licence from 
the maritime authority. Algal harvests must take place within the administrative region 
where registration is in effect (applying to all fishery resources), but no other formal 
spatial specification is in place. 
In central and south Chile these systems developed around the extraction of 
“cochayuyo” (Durvillaea antarctica), an emblematic species of Chilean culinary 
culture (Muñoz-Pedreros and Navarro, 1992; Montecino, 2005), and in north Chile 
for the harvest of “huiro” (Lessonia nigrescens, L.  trabeculata, and Macrocystis 
integrifolia). Total annual landings of cochayuyo are of the order of 6  000  tonnes 
(2010), with Regions VIII and X contributing 56 percent and 35 percent of national 
landings, respectively (Figure  11:B, D). In contrast, huiro harvests (considering all 
species) have reached almost 250 000 tonnes, with Regions III and IV yielding the bulk 
of national harvests (35 percent and 32 percent, respectively) (Figure 11:A, C). 
In all the cases, collection and processing of algae until it is ready to be sold involve 
several stages requiring intense physical activity and knowledge regarding the resource, 
the environment, and harvesting and processing techniques (e.g. when, where, and 
which algae to collect; currents favouring algal beach-stranding; and best conditions 
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for natural drying and storage). Algae gathering and processing is a collective activity 
that involves the participation of family (including women and children) and other 
community members. Division of labour is common and the benefits derived from 
parcela or varadero use rights are often shared (beyond family bonds) through a 
diversity of local arrangements. The seasonality of algae gathering is largely determined 
by the time of the year when natural drying conditions are optimal (spring and 
summer in the Southern Hemisphere). The demand for dried alga makes possible its 
conservation and storage for protracted periods. Hence, commercialization can be 
delayed until market conditions are most favourable, allowing a better organization of 
the household economy. Throughout Chile, gathering of algae is often complemented 
by other economic activities (agriculture, logging and fishing) and temporary jobs in 
nearby urban areas. 
FIGURE 11
The “parcela” system of algal harvests, Chile
Notes: (A) Harvests of huiro (Lessonia and Macrocystis) by region, 2010. (B) Harvests of Harvests 
of cochayuyo (Durvillea) by region, 2010. (C) Harvests of huiro, 1998–2010, regions aggregated. 
(D) Harvests of cochayuyo, 1998–2010, regions aggregated. (E) Harvesting cochayuyo, Region 
VI. (F) Sketch of a subdivision of parcelas in a stretch of intertidal rocky shore (1 km long) 
harvested by a community (Tocopalma, Region VI). (G) Packing of dried and folded cochayuyo in 
“muñecos”, “maletas” and “rodelas” (the largest). 
Sources: Data from SERNAPESCA; (F) C. Sepúlveda); photo credits: C. Sepúlveda.
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Cochayuyo harvesting in Region VI
Customary tenure in the harvest of cochayuyo along the coasts of Region VI (Central 
Chile) has two tiers. First, settlements of coastal gatherers (e.g. Las Quiscas, Los 
Huachos, and Alto Colorado; Araos-Leiva, 2006) have informal access rights to 
adjacent stretches of seashore. Tenure is refined by allocation of partitions of those 
stretches (parcelas) to members of the community. In the traditional system, parcela 
use rights are customarily allocated to individuals (heads of household) and their 
families, and are inherited along family lines (Araos-Leiva, 2006; Vázquez et al., 
2008). Parcelas are delimited exclusively for cochayuyo extraction; access to other 
resources within parcelas is open, although non-members of the community or group 
of gatherers are generally not welcome. Cochayuyo is extracted from the intertidal and 
shallow subtidal by cutting the plant at the base of the stipe during low tides by skin-
diving, and collecting the algae that drift to shore. 
In some sectors (e.g. Puertecillo and Topocalma), parcelas are rotationally allocated 
to individual members of the local fishers organization every 1–2 years (Figure 11:E), 
at the beginning of the harvesting season, through a lottery supervised by the leader 
of the organization (Gelcich et al., 2006; Sepúlveda, 2010). According to old fishers 
the system was introduced in the 1950s or 1960s by the “alcalde de mar” (a respected 
citizen appointed by the maritime authority to oversee activities in a caleta) from 
Topocalma to mitigate recurrent conflicts among gatherers (L. Ariz, IFOP, personal 
communication). Conflicts occurred when algae cut by someone in one parcel drifted 
away and were collected by others elsewhere. 
Parcelas are delimited on the basis of productivity, not size, and are identified 
by tracing an imaginary line from a distinctive rock on the intertidal to another 
(Araos-Leiva, 2006; Gelcich et al., 2006). Each parcela covers about 100–150  m of 
coastline and encloses a number of large rocks (6–8) where the algae grow. Harvesting 
takes place from November to March (late spring and summer). Once extracted, the algae 
are left to dry on the side of rocky cliffs (to avoid soil moisture) for 15–30 days depending 
on weather conditions, and then stored inside precarious constructions on the coast 
(made of wood and plastic, known as “rucos”), where each family resides in the 
harvesting season or permanently on occasions. Dried algae are folded back and forth 
to form a bundle. Bundles are packed together in groups of 25  to form a “rodela” 
(Figure  11:G), which weighs 7–9  kg, and then sold to intermediaries. In 2005–06, a 
parcela in Puertecillo produced about 1  200–1  800  kg of dry cochayuyo per season 
(Gelcich et al., 2006). A parcela holder is allowed to harvest and process cochayuyo 
accompanied by family or other community members, or temporarily transfer the 
harvesting rights to others (e.g. leasing a parcela) in exchange for monetary or non-
monetary forms of payment (often done by old or disabled members) (Araos-Leiva, 
2006; Gelcich et al., 2006). Parcela holders decide how the parcela is to be managed; 
a common practice is to clean rocks, extracting other kelp species (e.g. Lessonia spp.) 
to promote increased recruitment and production of cochayuyo (Araos-Leiva, 2006; 
Gelcich et al., 2006; Vásquez et al., 2008).
Cochayuyo harvesting in Region VIII
In Arauco Province (Region  VIII, Figure  11:A), de facto partition of the coast for 
cochayuyo harvesting has taken different forms (Ávila et al., 2005). In some cases 
(e.g. Caleta Yani), sectors are allocated to individual fishers and their families, much as in 
Region VI. In other places, with significant indigenous population (e.g. Tirúa Sur), there are 
community rights based on historical use. The common territory is subdivided in coastal 
sectors allocated to individual families (e.g. Quilantahue, Casa Piedra and Danquil) or to 
“cuadrillas” (each integrated by members of 10–15 families) formed as production units 
(e.g. Quilquilco, Millanao, Ancaten and Pillico). In a few other cases (e.g. Tranicura 
and Los Chilcos), the whole community harvests cochayuyo in a coordinated manner 
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during each harvest event, and commercializes the product as a unit. In all cases, algal 
thalli are cut by skin-divers (“cortadores”) from the intertidal and shallow subtidal, 
occasionally from boats and using hookahs. Harvesting takes place from November 
to March, coincidentally with the best conditions for drying. Collection of drifted 
algae from shore, transportation for drying (also with trucks) and packaging are done 
collectively, involving the collaboration of all the participants in the harvesting event 
(family, cuadrilla or community members, depending on the case). Cochayuyo is sold 
to intermediaries in rodelas weighting 50  kg each, and classified into “cochayuyo 
negro” (black cochayuyo) of higher quality destined to export, and “cochayuyo rubio” 
(blond cochayuyo) for local consumption. In 2001–02, each community produced 
about 15 tonnes of dried cochayuyo per season, on average. In some communities, each 
harvesting sector is left to rest for about 15 days between harvests.
Huiro harvesting in northern Chile
In the case of huiro harvests, de facto use rights over varaderos have been described for 
northern Chile (Regions I–IV, González et al., 2002), which contributes 92 percent of 
the national landings and involves about 3 000 registered coastal gatherers (SUBPESCA, 
2010a). Informal tenure arrangements are most significant in Region III, where landings 
are highest (35 percent of national landings, about 1 000–1 200 registered gatherers), 
while open access to algal resources predominates in Regions I, II and IV. In the latter, 
access is mainly restricted by landowners who control the right-of-pass to varaderos 
located adjacent to their land. In Region III, communities respect heritable use rights 
to varaderos held by fishers and their families. The origin of this system can be traced 
to the prior occupation of many algae gatherers, predominantly displaced artisanal 
miners or “pirquineros”. Pirquineros are independent workers that collect mineral 
(gold, copper or coal) from rivers and hills, an activity characterized by a strong 
territoriality over good sectors, individually discovered and appropriated de facto. Use 
rights for varaderos may be transiently transferred, or leased in exchange for payment 
or a fraction of the harvest. 
Huiro has traditionally been sold dried to intermediaries that resell it to processing 
plants. In 2000–01, an algae gatherer produced 2–4 tonnes of dried alga per month, on 
average, reaching up to 9 tonnes in summer months. In the last decade, the demand for 
fresh huiro to feed cultured abalone (Haliotis spp.) has increased rapidly (Figure 11:C; 
González et al., 2002; SUBPESCA, 2010a). This, together with overharvesting of other 
coastal benthic resources, has led to the sudden advent of newcomers to the activity 
(e.g. hookah divers who access subtidal algae) and a boom in registration in categories 
not previously involved in seaweed extraction (hookah diver, finfish fisher, boat 
owner). Conflicts among user groups has escalated as effort has increased, particularly 
for Lessonia nigrescens, the most accessible species (SUBPESCA, 2010a). Removal 
from natural grounds has been shown to affect the rate of natural stranding, affecting 
traditional users, and the ecological services of algal forests are being disrupted with 
unpredictable consequences (González et al., 2002; SUBPESCA, 2010a). The total 
number of fishers registered for huiro species is in the order of 13 000–19 000, with 
some regions showing insignificant harvests and exorbitant numbers of registered 
fishers (e.g. Region VIII, with about 5 000 registered fishers contributing 0.03 percent 
of national landings; Regions  I–IV, with about 3  000  registered fishers contributing 
about 90 percent of national landings). These figures reflect the problems encountered 
with registries and cadastres, highlighted in other sections of this publication 
(see Part  II  – Discussion). Registration in multiple categories and species, even by 
inactive fishers, is a generalized practice throughout Chile, creating inflated registries 
that pose serious difficulties at the moment of introducing access privileges. Recently, 
the fishery authority has temporarily suspended registration in the registry for all huiro 
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species (in effect, in Regions V–IX and XII) and prohibited active removal (“barreteo”, 
detaching the holdfast from the substrate) (SUBPESCA, 2010).
Conflict with the introduction of AMERBs. The introduction of TURFS 
(AMERBs, Case  7) raises concerns about their potential negative effects on pre-
existing traditional management practices. Although AMERBs legally grant harvest 
privileges for benthic resources within designated territories, organizations holding 
subtidal AMERBs often develop a sense of “extended privileges” over the adjacent 
intertidal zone, where algae gatherers operate. In some cases, user groups have reached 
agreements for coexistence. For example, in some sectors of Regions III and IV, algae 
gatherers are allowed to harvest in the intertidal zone in the vicinity of an AMERB if 
they provide support for vigilance to the fishers organization that holds the AMERB 
(González et al., 2002). 
In some cases, AMERBs have given formal recognition of use rights for historical 
users to the areas and resources informally managed under the traditional parcelas 
system (e.g. in Los Huachos and Pichilemu-Alto Colorado, Region  VI) (Vásquez 
et al., 2008). In others, as in some localities in Region  VI (Chorrillos, La Vega de 
TABLE 12
Case 13: “Parcela” system of algal harvests (Chile)
Main attributes of the 
access regime
How the rights are 
conferred and upheld
Traditional tenure systems for the harvesting of brown alga consist of allocation of use-
rights within coastal sectors –”parcelas” or “varaderos”- to individuals (and their families), 
groups of families or communities.
Exclusivity of participation 
in the fishery
Participation in alga extraction is limited to family members, groups of families or 
communities holding use-rights. Access to other resources within parcelas or varaderos is 
open to others (although they may be subject to formal access regulations). 
Duration of the rights 
conferred
In most cases, use-rights are inherited along family lines. In some cases (i.e. Puertecillo and 
Topocalma) parcelas are rotationally allocated every 1-2 years through a lottery supervised 
by the leader of the organization.
Security or quality of the 
title conferred by the 
rights
The system has shown to be vulnerable to disruptions by interference with formal 
management regimes. The recent introduction of AMERBs caused conflicts among user 
groups and affected traditional management practices in some cases.
Transferability of the 
rights
Temporary transfer of use rights in exchange for monetary or non-monetary (favours, a 
portion of the harvest, etc.) retributions has been observed in northern (for huiro) and 
central (for cochayuyo) Chile
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Algae gathering and drying involves families and community members. Division of labour is 
common and benefits are shared through a diversity of arrangements, from compensations 
for help with cutting and/or collecting, to leasing the parcelas. 
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
Parcela holders decide how to manage them (some may leave it unharvested, the case of 
some widows in caleta Puertecillo), who will participate in the harvest and processing, and 
how benefits will be shared.
Enforceability of rights 
and compliance with use-
rights limitations
Customary use-rights are generally honoured by the community. Alga gatherers defend 
their harvesting zones from intruders. Local enforcement and resource sustainability are 
being challenged by increased conflicts due to the sudden entrance of new users driven 
by overfishing of other coastal resources, displacement from other economic activities 
(e.g. mining), and increased demand for algae (by the alginates industry and abalone 
aquaculture). AMERBs have disrupted customary practices in some cases, causing the loss 
of parcela use-rights. In others, both regimes have coexisted relatively well. Agreements 
among user groups have allowed alga gatherers to operate in the vicinity of AMERBs in 
exchange for support with vigilance.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Cochayuyo are cut during low tides using a blade or knife; naturally stranded plants have 
poor quality. Traditionally huiro species have been collected from natural strandings using a 
trident attached to a rope to grab floating algae. Increased demand for fresh huiro has led 
to harvesting of subtidal populations by diving using metallic bars (“barretas”) to detach 
the holdfasts.
When fishing is authorized 
to take place
Algae are gathered in spring and summer, when natural drying conditions are optimum. 
Harvest controls The removal of whole huiro plants is banned due to its damaging ecological impact; 
authorities confiscate the tools used to extract them. Cutting of cochayuyo at the base of 
the stipe (without removing the holdfast) allows regeneration. Rocks are regularly cleaned 
up, extracting other kelp to increase recruitment and production. In some indigenous 
communities of southern Chile, sectors are left to rest for 15 days approximately between 
harvests.
Monitoring Monitoring is mostly restricted to landings (by Servicio Nacional de Pesca [SERNAPESCA]). 
Huiro is surveyed only in Regions III and IV.
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Pupuya, Matanzas, and La Boca de Rapel), the introduction of AMERBs generated 
severe conflicts among fishers, disrupting the parcela system and even resulting in 
loss of parcela use rights (L.  Ariz, IFOP, personal communication). In Puertecillo 
(Region  VI), it induced changes in local access and use arrangements, affecting the 
way in which local knowledge is used to plan for harvests (Gelcich et al., 2006), as the 
AMERB system requires a government-approved TAC based on a survey.
TERRITORIAL USE PRIVILEGES: FISHING SPOTS – RECAP
In this particular form of TURF, members of the fishing community have individual 
access privileges to fishing spots under some form of customary marine tenure. The 
common pool resource can be a formal territorial concession to a fishers organization 
or fishing community (Case 11), or the entire fishing grounds (Case 12). These systems 
are typically associated with interception gear, such as traps (Case  12), attraction 
devices (e.g. casitas, Case  11), gillnets (in the case of fish, e.g. Cordell, 1989) or 
shrimp nets (Moura, 2009). Individual privileges are usually tradable under a variety 
of arrangements (monetary or else) and can be inherited. The parcela system of algal 
harvesting from Chile (Case  13) is based on resources with a high turnover rate 
and privileges may be temporary and assigned through lottery. Informal customary 
marine tenure systems are the result of a protracted process of adaptive adjustment. 
Formalization of customary systems poses significant risks because, in the absence 
of effective feedback, formality can be a straightjacket for systems whose resilience is 
conditioned on their adaptiveness (e.g. Hviding, 1998).
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6. Territorial communal rights 
(traditional and indigenous users)
CASE 14: THE SERI INDIAN BENTHIC FISHERY (MEXICO)
The Seri Indians have lived in what is now northwest Mexico (Sonora State) since pre-
Hispanic times (Bourillón-Moreno, 2002; Basurto, 2005). The present Seri territory, 
although still large, is just a fraction of the land occupied by them in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries (Figure  12:A). During the 1970s, three presidential decrees 
granted the Seri formal rights to a portion of their historic coastal territory as an 
“ejido” (DOF, 1970, 1978), a form of communal land tenure, and permanent and 
exclusive harvesting rights of marine resources inside “the waters surrounding Tiburon 
Island” (DOF, 1975) (Table 13, Figure 12:B). These permanent and exclusive rights are 
limited to “the Seri tribe and the Seri fishing cooperative”. Unlike fishing concessions 
(e.g. in central Baja California or Quintana Roo State, introduced earlier), rights are not 
species-specific but include all the marine species commercially exploitable inside their 
territory, and are ceded in perpetuity. The main motivation for this restitution is not 
economic but social, to ensure the survival of the Seri people and its culture. 
In addition, Tiburon Island has been a reserve zone and refuge of wild fauna since 
1963, aimed at protecting a type of deer endemic to the island. Since 1978, the island 
has also integrated the area for the protection of flora and fauna (Área de Protección 
de Flora y Fauna – Islas del Golfo de California), which includes 380 000 ha of islands.
Main targets of Seri fishers are blue crabs (Callinectes bellicosus) and pen shells 
(Atrina  spp. and Pinna rugosa), respectively harvested by means of traps and 
hookah diving (Figure  12:D) (Basurto, 2006; Torre-Cosío, Bourillón-Moreno and 
Hudson-Weaver, 2004). There is also some intertidal gathering by adult men and 
women. The pen shell fishery operates in the Infiernillo Channel (5–15  m deep), 
which separates the mainland from Tiburon Island (Figure  12:B–C). As of 2009, 
between 30  and 60  boats operated inside the channel, of which 10–20  targeted pen 
shells (Basurto et al., 2012). While official statistics do not exist, unofficial calculations 
indicate that Seri landings are in the range of 75–100  tonnes (Basurto, unpublished). 
Historical accounts suggest that since the first beds of pen shells were discovered 
in the channel (in 1978) the catch has remained relatively stable (Basurto, 2006). 
However, some users (Seri and outsiders) perceive that beds are being depleted 
(Basurto, personal communication). 
The most important and powerful political structure in the community is the 
traditional government, headed by the governor and appointed cabinet members 
(a secretary and a treasurer). Its formal structure mimics that set up by the federal 
government to govern ejidos (Basurto, 2005). The Seri have an informal rule system 
to grant temporary access to outsiders to harvest pen shells inside their territory 
(Bourillón-Moreno, 2002; Basurto, 2005); blue crabs are harvested exclusively by Seri 
fishers. The pen shell rules were developed in response to increasing pressure from 
outsiders to access their fishing grounds, as resources in neighbouring communities 
were serially depleted beginning in the mid-1980s (Basurto et al., 2012). Outsiders 
must pay the Seri governor an access fee in the form of cash or pen shells and they must 
include a member of the Seri community as part of the fishing crew (Basurto, 2005). 
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The access fee brings economic income only to the Seri governor and the governor’s 
family, given that it is not customary to distribute those funds beyond family lines. The 
second rule compensates other members of the Seri community, given that monetary 
returns from the catch are shared equally among crew members. Their presence on 
outsider boats also helps to monitor compliance with other rules-in-use (e.g. not 
harvesting in culturally significant areas) at a low cost to the community. Participation 
in this fishery by non-Seri fishers is high: 87 percent of the fishing teams included non-
Seri crew members in 2000–01 (Basurto, 2006); the same pattern seemed to hold in 2009 
(Basurto, unpublished).
The Seri have managed to set a relatively effective rule system to grant temporary 
access to outsiders to prevent excessive fishing pressure inside their concession. 
Nominally, the Seri should comply with regulations that apply to all Mexican fishers, 
such as the requirement that the cooperative holds fishing permits to sell the harvest 
legally. However, the Seri do not make use of their own permits and commercialize 
the harvest through permits owned by others (usually intermediaries from outside the 
community) (Basurto et al., 2012). In practice, there is no participation of the federal 
government in any aspect related to Seri fisheries.
FIGURE 12
Seri Indian benthic fishery, Mexico
Notes: (A) Past and present land territory of the Seri tribe, present Sonora State, Mexico. (B) Fishing 
grounds of the Seri community of Punta Chueca and of the neighbouring community of Bahía de 
Kino. (C) Pen shell fishing areas in the Infiernillo Channel. (D) Diver removing pen shells with an ad 
hoc tool.
Sources: (A) after Bourillón-Moreno (2002); (C) courtesy of Nick Mellos; (D) X. Basurto.
Baja California
Bahía de Kino (BK)
USA
Mexico
29
°N Punta Chueca (PC)
Sonora
Tiburon 
Island
Infiernillo Channel
Seri PC pen shell fishing grounds
BK pen shell fishing grounds
Gulf of California
50km
N
El Desemboque
A B
C
D
Territorial communal rights (traditional and indigenous users) 51
The Seri enforce their own rule system mainly through the Guardia Tradicional, 
an armed, informal group of community members whose main task is to police the 
Seri marine and terrestrial territory to prevent poaching and land invasions, and to 
ensure collection of monetary benefits (i.e. that outsider fishers pay the access fee to 
the governor) (Basurto, 2005).
Several factors are thought to contribute to the maintenance of Seri fisheries and 
rule system, including (Basurto, 2008; Basurto et al., 2012): (i) the narrowness of the 
Infiernillo Channel and the location of the Seri village next to it, which makes it easy 
for the Seri to observe the access and exit of boats; (ii) a long history of external threats 
constitutes a powerful incentive for internal cohesion in the defence of territory and 
resources, often in a violent or confrontational mode, which deters outsiders from 
unauthorized fishing in their marine territory; and (iii) the legal restitution of rights 
that legitimizes the Seri fishers as owners of their resources.
CASE 15: BRAZILIAN MARINE EXTRACTIVE RESERVES (RESEXS)
Marine Reserva Extrativistas (RESEXs, Table 14) are a component of Brazil’s national 
system of protected areas, promulgated as such in 2000 (Sistema Nacional de Unidades 
de Conservação da Natureza [SNUC]). Since 2007, the SNUC has been executively 
implemented by a special agency, the Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da 
Biodiversidade Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade (ICMBIO). 
Marine RESEXs originated as an extension of a type of protected area conceived 
TABLE 13
Case 14: Seri Indian benthic fishery (Mexico)
Main attributes of access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
In the 1970s, three presidential decrees granted the Seri formal rights (“ejidos”, a form 
of land tenure for agricultural communal lands) to a portion of their historic territories 
on the mainland, and permanent exclusive rights to harvest all marine resources in 
waters around Tiburon Island. 
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
The concession is limited to the Seri tribe and the Seri fishing cooperative. However, the 
Seri grant temporary access to outsiders to fish inside their concession.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Rights are conferred in perpetuity.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
Highly secure. In practice, the federal government is not involved in any aspect related 
to the fishery inside Seri territory. Management authority (beyond fishery issues) has 
been devolved to the Seri tribe.
Transferability of the rights Rights are non-transferable. Internally, however, the Seri grant temporary access to 
outsiders to fish inside their concession. Participation by non-Seri fishers in this fishery is 
high.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
The Seri have developed an informal rule system to grant temporary access to outsiders 
to harvest pen shells inside their concession. This has been in response to increasing 
pressure from outside fishers to access Seri fishing grounds, as resources in neighbouring 
communities have been overexploited (beginning in the mid-1980s). Important rules 
include: (i) outsiders must pay the Seri governor an access fee in the form of cash or pen 
shells; (ii) all non-Seri pen shell fishers must hire a member of the Seri community as part 
of the fishing crew.
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
High; the Seri govern themselves without external intervention. 
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations
The informal rule system developed by the Seri has been effective to prevent excessive 
increases in fishing pressure inside their territory. The Seri enforce their own rules 
through the Guardia Tradicional, an armed, informal group of community members 
whose main task is to police the Seri marine and terrestrial territory to prevent poaching 
and land invasions, and to ensure collection of monetary benefits. 
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Commercial hookah diving for pen shells and trapping blue crab are the most important 
fishery. Fishing teams are formed of 2–4 crew members per boat. In the case of the 
diving fishery, the crew consists of one or two divers, a helm, and a shucker.
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
No fishing season regulations. In the past few years, fishing has occurred year-round; 
production is greatest between October and June. 
Harvest controls No legal size regulations. 
Monitoring Monitoring (blue crab and pen shell) started in 2009 as collaboration between fishers 
and independent scientists. 
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to reconcile environmental preservation with traditional extractive economies in 
Amazonia, emphasizing the benefits of common property (Lobão, 2000, 2006). The 
first two marine RESEXs (including Pirajubaé, discussed below) were created in 1992. 
Before that time, access to coastal resources in Brazil was regulated only through 
informal arrangements (Cordell, 2006). A marine RESEX is generically defined as 
an area used by traditional populations whose livelihood is based on extractivism 
(artisanal harvest of natural resources), possibly complemented by other activities, 
having as main goals the protection of the livelihoods and culture of these populations 
and the sustainable use of the natural resources that they depend upon (Vasconcellos, 
Diegues and Kalikoski, 2011). Rights are communal and not transferable by individual 
fishers (Table 15). As rights are formally granted to local users, RESEXs activate an 
assortment of constituencies and prompt participatory management arrangements 
between state agencies and users, which imply new duties for the latter in the form of 
monitoring, decision-making and crafting of rules.
Main steps in the implementation of marine RESEXs (not strictly sequential in time) 
are:
rAn association, created to manage the prospective reserve, starts negotiations with 
the ICMBIO. 
rA concession of use rights (Contrato de Concessão de Direito Real de Uso 
[CCDRU]) is determined.
rThe association approves a management plan by consensus of the assembly of its 
members. The plan specifies regulations about who can fish, as well as where, how 
and what can be fished.
rA participatory council (Conselho Deliberativo [CD]) is created, with 
representation of various agencies and stakeholders. The CD establishes the rules 
that govern resource use in the RESEX.
The rights conferred are highly secure. Glaser and Oliveira da Silva (2004, p. 231) 
pointed to fundamental conflicts in the granting of exclusive access rights to local users, 
TABLE 14
Brazilian marine RESEXs 
State RESEX Municipality Area (ha) Creation date Families
Para Soure Soure 27 463 22 Nov 01 400
Para Araí Peroba Augusto Correa 11 479 20 May 05 900
Para Caeté-Taperaçu Bragança 42 068 20 May 05 3 000
Para Gurupí-Piriá Vizeu 74 081 20 May 05 4 500
Para Tracuateua Tracuateua 127 153 20 May 05 1 400
Para Chocoaré-Mato Grosso Santarém Novo 2 785 13 Dec 02
Para Maracanã Maracanã 30 018 13 Dec 02 1 500
Para São João da Ponta Curuçá & São João da Ponta 3 197 13 Dec 02
Para Mãe Grande de Curuçá Curuçá 37 062 13 Dec 02 2 000
Maranhão Cururupu Cururupu & Serrano do Maranhão 185 046 2 Jun 04 2 600
Piaui/Maranhão Delta do Paranaíba Ilha Grande de Sta Isabel/PI, 
Araióses/MA & Agua Doce/MA
27 021 16 Nov 00 2 500
Ceara Prainha do Canto Verde Beberibe 29 805 5 Jun 09
Ceara Batoque Aquiraz 601 5 Jun 03 230
Pernambuco Acaú-Goiana Caapoá, Pitimbu & Goiana 6 677 26 Sep 07
Alagoas Lagoa do Jequiá Jequiá da Praia 10 203 27 Sep 01 3 046
Bahia Baia do Iguape Maragojipe & Cachoeira 8 117 11 Aug 00 1 150
Bahia Ponta do Corumbau Porto Seguro & Prado 89 597 21 Sep 00 500
Bahia Cassurubá Porto Seguro 100 767 2009
Bahia Canavieiras Una, Cavieiras & Belmonte 930 490 5 Jun 06 1 300
Rio do Janeiro [1] Arraial do Cabo Arraila do Cabo 56 769 3 Jan 97 3 000
Sao Paulo Mandira Cananéia 1 175 13 Dec 02 22
Santa Catarina [1] Pirajubaé Florianopolis 1 444 20 May 92 200
Source: Information from the ICMBIO.
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as illustrated by the mangrove crab fisheries: national legislation defines mangrove 
areas as federal property, and so the exclusion of outsiders would be essentially illegal. 
These situations, however, can be circumvented, as illustrated by the concession of use 
rights (CCDRU) extended to the Mandira RESEX (Andrade, 2011). In this case, the 
federal territorial authority (Serviço de Patrimônio da União) devolved management 
authority to the environmental authority (Ministério do Meio Ambiente), so that the 
ICMBIO could make effective the concession of use of public marine territory. 
Currently, there are 22 marine RESEXs approved (Table 14, Figure 13:A), and others 
are under consideration. Two cases, extreme on various accounts, are discussed below. 
Pirajubaé, located within an urban area, is the southernmost RESEX implemented so 
far and one of the smallest. The nine RESEXs from Pará, located in rural areas at the 
northern end of the country, integrate a huge region encompassing the world’s largest 
continuous area of mangrove forests and swamps.
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FIGURE 13
Brazilian marine extractive reserves (RESEXs)
Notes: (A) Location of created and projected marine RESEXs along the coasts of Brazil. (B) 
Marine RESEXs of Pará State. (C) Catch of mangrove crab in Brazil and Pará State (top of 
the bars), 2001–07. (D) “Catador de caranguejo” (mangrove crab gatherer), Caratateua 
(Bragança, Pará State). (E) Pirajubaé RESEX showing the two areas rotated (A and B, notice 
location of RESEX within urban area). (F) “gancho” (pull dredge) used to harvest berbigão 
clams.
Sources: (A) updated from the ICMBIO; (B) courtesy of E.T. Paes; (C) data from IBAMA; (D) 
M. Pinheiro, SEBRAE/PA; (F) M. Tavares da Silva.
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The Pirajubaé marine RESEX and the berbigão clam fishery
Pirajubaé (Santa Catarina State, Figure  13:E), the first marine RESEX, was created 
in 1992 (Karam, 2009; P.  Pezzuto, personal communication, 2011). The Pirajubaé 
RESEX is embedded in an urban area (the municipality of Florianópolis, capital of the 
state) and has an extension of 1 444 ha. The main target resource of artisanal fishers is 
berbigão (Anomalocardia brasiliana), a small clam commercially fished with a push-
dredge (“gancho”, Figure 13:F). The recorded harvest from Santa Catarina State was 
about 50  tonnes in 2001–07 (www.ibama.gov.br/documentos-recursos-pesqueiros/
estatistica-pesqueira), but this is a gross underestimate; Souza (2007) estimated that the 
catch was of the order of 950 tonnes in 2005. This is considered a “recruitment fishery”, 
i.e. virtually all the catch is composed of individuals that reached commercial size in the 
current year (Souza, 2007).
The RESEX was created at the request of a group of 81  fishers, not formally 
organized. An association (Associação da RESEX Marinha do Pirajubaé [AREMAPI]) 
was created in 1995 by fishers that depended exclusively on the resources of the RESEX 
(14–30  families) and others that used those for self-consumption (“beneficiaries”, 
180–200 families). It functioned well in the beginning, according to rules agreed upon 
by organized fishers. In 1996, authorized by Brazil’s environmental authority, the 
Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (IBAMA), 
sand mining for public construction works destroyed part of the clam beds. This 
brought a conflict between fishers and IBAMA, and discredit of the latter. Starting in 
1997, owing to low abundance, IBAMA closed the fishery, although in the absence 
of enforcement illegal fishing continued unabated and without control. In the end, 
fishers were marginalized or displaced, and their organization weakened. Problems 
were compounded in 2001–02 by the allocation of 104 huts (“ranchos”) built along the 
shoreline, a form of mitigation to compensate for environmental damage. Assignment 
of ranchos was decided without participation of AREMAPI, and some recipients were 
considered illegitimate.
Following research conducted by scientists from a local university, the Universidade 
do Vale do Itajaí (UNIVALI), the fishery was formally restarted in 2003. Contacts 
between fishers (no longer organized) and IBAMA led to a regulatory framework, 
upgraded some time later with participation of some fishers, IBAMA and scientists from 
UNIVALI. By 2008, the recently created ICMBIO had established a more consistent 
presence, while in the meantime scientists from UNIVALI conducted substantial 
work on the identification of the “traditional population”, education and participatory 
activities. A new organization (Associação Caminhos do Berbigão [ACB]) was created 
in 2010 making it possible for the federal government to grant a CCDRU. The ACB is 
required to promote the organization, registry and representation of fishers. The CD 
of the RESEX has 30 members, including representatives of: (i) fishers who depend 
exclusively on resources from the RESEX (12); (ii) “beneficiaries” (6); and (iii) the 
fishing authority and NGOs (12). Current regulations (Instrução Normativa) recognize 
different categories of users; 25 commercial fishers are the only ones authorized to use 
the gancho (Table 15). The issue of who obtains fishing permits has been contentious 
as it is difficult to establish who the “traditional users” are in a RESEX located within 
an urban area. Access among members of the RESEX is regulated by means of effort 
controls.
The nine marine RESEXs of Pará and the caranguejo-uçá fishery
The nine marine RESEXs cover a combined area of more than 255 000 ha. According 
to ICMBIO, about 15 000 families depend on the harvest of natural resources, among 
which a mangrove crab (caranguejo uçá, Ucides cordatus) is one of the most important 
(Glaser, 2003; Glaser and Oliveira, 2004; Silva, 2008; Silva, Correa de Melo and Santos-
Paiva, 2008). Countrywide, recorded annual landings of caranguejo have dropped 
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by about 39 percent in recent years, from 11 135  tonnes in 2000 to 6 818  tonnes in 
2007 (Figure  13:C; www.ibama.gov.br/documentos-recursos-pesqueiros/estatistica-
pesqueira). At least in the sector between Ceará and Espirito Santo States, this drop 
coincided with recurrent incidence of caranguejo mass mortality occasioned by a fungal 
disease (Boeger et al., 2007). Landings recorded by IBAMA also dropped in the Pará 
fishery, from 5 214 tonnes in 2001 to 2 748 tonnes in 2007. Caranguejos hide in deep 
burrows, down to more than 1 m in the muddy substrate of mangrove swamps. Crabs 
are removed from their gallery at low tide by introducing the arm (“braceamento”) 
and/or with the help of a hook (“gancho”) (Figure 13:D, Table 15) (Silva, Correa de 
Melo and Santos-Paiva, 2008). Clogging of the galleries (“tapamento”) and snares 
(“laço”), although nominally banned by IBAMA, are also used. Recorded average 
daily CPUE (in terms of crabs per day per fisher) is commensurate between different 
studies: 150 in Bragança in 2003–04 (Araújo, 2006), and 167 in Quatipurú in 2006–07 
(Silva, Correa de Melo and Santos-Paiva, 2008). Regulations include a minimum legal 
size (6  cm carapace width), no take of females, and closures during the “andadas”, 
when crabs come out of the galleries for mating and egg hatching (e.g. DOU, 2012). 
A size-sex-season strategy may be sufficient to ensure biological sustainability (Glaser 
and Diele, 2004; Diele et al., 2010).
Glaser and Diele (2004) studied one sector of the region in the period 1997–2001, 
before the nine RESEXs were created, concluding that at the time this was a de facto 
open-access fishery. The fishery confronted serious issues of social and economic 
sustainability, in part because a combination of low entry cost and poverty in 
TABLE 15
Case 15: Brazilian marine extractive reserves (RESEXs)
Main attributes of the access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
A users association, created to manage the prospective reserve, starts negotiations 
with ICMBIO, the federal agency charged with implementing “conservation units” (of 
which RESEXs are one specific type). A management plan is elaborated and eventually 
approved by the authority, and a concession of use rights (Contrato de Concessão de 
Direito Real de Uso [CDRU]) is extended. 
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
The group of users is defined in the management plan. Rules are established by a 
participatory council (Conselho Deliberativo [CD]). 
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Long term (30 years), renewable. Rights can be revoked in cases of non-compliance with 
the management plan; conditions established in the CCDRU or federal legislation.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
Highly secure.
Transferability of the rights Non-transferable.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Access and benefits divisible among members of the community.
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
Generally high.
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations
Difficult and often contentious. ICMBIO and IBAMA have enforcement authority. The 
regime allows for “fiscais colaboradores”, who may be fishers or members of other 
user groups. Fiscais prepare “autos de constatação”, which must be backed by three 
witnesses and may lead to the indictment of violators.
Harvesting strategies: 
Pirajubaé berbigão fishery
Fishing methods and gear Only “gancho”, a push net, is authorized for commercial fishing. Other users have to 
gather clams manually. 
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
Rotation of ground divided in two sectors; 1 November – 31 July: bed A, 1 August – 31 
October: bed B.
Harvest controls Minimum legal size (20 mm shell length), 10 percent tolerance. Only 25 commercial 
fishers. Time window: 5 am –2 pm.
Harvesting strategies: Pará 
caranguejo-uçá crab fishery
Fishing methods and gear “Braceamento” (introducing the arm in the crab gallery) and/or hook (“gancho”) 
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
No fishing in reproductive period or “andada” (Ley No. 7.679/1988), as defined by IBAM. 
Strong pressure and proposals to better adequate closures to crab reproductive biology.
Harvest controls Only males, minimum legal size (6 cm carapace width).
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rural areas continued to attract new entrants in spite of declining CPUE. In recent 
years, partly prompted by the implementation of the RESEXs, there has been 
regular interaction between fishers organizations, government agencies and NGOs, 
motivated by concerns about the use of the mangrove ecosystem in general and of 
the caranguejo resource in particular (Glaser and Oliveira, 2004; Diele et al., 2010). 
Consensus about improvements needed in the caranguejo fishery was expressed in 
the Carta de Bragança (FPCU, 2009), which makes extensive recommendations on 
education, research, regulations, enforcement, processing, social issues, marketing and 
institutional arrangements.
CASE 16: COLOMBIA’S AFRO-AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (PIANGUA FISHERY)
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 and “Law  70” of 1993 (known as “Ley de 
Negritudes”) acknowledged the right to collective entitlement of historic territories 
occupied by Afro-Colombian communities that make up about 90  percent of the 
population along the Pacific coast of the country (Figure  14:A, Table  16). These 
communities are formed by descendants of slaves arrived in the seventeenth century 
for mining exploitation (DNP, 2007). The area under the regime defined by Law 70 
has an extension of almost 6 million ha, including 233 403 ha of mangrove swamps 
(Orjuela et al., 2009). About 40 percent of the rural population in this area are settled 
along rivers and practise a variety of economic activities, including fishing in mangrove 
swamps, where one of the main fishing resources is the “piangua” (Anadara tuberculosa 
and A. similis, known as blood cockles in English) (Espinosa et al., 2009). Harvested 
by hand in the muddy intertidal zone of mangrove swamps (Figure  14:D), piangua 
sustains the main mollusc fishery in Colombia. Entitlement over natural resources 
contemplated in Law 70 (Art. 6) is restricted to soil and forests. It is unclear if muddy 
bottoms fringing mangrove forests (piangua habitat, technically tidelands, and as such 
public property) can be legally entitled to the communities (González-Cuesta, 2004), 
but in any case they can be granted as concessions for administrative and management 
purposes.
Law  70 specified the procedures to claim rights, defined the beneficiaries, and 
established the process to accommodate claims by a diversity of public and private 
stakeholders (Vélez, 2011). Authority has been devolved to communities for issues of 
cultural identity and the use and conservation of natural resources within a territory. 
In order to claim territorial rights, communities are required to self-organize around 
community councils, which implied a major change in governance. Community 
councils control the use and conservation of natural resources within their territories 
(Meza, 2010), among other governance functions. There are 157 councils, which vary in 
membership and in the extension of the territory claimed. In some cases, the councils 
define entry rules, regulate access to resources, and delimit extraction areas. Trespassing 
of boundaries of extraction areas defined by towns or community councils is a frequent 
source of conflict. Within council boundaries, associations have been established 
in some towns to harvest and sell piangua; 36  such organizations were identified in 
the Department of Nariño in 2004 (Candelo-Reina, 2005). Occasional conflicts arise 
among piangua gatherers, intermediaries and Ecuadorian traders, who sometimes offer 
boats with motors to take piangua harvesters to extraction areas, where the product is 
paid for on the spot (Espinosa et al., 2010). Armed conflicts involving different factions 
constitute a major threat to the governance system, and to the social matrix of the 
communities (González-Cuesta, 2004).
Organizations involved in different aspects of the fishery management include the 
national fisheries and conservation authorities, municipal-level support (through the 
Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria [UMATA]), fishers associations 
(e.g. Asociación de Concheras de Nariño [ASCONAR]), conservation-oriented 
NGOs (e.g. World Wildlife Fund [WWF] Colombia), and academic organizations 
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(e.g. Universidad del Valle). Interaction between players has taken diverse forms, among 
them a participatory information institution known as Conversatorios de Acción 
Ciudadana, these are a sort of “town hall” meeting contemplated in the Constitution 
(Candelo-Reina, 2005). The territories of many communities of piangua harvesters 
overlap with protected areas, such as the Sanquianga Park (with about 80 000 ha of 
protected mangrove and more than 2 000 piangua gatherers, Figure 14:C; Zapata and 
Caicedo, 2011), the Utria Park (with 110 ha of mangrove swamps), and the delta of the 
Baudo River (a Ramsar conservation site, 5 585 ha of mangrove swamps; Villa et al., 
2009). National parks are excluded from the regime, even if fishing communities are 
FIGURE 14
The “piangua” clam fishery of the Colombian Pacific coast
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Notes: (A) Departments of the Colombian Pacific coast where Afro-Colombian communities have 
been collectively entitled with user rights over natural resources. (B) Approximate number of 
“piangüeras” by department. (C) Nariño Department, which concentrates the largest number of 
piangüeras, with indication of mangrove areas, community councils and the Sanquianga National 
Park. (D) Piangüera at work in a mangrove swamp. (E) Landings of piangua from Tumaco Bay 
(a major producing area), 1996–2008.
Sources: (A), (C) and (D) INVEMAR; (B) based on Delgado et al., 2010; (E) based on Borda and Cruz 
(2004) and Gil-Agudelo et al. (2011, their Table 2).
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located within their boundaries. Nesting of communities within protected areas has led 
to ad hoc management arrangements with park authorities, with provisions for specific 
management-related and monitoring activities (Gil-Agudelo et al., 2011). In Sanquianga 
Natural Park, 52 percent of towns and communities have some sort of organization, 
well above the average for the Nariño Department (28  percent), suggesting that the 
existence of the park facilitates self-organization (Zapata and Caicedo, 2011).
It is estimated that more than 11  300  families from rural areas, all of them on 
low incomes, depend to some extent on piangua gathering along the Pacific coast 
of Colombia (Figure  14:B); the number of users may increase in periods of high 
demand (Delgado et al., 2010). Traditionally, harvesting was conducted by women 
(“piangüeras” or “concheras”, about 78  percent of the gatherers in 2004; Candelo-
Reina, 2005) and children. However, current demand and low profitability of 
alternative activities have led to increased entry of men (Espinosa et al., 2009; Candelo-
Reina, 2005), which has generated gender-related conflicts; women feel displaced by 
men in areas of difficult access, and also complain about men damaging mangrove roots 
during piangua extraction. Originally, piangua was consumed locally, but in recent 
years there has been a growing demand from Ecuador, which imports 80-85 percent 
of the production (Borda and Cruz, 2004). Landing statistics are fragmentary, 
based mostly on information provided by associations of concheras (Gil-Agudelo 
TABLE 16
Case 16: Colombia’s Afro-American communities (piangua fishery)
Main attributes of the access 
regime
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
Collective entitlement of historic territories to communities of traditional users. 
Technically, muddy areas fringing mangrove forests are considered tidelands (and as 
such public), although they can be granted as concessions for management purposes. 
Within communities, community councils may play a role in regulating access.
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
Exclusive access rights vested collectively on community members.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Rights can be revoked in cases of non-compliance.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
Legally secure entitlement, but threats owing to intruders, illegitimate users and violent 
conflict.
Transferability of the rights Non-transferable.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Contingent upon internal, informal arrangements within communities.
Flexibility in the use of the 
rights
High.
Enforceability of rights and 
compliance with use-rights 
limitations
Enforcement is difficult, in part owing to various sources of conflict. Informal sanctions 
are weak.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Hand gathering in mangrove swamps, mostly by women and children.
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
Closures are either informal or based on ad hoc local arrangements. In some cases, a 
“rest season” has been agreed upon due to excessive exploitation. The “rest season” 
instead of “close season” intends to capture the fact that it is voluntary and not 
enforced. In the Sanquianga National Park, agreements have been reached with 
communities, including temporary closures. Piangua can be harvested for only 16 days 
each month.
Harvest controls A minimum size (5 cm, shell length) for piangua is the only formal regulation. A smaller 
minimum size adopted in Ecuador (4.5 cm) generates conflicts because about 80 percent 
of the production is exported to that country. 
Some management initiatives have originated from piangua gatherers themselves, in 
some cases accompanied by government agencies. In the Sanquianga National Park, 
agreements included temporary closures, restriction of participation by children, rotation 
of areas, mangrove reforestation, and closures during extreme tides, when a larger 
fraction of the swamps is exposed. Three communities overlapping with the Baudo River 
delta Ramsar site agreed to a gradual increase in minimum size, three-month closures, 
and rotation among communities.
Monitoring Catch information is provided by associations of concheras. Concurrence of the 
communities is required for the assessment or exploitation of natural resources. 
Community members participate in monitoring. 
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et al., 2011). The best data correspond to Tumaco Bay, where recorded annual landings 
were in the range of 100–700 tonnes in 1996–2008 (Figure 14:E), and (more recently) to 
the Sanquianga National Park (Gil-Agudelo et al., 2011). The value of annual landings 
is in the order of U$S10 million (Delgado et al., 2010).
The piangua resource is thought to be severely overfished, and is threatened by the 
degradation of mangrove habitat from various anthropogenic impacts (INVEMAR 
et al., 2010; Delgado et al., 2010; Gil-Agudelo et al., 2011). CPUE, measured as catch 
per day, declined slightly in Sanquianga Park since 1998 (Zapata and Caicedo, 2011), 
but the number of working hours per day has generally increased and gatherers have 
moved progressively farther from settlements (Delgado et al., 2010).
TERRITORIAL COMMUNAL RIGHTS (TRADITIONAL AND INDIGENOUS USERS) – 
RECAP
These cases are different from the others because fishing rights are usually only part of 
a broader package of rights restored to communities of indigenous peoples (Cases 5.1 
and 5.3) or traditional users (Case 5.2). Significant devolution of management authority 
results in two-tier governance systems, in which some decisions are made at the 
national level (e.g. “bounding” the community), while rules for the access to resources 
(e.g. Case 5.2.1) or benefits (e.g. Case 5.1) are decided within the community. Issues of 
legitimacy raised by the definition of “communities” can be very complex. Moreover, 
granting of exclusive communal rights may be in conflict with national legislation, as 
exemplified by the mangrove fisheries for clams in Colombia (Case 5.3) and crabs in 
Brazil (Case 5.2.2).
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7. Transversal subjects
The following sections discuss several themes that run across cases, attempting to 
identify commonalties and regularities, and to derive some lessons. 
ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF RIGHTS SYSTEMS
The systems of access privileges and rights discussed in the above sections have diverse 
of origins, an important consideration in order to assess their performance.
Biological sustainability. Concerns about biological sustainability have been the 
most common reason for the introduction of privileges and rights, usually top-down 
and designed de novo. There have been two basic triggers: (i) overfishing (real or 
perceived) resulting in a crisis (Cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9); and (ii) new or expanding 
fisheries, usually associated with the development of market opportunities (Cases 3, 6 
and 10).
Social equity for access opportunity and conflict resolution. While the customary 
tenure systems discussed here (Cases 11–13) have been successful from the viewpoint 
of biological sustainability, in their origin they were motivated by the need to provide 
rules for an equitable or fair allocation of access opportunities and to reduce use 
conflicts in tightly knit communities. Elaborate but informal rules that regulated access 
(transfers, inheritance, lotteries, etc.) have the potential to maintain some level of social 
equity in the distribution of benefits from the fishery in the cases considered.
Conservation (biodiversity and ecological integrity). This objective is explicit 
only in the case of the Brazilian RESEXs, which also attend to historical rights and 
cultural identity. In the case of Chilean AMERBs, while the letter of the law only 
attends to issues of biological sustainability, in many circles (particularly academia) it 
is argued that they are also instruments for conservation (Meltzoff, Lichtensztajn and 
Stotz, 2002). The interpretive document of the law (SUBPESCA, 1995) introduced the 
notion of “secondary species” (essentially predators and competitors of the target or 
“principal” species), requiring a detailed baseline study with a description of benthic 
communities in the area prior to granting the concession of use. The information 
accumulated over 15  years has not been used for management purposes. Even if 
conservation was not a consideration in their inception, it is probable that AMERBs 
have positive collateral conservation effects by providing protection to species other 
than those targeted (Gelcich et al., 2010). Other collateral effects have received less 
attention. As an example, the ecological consequences of the removal of predatory 
loco snails (a “capstone” predator), well studied in the rocky intertidal (Castilla, 1999), 
have not been investigated for the subtidal zone, where AMERBs focused on loco are 
located.
Restitution of historical rights to indigenous or traditional users. Historical 
rights and preservation of cultural identity have been the main motivation for the 
restitution of historical use rights to Afro-Colombian communities (Case 16), the Seri 
Indians from Sonora (Mexico, Case  14), Chilean originary peoples, and traditional 
users of the Brazilian coastal zone (Case 15). 
DEVOLUTION OF AUTHORITY
Among the fisheries considered here, there are three basic categories of devolution of 
authority by the State, a driver of institutional sustainability:
None, the case when access privileges are vested directly on individual fishers or 
boats (Cases 1–6). Participatory ambits, when they exist, have only a consultative role 
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and are not binding: the PMB in the Galápagos sea cucumber fishery (Case  1), the 
Comisión de Manejo de las Pesquerías Bentónicas de las Regiones X y XI (COMPEB) 
in the Chilean sea urchin fishery (Case 2), and the advisory committees of the Chilean 
Juliana clam fishery (Case 3), the San José Gulf fisheries (Case 4) and the Patagonian 
scallop industrial fishery (Case  6). However, it is often the case that the fisheries 
authorities adopt the recommendations made by these bodies, especially when a 
consensus has been reached. In all cases, the creation of these bodies has had positive 
results, even when progress is perceived as slow. Participation in boards or committees 
requires that fishers become organized (associations and cooperatives) and designate 
representatives. Politicization of the latter and questions about their legitimacy are 
recurrent problems, particularly when membership is large. Participatory processes are 
weakened when politicized leaders lobby at the level of the executive authority, where 
interests external to the reserve and the fishery predominate (e.g. Case 1; Heylings and 
Bravo, 2007).
Some, when authority is devolved to fishers organizations, typically the case of 
TURFs and territorial concessions (e.g. Cases 7, 8 and 11). In all cases reviewed, the 
organizations have full control of membership, and therefore access privileges within 
their TURFs. Although some organizations cannot legally close their registries, they 
charge very high entrance fees, which constitutes a de facto limited-entry mechanism. 
Collective rights foster organization, needed for collective sales, coordination of TURF 
vigilance, distribution of costs and benefits, sanctioning for non-compliance with 
internal rules, and building of social capital. Among the cases reviewed, devolution 
is most significant in the case of territorial concessions to cooperatives with a long 
history of organization (Cases  8 and 11). One factor that contributes strongly to 
effective devolution of authority is the upholding in court of sanctions imposed by the 
organization to rule-violating members (e.g. Case 11). 
Significant, when historical rights are restored to communities of traditional users 
or indigenous peoples. In these systems, as discussed above, there are two tiers of 
authority.
There is a special circumstance common to many small-scale fisheries targeting 
sea bed resources that play a central role in institutional sustainability: the overlap 
between fishing grounds or villages with areas receiving some form of protection 
for conservation reasons (Table  17). Several of the systems included in this study 
fall into that category. Interaction between agencies with an ecological conservation 
mandate, conservation-oriented NGOs and fishers organizations have been generally 
constructive, resulting in better fishers organization, improved practices and effective 
enforcement. Initial distrust has often given way to strategic alliances (e.g. Case 4).
TABLE 17
Interfaces with areas designated for conservation
Case Conservation unit Relation Effects on fishery References
1: Galapagos 
Islands sea 
cucumber fishery
Galapagos Marine Reserve 
(GMR) World Natural 
Heritage Site (UNESCO)
Galápagos National Park 
(administers the GMR, in 
charge of implementation 
of regulations and 
enforcement).
Fishery fully 
contained within 
the boundaries of 
the reserve
Zoning of uses
Creation of participatory board 
(aim: reserve management, with 
fishers’ participation) 
Improved monitoring and 
enforcement
Greater definition of access 
privileges (exclusive for local 
residents)
Toral-Granda and 
Martínez, 2004; 
Baine et al., 2007; 
Castrejón, 2011
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Case Conservation unit Relation Effects on fishery References
4: San José Gulf 
scallop diving 
fishery
Natural Protected Area 
(NPA) Península Valdés
Valdés Peninsula World 
Natural Heritage Site 
(UNESCO)
Fishery fully 
contained within 
the boundaries of 
the NPA
Prohibition of damaging fishing 
gear
Zoning of uses 
Creation of participatory board 
(aim: fisheries management 
inside NPA, with fishers’ 
participation) 
Reinforcement of limited entry
Enhanced institutionalization
Orensanz et al., 
2007
7: Chilean 
AMERBs
Isla de Choros Marine Park Fishery contained 
within the 
boundaries of the 
reserve during 
specific periods 
(specified in 
management 
plan). The reserve 
is adjacent to an 
AMERB belonging 
to a fishers 
organization. 
Agreements between reserve 
authorities and fishers for 
co-administration and vigilance 
of the reserve
Exacerbated conflicts among 
user groups for unequal 
access to the reserve (access 
initially granted to the fishers 
organization grantee of the 
adjacent AMERB, excluding 4 
other groups with historical use 
of the area)
Lack of coordination among 
intervening agencies leading to 
inaction
UCN, CEAZA and 
CREDHU, 2007
Case Conservation unit Relation Effects on fishery References
8: Concessions 
from central Baja 
California
El Vizcaíno Biosphere 
Reserve
Isla Guadalupe Biosphere 
Reserve
Part of the fishery 
contained within 
the boundaries of 
the reserves
Creation of participatory boards 
(aim: reserve management, 
with fishers’ participation) 
(in addition to lobster fishery 
boards)
Prohibition of damaging fishing 
gear
Reinforced vigilance
9: Rock scallop 
predio
Alto Golfo de California 
y Delta del Río Colorado 
Biosphere Reserve
Part of the fishery 
contained within 
the boundaries of 
the reserve
Creation of participatory board 
(aim: reserve management, 
with fishers’ participation) (in 
addition to state rock scallop 
committee) 
Increased enforcement (within 
reserve limits) 
Greater definition of access 
privileges (due to limited-entry 
policy implemented in the 
reserve)
Increased – costly – requirements 
for the cooperative (e.g. 
environmental impact 
assessment)
Cudney-Bueno 
et al., 2009a; 
Martínez-Tovar 
and Turk-Boyer, 
2012
Sea cucumber 
fishery
Bahía de Loreto National 
Park
Fishery fully 
contained within 
the boundaries of 
the park
Creation of participatory 
board (aim: park management, 
with fishers’ participation) (in 
addition to state sea cucumber 
committee)
Improved monitoring and 
enforcement
Greater definition of access 
privileges 
Avendaño-
Ceceña, 2007; 
Reyes-Bonilla 
et al., 2008; 
M.T. Sanchez, 
personal 
communication
Sea cucumber 
fishery 
Bahía de los Ángeles 
Canales de Ballenas y de 
Salsipuedes Biosphere 
Reserve
Fishery (target 
of Bahía de los 
Ángeles fishers) 
fully contained 
within the 
boundaries of the 
reserve
Creation of participatory board 
(aim: reserve management, with 
limited fishers’ participation) (in 
addition to state sea cucumber 
committee)
In the process of further 
defining access privileges and 
fishing restrictions
Avendaño-Ceceña, 
2007; Danemann 
and Ezcurra, 2007; 
Cinti, 2010
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INCENTIVES FOR RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND STEWARDSHIP
Latin American fisheries targeting sea bed resources vary greatly in the incentives 
offered for stewardship and conservation, drivers of biological sustainability:
None, including some fisheries important in terms of landings and employment. A 
notable example is the pepitona clam fishery from Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
(Lodeiros et al., 2012). 
Weak, the case of moratoria when there are a large number of participants (Cases 1 
and 2). Incentives are stronger when the number of participants is smaller (e.g. Case 3).
Basic, in the case of catch shares and some TURFs. Incentives offered by the latter 
vanish when there are no effective internal rules to regulate the access of members of 
the fishers organization or cooperative holding the territorial concession (e.g. Case 9), 
or when the productivity of the TURF is too low to justify transaction costs associated 
with TURF maintenance. Incentives offered by catch shares vanish under conditions of 
weak enforcement, even if the number of participants is small (e.g. Case 4).
Case Conservation unit Relation Effects on fishery References
10: Concessions 
for seaweed 
extraction from 
Chubut Province 
(Argentina)
Parque Inter-Jurisdiccional 
Marítimo Costero Patagonia 
Austral
11: Lobster 
concessions of 
Punta Allen
UNESCO Sian Ka’an 
Biosphere Reserve
Most of the fishery 
contained within 
the boundaries of 
the reserve
Zoning of uses
Creation of participatory board 
(aim: reserve management, with 
fishers’ participation) 
Prohibition of use of a local 
palm to construct the fishing 
gear (casitas) (now entirely 
made of ferrocement)
In some cases, internal rules 
or cooperative agreements 
have been incorporated to 
the management plan of the 
reserve, e.g. prohibition of scuba 
and hookah as fishing gear.
Briones-Fourzán, 
Lozano-Álvarez 
and Eggleston, 
2000; Sosa-
Cordero, Liceaga-
Correa and Seijo, 
2008
12: Juan 
Fernández Islands 
lobster fishery
Juan Fernández National 
Park
Proposed: Área Marina 
Protegida de Múltiples Usos
15: Brazilian 
RESEXs
RESEXs themselves are 
conservation units
Creation of participatory board 
(aim: RESEX management, with 
fishers’ participation) 
Greater definition of access 
privileges/rights (exclusive for 
locals)
Higher level of fishers 
organization and involvement in 
management
Exacerbated conflicts among 
user groups owing to issues of 
exclusion and illegitimacy of 
membership of the association 
that holds the RESEX 
16: Piangua 
fishery, Afro-
Colombian 
communities
Sanquianga National Park
Utría National Park
Baudó River delta RAMSAR 
site
Part of the fishery 
contained within 
the boundaries of 
protected areas
Agreements between park 
authorities and fishing 
communities to establish sites 
with different exploitation levels 
and temporal closures
Improved monitoring
Higher level of fishers 
organization Environmental 
authorities work together with 
community councils for the 
protection of mangroves
Espinosa et al., 
2009, 2010; 
INVEMAR et 
al., 2010; Gil-
Agudelo et al., 
2011; Villa et al., 
2009; Zapata and 
Caicedo, 2011
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Strong, in TURFs held by strong organizations and in cases of customary tenure 
(informal access privileges to fishing spots). In successful TURFs, there are clear 
internal rules for access by organization members (e.g. Cases  8 and 11) and/or for 
the distribution of costs and benefits, and a graduated system of sanctions for non-
compliance. In successful Chilean AMERBs, the catch (typically, loco snails) is 
obtained with the participation of all the fishers on predetermined dates. No diving 
activity by individual members is allowed within the TURF during the rest of the time. 
BIOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY
Evaluating the biological sustainability of benthic fisheries is difficult for the same 
reasons that complicate stock assessments: the persistent spatial heterogeneity of stock 
structure and dynamics, and consequently of the fishing process. Spatial heterogeneity 
is extreme in cases such as the Colombian piangua and the Brazilian mangrove 
crab fisheries, where stocks and fishing communities mirror the fragmentation of 
coastscapes. In the case of the Chilean loco fishery, heterogeneity is exacerbated by 
the management regime, as hundreds of relatively small TURFs are monitored and 
managed independently from one another. An effort to assess the performance of the 
regime (Techeira, 2012) found extreme variability using average density as an indicator 
of stock status within individual TURFs.
The biological sustainability of some of the fisheries considered here is however 
attested by a long history free of collapses or crises. This is the case for three lobster 
fisheries (Cases 8, 11 and 12), in all of which the current management system is rooted 
in traditional tenure involving some form of territorial access privileges. Two of those 
fisheries (Cases 8 and 11) have been certified by the MSC, and the third (Case 12) is 
entering the pre-certification stage.
Indicators other than landings are currently monitored in most of the fisheries 
considered here, either through surveys (Cases 1, 3, 4 and 6–9, plus intertidal mussel beds 
in Argentine Patagonia and beach clams in Uruguay) or fishery-dependent information 
(Cases 2, 11 and 12). In other instances, partial information has been collected through 
research conducted by academic projects or NGOs (Cases 15 and 16). Most time series 
are too short (and in some cases information-limited) to judge performance in terms 
of biological sustainability, but the prospects have clearly improved in most cases in 
which monitoring was introduced concurrently with institutional consolidation of a 
participatory management system (e.g. Cases 2–4).
However, some fisheries have proved unsustainable. Vagaries of recruitment and 
climate-driven episodes of mass mortality (e.g. Case 7, macha fishery) contribute to 
challenge policies based on incentives for responsible behaviour when communities are 
too dependent on single-species fisheries. In the Chilean macha fishery, TURFs have 
aggravated the problem by eliminating fishers migration (a form of spreading risk), 
locking them into small, intrinsically variable areas (Aburto and Stotz, 2013). Climatic 
forcing associated with the El Niño phenomenon also contributed to declines in the 
Galapagos Islands sea cucumber fishery, but here the problems in the management 
system discussed above were a major cause of collapse.
ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY
Several factors hinder the economic sustainability of rights-based benthic fisheries. The 
following emerged recurrently in this overview: 
Poverty, demographic pressure and low entry cost. Entry cost is minimal in 
many benthic fisheries, particularly in the case of hand gathering. For that reason, the 
coastal zone has historically absorbed workers displaced by crises in other sectors, e.g. 
agriculture and mining. Demographic pressure on resources from extended coastlines 
poses a major challenge to the implementation of access privileges.
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High transaction costs of rights-based systems. Transaction costs of rights-
based systems are high as a rule, but are particularly demanding to fishers in the case 
of territorial access privileges. In the Chilean TURF system, the costs of mandatory 
surveys and vigilance, plus a tax per unit area (to be abolished in 2013), have forced the 
abandonment of many TURFs by the holding fishers organizations. 
Global economic drivers. The economic sustainability of the main fisheries 
considered here (sea urchins, sea cucumbers, scallops, Juliana clams, loco snails, lobsters, 
etc.), especially those that supply export-oriented markets, is highly conditioned by 
contingencies that are beyond management control, such as the monetary policy of the 
country, and the fluctuations of global markets. Ex-vessel value of landings of Chilean 
loco and Argentine tehuelche scallops, for example, are driven by supplies of cultured 
abalone and bay scallop meats from China.
Dependence on one or a few resources. Diversification of the portfolio of 
opportunities, not only across specific resources but also across activities, is perhaps 
the best alternative for risk management (Hilborn et al., 2001; Sethi, 2010). The 
most immediate form is a “basket of resources”, often implemented in the form 
of stackable permits or licences. While in principle this form of diversification 
may alleviate the impact of external drivers (economic or climate), in practice, the 
dependence on lucrative, export-oriented resources may be unavoidable given large 
price differences between those and other resources marketed domestically. Another 
problem associated with this, particularly in the case of territorial access privileges, 
is a form of triage in which less-valuable resources are overfished to safeguard the 
most valuable ones. Diversification may extend to activities other than fishing, 
including small-scale aquaculture (now promoted in Chilean TURFs), added value 
(new markets, denominations of origin, certification, pre-processing, etc.) and 
community involvement in ecotourism (Lopes, Silvano and Begossi, 2011). The latter is 
facilitated when fishing communities are coincidental with protected areas, a frequent 
pattern discussed above. However, there are some due caveats. Broadening the scope 
of territorial use privileges to include activities other than fishing often collides with 
other users of the coastal zone and with regulatory frameworks for other activities 
(navigation, recreation, development, etc.). Moreover, tourism can be distortive of 
the social matrix of fishing communities, some of which have opted for regulating 
the activity. Tourism-related development frequently encroaches on the traditional 
territories of fishing communities (e.g. Case 15, Brazilian marine RESEXs; Diegues, 
2008). 
Fishers’ organizations or communities holding territorial privileges or rights have 
access to fewer conventional opportunities: subsidies, compensations and credit. Many 
organizations have been very successful in attracting subsidies from government 
agencies or NGOs, aided by a discourse that has substantial appeal among the public, 
the media and politicians (Gelcich et al., 2005). Several Chilean TURF-holding 
organizations have claimed compensation from industries (mining, and industrial 
aquaculture) for environmental damage, to the extent that in some cases compensations 
have become a more attractive source of income than fishing. Resources in the TURFs 
(with the backing of surveys conducted by consultants) have been used in some cases 
(mostly in central Chile) as collateral for credit, either to individual fishers or to the 
organizations. On some occasions, this has worked against biological sustainability, as 
fishers have been more inclined to deplete their holdings rather than default on their 
debt to the banks. 
SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY
In the cases introduced above, social sustainability hinges on the issues of equitable 
distribution of access opportunities and legitimacy of the participants. The two 
are intertwined, as being a legitimate user is a general condition for holding access 
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privileges (formal or informal). The most common criteria for establishing legitimacy 
are history of participation, family ties with participants (e.g. Cases  11 and 12) and 
compliance with rules (formal or informal). Equity problems arise recurrently when 
a formal rights-based system is implemented and privileges are first allocated, as 
discussed below. These issues are significant in the case of small-scale fisheries, but 
are not drivers of sustainability in the one industrial fishery considered here (Case 6, 
Patagonian scallop industrial fishery). Issues of equity found in this overview fall into 
three main categories:
Equity among individual rights holders: catch shares. When privileges are granted 
to boat owners, crew members do not receive a share even if they are legitimate users 
on account of their history of participation. Privileged permit-holders often become 
de facto intermediaries, leasing their licensed boats to legitimate but non-privileged 
participants (e.g. Case 4), or laundering the catch from non-licensed boats (e.g. Case 9; 
Cinti et al., 2010). In general, the granting of individual privileges by the State, whether 
to boat owners or individual fishers, leads to official registries that do not reflect 
the active participants and the trading of individual quotas (Cases 4, 5 and the failed 
attempt to introduce ITQs in the Galapagos Islands sea cucumber fishery).
Equity among user groups. Another form of the initial allocation problem comes 
with the granting of sea bed tracts to organizations in formal TURF systems. This 
is well illustrated by two families of consequences of the top-down implementation 
of the Chilean AMERBs. The first pertains to variation in productivity among the 
fishing grounds accessible to fishers from different caletas. Faced with the prospects 
of being left empty-handed during the distribution of sea bed access privileges, fishers 
organizations felt compelled to request AMERBs even when sea bed tracts accessible 
to them were not particularly productive. In the end, the transaction costs of keeping 
low-productive AMERBs were too high relative to benefits, and many organizations 
“abandoned” their TURFs (e.g. stopped hiring consultants to conduct the annual 
surveys required for quota allocation).
The second type of problem emerged because there was not a process of stakeholder 
identification before AMERBs were granted to organizations on a first-come first-
served basis. As a result, many users were excluded from their traditional fishing 
grounds. In some cases, conflict was solved through informal arrangements between 
user groups, as exemplified by the renunciation of some TURFs in Ancud Bay 
(Case 7; San Martín, Parma and Orensanz, 2010). In others, there were elaborate access 
agreements between groups of users, e.g. among macha clam fishers in Coquimbo 
Bay (San Martín and Norambuena, 2008). There, fishers from three caletas (Peñuelas, 
San Pedro/La Serena and Coquimbo) historically harvested macha clams from 
common fishing grounds. In 2000, the fishers’ organization of Peñuelas took the lead 
and formally requested an extensive AMERB, granted in 2002. Discontent of excluded 
users surfaced soon afterwards. The conflict was resolved through an agreement for the 
common use and vigilance of the area among the three organizations, representatives of 
the regional government and the fisheries authority. Peñuelas remained, however, the 
sole legal holder of the AMERB (Cinti, 2006).
Equity among members of organizations, cooperatives or communities. Criteria 
for legitimacy are more realistically defined when access rules are established by fishers 
organizations or local communities, without intervention of the fisheries authority 
(e.g. Cases  11 and 12). In contrast, difficult problems were encountered during the 
initial granting of territorial use privileges to Chilean organizations targeting loco 
snails. The only formal legitimacy criterion was that members had to be registered 
artisanal fishers – they could be registered for any resource and activity, independently 
of the target species within the requested tract. This loophole effectively broke down 
the existing moratorium in the loco fishery, opening a door to individuals with no 
history of loco harvesting (San Martín, Parma and Orensanz, 2010). In recent years, 
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most fishers organizations, faced with overblown memberships and dwindling per 
capita benefits, have adopted strict internal rules to restrict access of new members. 
PROVISION OF SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL SUPPORT
Input of scientific and/or technical support for management can occur at different levels 
depending on the structure and nature of the decision-making process: (i) directly to 
the fisheries authority (Case 6 or the small coastal gathering fisheries targeting yellow 
clams in Uruguay and mussels in El Riacho, Argentina); (ii) to a participatory advisory 
committee (Cases  1–3), or (iii) to local fishers organizations. Some of the cases 
considered here are hybrid, particularly in those involving territorial access rights, 
where local fishers organizations may retain the services of consultants that report 
to the fisheries authority (Cases 7 and 9) The cooperatives of central Baja California 
retain their own experts that monitor resources jointly with agency technicians, 
which contributes legitimacy to the process (Ponce-Díaz, Weisman and McCay, 2009; 
McCay, Weisman and Creed, 2011). In Chilean AMERBs, the hiring of a consultant to 
coordinate the annual survey and produce a report is seen in some cases solely as an 
administrative requirement to obtain a TAC (San Martín, Parma and Orensanz, 2010). 
Monitoring of the lobster fishers from the Juan Fernández Islands was started by the 
collaboration between a proactive fishers organization and independent scientists 
(Ernst et al., 2010a), but is now conducted with funding from the fisheries authority.
The demand for (and cost of) scientific and/or technical support is highest where 
a TAC is part of the regulations (whether or not including catch shares, Cases 1–6), 
and minimal in customary tenure systems (Cases 11–13). Where access privileges over 
tracts of seabed are vested on fishers organizations (Cases 7–9, 11 and 13), these assume 
at least part of the cost of assessing resources within territorial boundaries, albeit often 
with direct or indirect subsidies (e.g. Case 11; González et al., 2006).
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
Enforcement is inherently difficult in small-scale fisheries, where small boats can 
land the catch anywhere along extended coastlines. This is in sharp contrast with 
industrial fisheries, logistically constrained to operate from few locations and for 
that reason enforceable (Orensanz et al., 2005). In fact, enforcement does not present 
major problems in the one industrial fishery discussed (Case 6). Management of the 
considered small-scale fisheries faces three main families of enforcement problems: 
Exclusion of illegitimate users in the case of territory-based privileges (Cases 7–9, 
15 and 16). Vigilance and deterrence displays by organizations or communities are often 
insufficient to discourage intruders, largely because the former lack legal enforcement 
authority. Maritime authorities are slow to react, and so violators are rarely prosecuted 
in court. This has repeatedly led fishers to take justice into their hands, in the form of 
physical interference with intruders’ fishing operations (Cases 11 and 15), which may 
end up in court. 
Rule violations by fishers holding individuals privileges (licences or catch shares). 
In the absence of the strong internal rules typical of TURFs, ineffective enforcement 
weakens fishers organizations, promotes a race for fish even within small commons, 
and dilutes the incentives supposedly associated with restricted access. 
Rule violations by members of groups holding access privileges. These are 
generally well controlled by TURF-holding organizations (Cases  7, 8 and 11). 
Sanctions in Chilean and Mexican cooperatives may involve reductions in the benefits, 
suspensions, or even exclusion from the organization. Penalties are, as a rule, more 
severe than those imposed by the fisheries authority. Endorsement of sanctions by the 
authority, particularly in the face of litigation in court, is a significant issue. 
Participation of community members in enforcement, beyond vigilance and 
deterrence displays, is difficult because of legal constraints on the devolution of 
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authority. A solution that has been recurrently implemented is the designation and 
training of respected members of the community, whose testimony can be used by the 
corresponding authority. In Chilean caletas, the “alcalde de mar” is a citizen appointed 
by the maritime authority to supervise activity in a particular artisanal harbour or 
caleta (e.g. recording boat arrivals and departures) and report violations. This person is 
usually a respected community member (an ex-fisher in most cases). Brazilian RESEXs 
allow for “fiscais colaboradores”, who may be fishers or members of other user groups. 
Fiscais prepare “autos de constatação”, which must be backed by three witnesses and 
may lead to the indictment of violators.
DISCUSSION – RECAP
The diversity of access systems introduced in this study and the consideration of several 
significant issues across cases suggest simple general lessons. Rights and privileges 
(whether formal or informal) contribute to the sustainability of these fisheries, 
particularly in the case of territorial access privileges. However, even in that case, 
success depends on fishers organization, productivity of the territory, enforceability 
of boundaries and effective devolution of authority. The most salient lessons of this 
comparative exploration is that there are no general recipes other than the need to 
attend to the multiple aspects of sustainability (biological, social, economical and 
institutional) when a system is implemented, providing for flexibility and adaptiveness, 
creating ambits for interaction among stakeholders (fishers, managers, scientists and 
environmentalists being the main ones), and counting on transparent and effective 
support from the State regarding enforcement, legislation and courts.
PART II
Latin American rights-based 
fisheries targeting finfish species
Juan Carlos Seijo, Minerva Arce, Eduardo Pérez, 
Álvaro Hernández and Miguel A. Cabrera
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8. Introduction
The case studies reported in this Part  II specify the main attributes of the property 
rights (Shotton, 2000) granted or assigned by the corresponding finfish fisheries 
management authority: (i) the exclusivity of participation in the fishery; (ii) the 
duration of the rights conferred; (iii) the security or quality of the title conferred by 
the rights; (iv) the transferability of the rights; (v) the divisibility of the rights assigned; 
and (vi) the flexibility associated with the use of the rights. One critical aspect in the 
case studies is the actual rights enforceability, and corresponding compliance with use 
rights limitations.
The cases also report on: (i) how the rights are conferred and upheld; 
(ii) how these rights are defined in terms of who has the right to use the specific finfish 
resources; (iii) which component of the population structure (if any, minimum and/or 
maximum size restrictions) or portion of the fishery stock TAC may be used; (iv) how 
it is to be caught (fishing methods and gear used); and (v) when fishing is authorized 
to take place.
A final discussion section attempts to include answers to the following questions: 
rHow can the property rights systems illustrated in the case studies improve the 
incentives for stewardship, conservation and sustained profitability? 
rWhat sorts of distributional implications are there in each of the rights-based 
finfish fisheries reported?
rWhat sorts of operational requirements do the different types of property rights 
documented demand in terms of research, enforcement, administration and actual 
fishing operations?
The four case studies reported in Part II are:
r individual vessel quota (IVQ) management of the anchovy (Engraulis ringens)
fishery of Peru;
r individual stakeholder quota management of the hake (Merluccius gayi gayi) 
fishery of Chile;
rcommunity territorial use rights in the Gulf weakfish (Cynoscion othonopterus) 
fishery of the Gulf of California, Mexico;
r limited entry with spatial management of maximum allowable effort (MAE) 
of artisanal communities in the multispecies multigear finfish fishery at Coiba 
National.
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9. Individual vessel quota 
management of the anchovy 
(Engraulis ringens) fishery of Peru
INTRODUCTION
Large fluctuations in fish stocks and long-term changes in human harvest of marine 
resources are well known from long before modern exploitation started and harvesting 
technology became efficient enough to make significant stock reductions (Hjort, 1914; 
Jakobsson et al., 1995). Historical long-term changes in stock abundance have been 
related to climatic changes as pointed out by Øiestad (1994), and fish stocks seem to 
fluctuate over time in relation to warm and cold periods in ocean waters. Andersen and 
Sutinen (1984) and Ishimura, Punt and Huppert (2005) acknowledged large fluctuations 
in stock levels and yields on a year-to-year basis due to stochastic recruitment processes, 
and Hannesson (1993) considered the choice of optimum fishing capacity of fish stocks 
that vary at random. Conklin and Kolber (1994) reported that stock assessment surveys 
consistently reveal fluctuating stock levels regardless of whether or not they are subject 
to exploitation. Seijo (1995) reported an environmentally driven stock-recruitment 
function with decadal fluctuations for the anchovy and sardine fisheries of Peru, using 
a sine function with 33year cycles. Steinshamn (1998) applied a dynamic Gordon-
Schaefer model using a sine function, with alternative cycles of 4, 8 and 12 years, for 
the exogenous disturbance affecting fish stock reproduction over time. 
A decade ago, Kliashtorin (2001) found that populations of the most commercially 
important Atlantic and Pacific fish species – Atlantic and Pacific herring, Atlantic cod, 
European, South African, Peruvian, Japanese and Californian sardine, South African 
and Peruvian anchovy, Pacific salmon, Alaska pollock, Chilean jack mackerel and some 
others  – undergo long-term simultaneous oscillations. Concerning climate change 
effects on fish stocks, evidence reported by Cochrane et al. (2009) indicates that climate 
change is modifying the distribution of marine and freshwater species. Schreiber et al. 
(2011) report on the evolution of coping strategies in the anchovy fishery of Peru to 
deal with climate variability and extreme El Niño–Southern Oscillation events.
Within these complexities, the Government of Peru established in 2008 a 
rights-based system of IVQs to manage the world’s largest fishery  – the anchovy 
(Engraulis ringens and Anchoa nasus) fishery.
In peak years, landings of Peruvian anchovies (Engraulis ringens) account for about 
10 percent of global fish, harvested from the most productive marine ecosystem that 
exists (Bakun and Weeks, 2008). With the IVQ system for the Peruvian anchovy 
fishery, the share of global fish catches managed by rights-based management systems 
has increased dramatically, especially in Latin America. It is considered by many 
a major step for fostering marine stewardship and for mitigating the race to fish in 
the most productive marine ecosystem of the world (Costello, Gaines and Lynham, 
2008). Because of the above, the Peruvian anchovy fishery has received much attention 
because of its size, and also because it is the most important input for the fishmeal 
and fish oil industry (Tveteras, Paredes and Peña-Torres, 2011; Chu, 2009). It also 
means that the representation of developing countries using rights-based management 
systems in fisheries has increased substantially. Of the 18  countries that had ITQ 
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schemes in 2006 only 6 were developing countries (Chu, 2009), including Argentina 
and Chile that score high on the human development index and are probably better 
classified as emerging economies. Consequently, it seems that individual quota systems 
are best suited in countries with strong institutions. However, if a developing country 
with presumed weak institutions can successfully introduce ITQs for a fishery that 
generated more than US$1 billion in export revenues in 2009, it could pave the way for 
a broader application of rights-based management systems around the world. 
BRIEF HISTORIC EVOLUTION OF THE FISHERY
The anchovy (Engraulis ringens) is a fast-growing small pelagic species that reaches 
a maximum size of 20  cm. It lives in moderately cold waters (16–23  °C in summer 
and 14–18 °C in winter) with salinity in the range of 34.5–35.1 UPS. It has a highly 
gregarious behaviour, forming large and dense schools facilitating their harvest. In the 
South Pacific, its geographic distribution involves the Peruvian and Chilean coastal 
area between latitudes 03°30’S and 37°00’S (Ñiquen et al., 2000). Two stocks have been 
differentiated: the northern-centre stock of Peru (03°30’–16°00’S), which exhibits the 
highest concentrations; and stock of south Peru  – north of Chile (16°01’–24°00’S). 
Spawning occurs most of the year with two periods of high intensity: the highest taking 
place in winter (August–September) and the other in summer (February–March). 
Anchovy feeds exclusively from plankton (phytoplankton and zooplankton) (Ñiquen, 
Espino and Bouchon, 2000b).
It is recruited to the fishery at 5–6 months of age, and a size of 8–9 cm. Recruitment 
usually occurs between December and April (IMARPE, 2012). The interannual 
and decadal fluctuating nature of small pelagics as anchovy (Chávez et al., 2003), is 
expressed in Figure 15. Although this marks the beginning of the rights-based fishery 
management, three years is a relatively short period to assess fishery performance 
under the rights-based system.
Anchovy fishing takes place along the Peruvian coast area involving 1  200  purse 
seine vessels using a mesh size of 13  mm. Anchovy is also captured by small-scale 
vessels within a 5 mile exclusive fishing area for artisanal fishing. Anchovies are usually 
caught in the coastal area within 60 nautical miles at depths of less than 100 m.
Concerning spatial distribution of target species and fleets targeting the anchovy 
species, Bertrand, Díaz and Ñiquen (2004) show that: (i) Peruvian anchovy exhibited 
a composite spatial strategy characterized by a change in biomass associated with both 
FIGURE 15
Peruvian catch of anchovy (Engraulis ringens and Anchoa nasus), 1950–2011
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change in geographical extension and density; (ii) fishing behaviour varied significantly 
within and among vessels in terms of travel duration, searching duration, and number of 
fishing sets; and (iii) interactions between fish and fisher behaviour differed according 
to the spatial scale. As previously reported by McCall (1984) and Csirke (1989), fishing 
was more efficient with low biomass and high spatial concentration (low stock range 
and high biomass). Bertrand, Díaz and Ñiquen (2004) also found that at a local fish 
spatial scale fishing performance was favoured by high mean local abundances and low 
spatial concentration, and that at the school scale both high abundance and high spatial 
concentration were favourable to fishing success.
The historic harvest of anchovy shows interannual and interdecadal fluctuations 
with highest catches reported in 1972, 1994, and 2005 (Ministerio de Producción, 
2012). In this period, major El Niño–Southern Oscillation events of 1972–73, 1982–83, 
1997–98 caused substantial decreases in annual catches followed by time-varying 
recovery periods (Ñiquen, Espino and Bouchon, 2000; Ñiquen and Bouchon 2004; 
IMARPE, 2011).
There were 1 232 registered industrial vessels targeting anchovy for indirect human 
consumption in 2010, with a total storage capacity of 220 922  tonnes (Ministerio de 
Producción, 2010).
Spatial area for the anchovy fishing regime
The geographic specification for the application of the Peruvian anchovy rights-based 
fishery management regime involves the area between the northern extreme of Peru’s 
maritime domain and parallel 16o00’00”S, outside the reserved areas for artisanal and 
small-scale fishing.
Figure 16 shows the fish quotas allocated by the Ministry of Production to harvest 
anchovy species in the Northern-Centre stock area as well as in the Southern stock 
area. Fish quotas are allocated per semester to each of the above-mentioned areas. Fish 
quotas established for the Northern-Centre stock area are substantially higher than the 
ones indicated for the Southern stock area.
Figure 16 shows that the TACs of 2010 and 2011 allocated to fish in the North-
Centre stock area are 4.4 and 6.7  times greater, respectively, than the ones allocated 
to fish in the Southern stock area. It can also be observed that 2010 catch of anchovy 
represented only 63.7 percent of the total maximum fish quota specified for 2010. In 
2009 and 2011, the actual catch of anchovy and the corresponding maximum quotas 
are very similar.
FIGURE 16
Total catch and total allowable catches of anchovy harvested in the North-Centre 
and Southern stock areas after the rights-based system was established
Sources: Ministerio de la Producción – Perú (2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2012).
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Recently, the Ministry of Production authorized for the first fishing season 
(April-July) of 2012 for anchovy (Engraulis ringens and Anchoa nasus) the area 
comprising the extreme north of Peru’s maritime domain and parallel 16o00’00”S. The 
maximum limit of TAC catch has been established for this first fishing season of 2012 
at 2.7 million tonnes. PRODUCE also determined a minimum size restriction of 12 cm 
for both species. A tolerance of 10 percent of harvest below minimum size is allowed 
(OLDEPESCA, 2012).
Figure  17 shows the anchovy fishing areas and the allocation of the TACs for 
harvesting anchovy for indirect human consumption in both the North-Centre stock 
area and Southern stock area.
FISHERY PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLACE
The law on vessel quota limits was established through Presidential Legislative Decree 
No. 1084 issued in June 2008. As stated in its Article 1, it had the purpose of establishing 
a fisheries management mechanism applicable to the extraction of the anchovy species 
(Engraulis ringens and Anchoa nasus) for indirect human consumption. It was aimed 
at improving the conditions for modernization and efficiency of the industrial sector 
and securing a responsible use of hydrobiological resources in harmony with the 
conservation of the marine environment and its biodiversity.
Before June 2008, the Peruvian anchovy fishery had been managed under a regulated 
open-access regime. As mentioned above, in 2009, an IVQ regime was implemented, 
and consequently, TAC quotas were established for each of the two stock areas 
(North-Centre and Southern) per semester.
The law establishes that two fishing seasons will be specified per year for the two 
stock areas. One fishing season in the first semester of the year, and the other in the 
FIGURE 17
Peruvian anchovy (Engraulis ringens) fishing areas and corresponding 
catch quotas for the North-Centre and the Southern stock areas in 2011
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second semester. The duration of the fishing seasons will depend on environmental and 
biological conditions observed by the Marine Research Institute of Peru (IMARPE). 
However, for the Southern area, there are no closed seasons specified as in the case of 
the North-Centre area.
In 2011, the President of Peru abolished Supreme Decree No. 003-2008-PRODUCE, 
which had established a Special Fishing Regime for anchoveta (Engraulis ringens) in 
the Southern stock area between 16°00’S and the southern extreme of the Peruvian 
maritime domain. With the above-mentioned Supreme Decree, industrial vessels 
harvesting anchovy species had the possibility of fishing within the 0–5mile area, 
historically reserved exclusively for artisanal and small-scale fishing of a high diversity 
of marine species. It should be pointed out that anchovy harvest by artisanal and 
small-scales vessels within the 5mile area should be used exclusively for direct human 
consumption.
Maximum limit of TAC and IVQs
The 2008 fisheries law indicates that the Ministry of Fisheries will establish, for each 
fishing season, a maximum limit of TAC of anchovy resources (Engraulis ringens 
and Anchoa nasus) for indirect human consumption, based on a biomass scientific 
report prepared by IMARPE. It also specifies that a maximum catch limit per vessel 
(i.e. IVQ) will be established by multiplying the percentage of maximum catch per 
vessel (PMCPV) by the maximum limit of TAC for the corresponding fishing season. 
In accordance with the regime established by Decree No. 25977, the maximum catch 
per vessel is determined by the Ministry of Fisheries based on a vessel participation 
index. This index is calculated by adding up the following components: 
r60  percent stemming from the vessel-catch participation index of the year of 
vessel’s highest percentage participation of total catch registered in the Ministry of 
Fisheries in the period 2004 to date. For this calculation, only anchovy harvested 
within the area comprising the extreme north of Peru’s maritime domain and 
parallel 16o00’00”S will be considered.
r40  percent stemming from the vessel storage capacity index resulting from 
dividing the authorized capacity in the fishing permit to harvest anchovy by the 
total storage capacity authorized by the Ministry of Fisheries.
Concerning wooden boats, subject to the regime established in Decree No. 26920, 
the vessel-catch participation is the one involving the highest percent participation of 
the vessel in the total anchovy harvest from 2004 up to 2009, when the rights-based 
system was put in place. 
The PMCPV (MCPVi), either subject to the regime of Decree No. 25997, Fisheries 
Law, or the regime established by Decree No.  26920, is calculated by dividing the 
vessel-catch participation index (VPIi) by the total sum of all participation indices of 
authorized vessels, i.e. 
The procedure for calculating the maximum catch limit per vessel (IVQ) indicates 
that the Ministry of Production, based on the maximum limit of the TAC of anchovy 
species for indirect human consumption, will determine for each fishing season the 
maximum catch limit per vessel for every licence owner. The IVQ is obtained by 
multiplying the PMCPV by the maximum limit of the TAC. The allocated maximum 
catch limit per vessel is kept during the fishing season, unless the Ministry of Production 
modifies the maximum limit of the TAC as a result of a scientific recommendation 
indicated by IMARPE. In such a case, the maximum catch limit for each vessel will be 
adjusted accordingly. The uncaught biomass fraction of the maximum catch limit for 
each vessel is not transferable to future fishing seasons.
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Exclusivity and duration of the rights conferred
Vessel harvesting of anchovy (Engraulis ringens), can only take place if the vessel 
has a valid fishing licence to harvest anchovy (Engraulis ringens) and white anchovy 
(Anchoa nasus) for indirect human consumption. It is also required that each vessel 
carries an onboard satellite tracking system  – SISESAT, which must permanently 
transmit the geographic position of the vessel through a satellite navigation system.
The 2008 fisheries law also establishes that fishing licence holders can sign 
permanence warranty contracts with the Ministry of Production to secure the 
maximum catch limit per vessel established in the rights-based fishing regime. The 
duration of the permanence warranty contracts is ten years. Nevertheless, the Ministry 
of Production retains the possibility to regulate the fishery as a result of biological 
measures recommended by IMARPE.
Security or quality of the title conferred by the rights
Article  6 provides legal stability concerning the PMCPV that will be maintained 
without alteration during the validity period of the current management measure. If 
during four consecutive fishing seasons the non-captured percentage of the maximum 
catch limit of a vessel (IVQ) exceeds 20 percent in each period, the relative participation 
index of the vessel will be adjusted by deducting the average non-captured percentage 
in that period. 
The sum of the average non-capture percentages deducted from vessels will be 
proportionately added, in the next fishing season, to the remaining licensed vessels’ 
percentage of maximum catch per vessel not subject to such reduction.
Divisibility of the rights assigned
The catch reported for the same period and geographic area will be considered for the 
case of fishing permits involving storage capacity substitution. If, because of storage 
capacity substitution, two or more vessels were granted anchovy fishing permits, the 
authorized catch for the vessel giving origin to the substitution will be divided in the 
corresponding proportion. 
Transferability of fishing rights
Once a PMCPV has been attributed to a specific vessel, it will be linked to the 
corresponding fishing licence associated to the vessel from which the initial allocation 
calculations were made. The PMCPV cannot be transferred in vessel-independent 
form. If the vessel from which the initial allocation calculations were made is 
dismantled or dedicated in definite form to another fishery or subject, the vessel 
licence owner could request authorization to obtain an authorization of substitution 
of an equal capacity volume of the existing vessel – the PMCPV could be associated or 
incorporated to another or other vessels of the same licence owner. If the vessel owner 
still has pending compliance of sanctions determined by the Ministry of Production, 
the above-mentioned association or incorporation will not proceed. 
RIGHTS ENFORCEABILITY
The fact that the anchovy catch does not significantly exceed the fish quotas established 
is an indication of good fisheries management based on sound enforcement and 
compliance. However, there are reports indicating that some fraction of the catch of the 
artisanal sector of southern Peru is still used to produce fishmeal and fish oil instead of 
using it for direct food consumption, which is the only authorized use of the harvest.
COMPENSATION FUND FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
The 2008 Peruvian fisheries law also created the Compensation Fund for Fisheries 
Management. This fund will be formed with the contributions of licence owners who 
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harvest anchovy species for indirect human consumption. The interest earned from 
the fund will be reinvested in the fund. The Fund will exclusively finance fisheries 
management and benefit programmes established in the 2008 law.
A summary of the main attributes of the Peruvian anchovy fishery 
(Engraulis ringens) regime is presented in Table 18.
DISCUSSION OF THE IVQ SYSTEM AND RECENT PERFORMANCE
The property rights system illustrated in this case study seems to improve the incentives 
for stewardship, conservation and sustained profitability because most of the attributes 
of non-attenuated property rights seem to be in place in the design of the 2008 fisheries 
law of Peru. 
The IVQ rights-based system described above provides rights exclusivity, a 
duration of the right regime for ten years, and a warranty contract that provides 
security of licence ownership. Rights divisibility is allowed, as long as the percentage of 
maximum catch for the specific vessel that is to be substituted, or its percentage divided 
up between two or vessels, is not exceeded. Vessel quota rights are non-transferable 
independently of the vessel unit itself. 
TABLE 18
Summary of main attributes of rights-based management regime in place for the Peruvian anchovy 
(Engraulis ringens) fishery
Main attributes of the access 
regime
Description
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
The individual vessel quota (IVQ) is determined by the Ministry of Fisheries based 
on vessel participation index. This index is calculated by adding up the following 
components: 
a) 60 percent stemming from vessel-catch participation index of the year of vessel’s 
highest percentage participation of total catch registered in the Ministry of Fisheries in 
the period 2004 to date. For this calculation, only anchovy harvested within the area 
comprising the extreme north of Peru’s maritime domain and parallel 16°00’00”S will 
be considered.
b) 40 percent stemming from vessel storage capacity index resulting from dividing 
the authorized capacity in the fishing permit to harvest anchovy by the total storage 
capacity authorized by the Ministry of Fisheries.
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
The 2008 fisheries law also establishes that fishing licence holders can sign permanence 
warranty contracts with the Ministry of Production to secure the maximum catch limit 
per vessel established in the rights-based fishing regime.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
The duration of the permanence warranty contracts is 10 years.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
Article 6 provides legal stability concerning the percentage of maximum catch per 
vessel (PMCPV) which will be maintained without alteration during the validity period 
of the current management measure. Nevertheless, if during four consecutive fishing 
seasons the non-captured percentage of the maximum catch limit of a vessel (IVQ) 
exceeds 20 percent in each period, the relative participation index of the vessel will be 
adjusted by deducting the average non-captured percentage in that period.
Transferability of the rights The PMCPV cannot be transferred in vessel-independent form.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
If, because of storage capacity substitution, two or more vessels were granted anchovy 
fishing permits, the authorized catch for the vessel giving origin to the substitution will 
be divided in the corresponding proportion.
Actual rights enforceability, 
and corresponding compliance 
with use rights limitations 
The fact that anchovy catch does not significantly exceed the fish quotas established 
is an indication of good fisheries management based on sound enforcement and 
compliance.
Harvesting strategies 
Fishing methods and gear Anchovy fishing takes place along the Peruvian coast area with 1 200 purse seine 
vessels using a mesh size of 13 mm. Anchovy is also captured by small-scale vessels 
within a 5mile exclusive fishing area for artisanal fishing. Anchovies are usually caught 
in the coastal area within 60 nautical miles at depths of less than 100 m.
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
Fish quotas are allocated per semester to Northern-Centre stock area and the Southern 
stock area. Fish quotas established for the Northern-Centre stock area are substantially 
higher than the ones indicated for the Southern stock area.
Harvest controls In addition to spatial monitoring of vessels, individual vessel recording of harvest is 
checked against the IVQ on a real-time basis. 
Monitoring Each vessel carries an onboard satellite tracking system – SISESAT, which must 
permanently transmit geographic vessel position through a GPS.
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Although three years of having the rights-based fisheries management scheme in 
place might not be sufficient to assess its performance properly, Tveteras, Paredes and 
Peña-Torres (2011) reported that there have considerable improvements in the fishery 
as a result of the rights-based management system being put operationally in place 
since the fishing seasons of 2009.
The initial distributional implications of the 2009 Peruvian fisheries law allowed, 
under the special fishing regime, industrial vessels to harvest anchovy for indirect 
human consumption (fishmeal and fish oil) within the 0–5mile limit coastal area. This 
arrangement involved changing the historic exclusive rights granted to artisanal and 
small-scale fishers to harvest a high diversity of marine species, including anchovy 
for direct human consumption within a 0–5mile limit area. However, as noted 
above, in 2011, the President of Peru abolished the corresponding Supreme Decree 
No. 003-2008-PRODUCE.
As pointed out by Aranda (2009a), the Peruvian IVQ model aims at stopping the 
race for fish without allowing the full transferability of rights and thus concentration 
of wealth among few operators. The current regime provides the possibility of allowing 
capacity substitution of a withdrawing vessel, which could result in some boat owners 
deciding to harvest their quotas using fewer vessels. This could involve a reduction 
in fishing capacity and a corresponding increase in efficiency. However, a highly 
attractive fishery such as the Peruvian anchovy will tend to foster increases in the 
price of registered vessels and their associated rights and licences, as the purchase of 
registered vessels is the only way that outside investors may enter the fishery.
The IVQ system currently in place requires effective surveillance and enforcement 
mechanisms to yield the expected performance operationally. The IVQ system and 
its complementary financing instruments strengthens, through cost recovery from 
stakeholders, the monitoring, control and surveillance of the fishery (Aranda, 2009b).
This new fishing regime is a step in the direction of mitigating unsustainability of 
fisheries (Seijo, 2008; Seijo et al., 2011) through properly dealing with environmental 
fluctuations of the Humboldt Current ecosystem, local governance issues and 
distributional impacts.
The scientific capacity of Peru, through IMARPE, to monitor the state of the 
Humboldt Current ecosystem and the fishery itself allows for the possibility of 
having adequate and timely information for establishing fishing seasons per semester 
and the corresponding TACs for both the North-Centre and Southern stock areas. 
The existing real-time information system for the anchovy fishery in the Ministry of 
Production also provides the possibility for following the catch of individual vessels 
over the fishing seasons. The major challenge seems to be to maintain an efficient and 
transparent monitoring, surveillance and enforcement system.
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10.   Individual stakeholder 
quota management of the hake  
(Merluccius gayi gayi) fishery 
of Chile
BRIEF HISTORIC EVOLUTION OF THE FISHERY
There is evidence of hake capture in 1930s in the central-southern zone of Chile. 
Nevertheless, the quantitative available precedents on landings of hake (Merluccius gayi 
gayi) go back to about 1940. According to the Chilean Under-Secretary of Fishing, the 
development of this fishery was associated strongly with the key role the State played 
in the process of industrialization and growth of the country at the end of the 1930s.
In the period 1940–45, registered landings did not exceed 15 000 tonnes. In 1946, 
with the incorporation of industrial vessels, a phase of exponential growth in landings 
began, achieving maximum harvests of 90 000  tonnes in 1955 and 130 000 tonnes in 
1968. In this period, the main destiny of these catches was to be a raw material for 
the first plants to produce fishmeal that were located in the central-southern zone of 
Chile, near Talcahuano. The boom in the extraction sector as well as the associated 
fishmeal production is explained essentially by the application of an economic policy 
with tributary incentives and dynamic tariff reductions on capital assets, which allowed 
the blossoming of the fishmeal production sector and the construction of new vessels. 
However, this intensive expansion resulted in a collapse in the catches, diminishing to 
levels of 20 000 tonnes at the beginning of the 1980s. At the beginning of the 1970s, a 
ban was established on using the resource for indirect human consumption, authorizing 
its harvest only for direct human consumption, with a greater involvement of the State 
in the production process. The political turmoil in Chile in 1973 also meant a change 
in public policies, involving: an economic unilateral opening to foreign investment; an 
aggressive reduction of duties as of 1974; a restitution of private initiative to a leading 
role in the economy; and the application of policies of open access to fish resources.
This situation resulted, as predicted in fisheries bioeconomic theory (Anderson, 
1977; Clark, 1985, Hannesson, 1993; Seijo, Defeo and Salas, 1998; Anderson and 
Seijo, 2010), to an overinvestment in fleet and plant capacity, with the corresponding 
resource overexploitation. This resulted in landings falling to 20 000–30 000 tonnes. In 
1982, the national fishing authority introduced for the first time the concept of TAC, 
in addition to other regulations on fishing gear. As a result, in 1983 and 1989, a TAC 
of 45 000 tonnes was established, which in general was not reached owing to the poor 
conditions of the stock. Keeping TACs at a low level and the regulation of fishing gear 
allowed the recovery of the stock after almost a decade.
The 1990s found Chile’s economy in good condition, marked by an opening to 
the global economy reflected in free-trade agreements signed with many nations. 
The announcement of a new general law of fisheries and aquaculture established the 
concept of maximum catch limits. The aim was to distribute a given level of the TAC 
allocated to the industrial sector among stakeholders that have vessels authorized to 
fish for hake.
The economic prosperity, added to the rebuilding of the stock, influenced an 
increasing pressure on the part of the extractive and processing sector for an increase 
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in the TAC. In this period, landings began to be increased until reaching a maximum 
of 121 000 tonnes in 2001. Landings then suffered a new collapse, a situation that is 
observed until the present time.
Finally, in December 2011, the Fishing Authority submitted to the Parliament for 
its discussion a document that modifies the general law of fisheries and aquaculture 
contained in Law No. 18,892, incorporating for the first time in Chilean legislation the 
concept of ITQs. This new general law of fisheries and aquaculture was passed by the 
Parliament on 19 December 2012. A summary of the main attributes of this new law, 
which is not yet in operation, is presented at the end of this section.
TIME SERIES OF REPORTED CATCH OF COMMON HAKE
The first hake landing records date from the beginning of the 1940s. A predevelopment 
phase covers the period 1940–46 with catches of about 15  000  tonnes (Figure  18). 
The growth phase is observed in the historical series from 1947 to 1952, and the 
full exploitation phase occurred in the period 1953–1961, while the overexploitation 
phase was between 1962 and 1968. The phase of collapse occurred after a historically 
observed maximum landing in 1968 of 130  000  tonnes. In this last stage, observed 
landings fell to about 30 000  tonnes, equivalent to the values observed in the 1940s. 
Finally, the recovery phase is observed just after 1988 when catches again showed the 
pace of biomass growth. However, a new fishery collapse occurred in the early 2000s.
Only since 1969 have catch statistics made the distinction between industrial and 
artisanal landings. From that year until the early 1980s, the artisanal participation in 
total landings was low, about 7  000  tonnes. Greater participation in total catch has 
been observed since 1984, coinciding with the collapse of industrial landings. With 
the recovery phase and the increase in total landing from 1989, the artisanal sector 
increased its participation of total landings, reaching 31  000  tonnes, its historical 
maximum. In the collapse phase in the early 2000s, the artisanal participation decreased 
to values observed in the 1970s, with landings of only 4 000 tonnes.
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TARGET SPECIE AND PORT LOCATIONS OF FLEETS
Genetic studies (Hernández, Galleguillos and Oyarzún, 2000) have established 
that the common hake of Chile is a taxonomic entity other than the Peruvian hake 
(Woznitza-Mendo and Guevara-Carrasco, 2000).
FIGURE 18
Time series of reported landings of common hake in Chile
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It has been determined that there 
is one population of common hake 
in Chile (Subsecretaría de Pesca, 
2010), which is distributed between 
29°S and 47°S, although catches range 
from 30°S to 41°S (Aguayo, 1994). 
The main landing ports (Figure  19) 
are Coquimbo (IV  Region), San 
Antonio and Valparaiso (V  Region), 
Duao and Constitución (VII  Region), 
Talcahuano, Coronel, Tome and San 
Vicente (VIII  Region) and Valdivia 
(IX Region).
INPUT AND OUTPUT FISHERY 
REGULATIONS OVER TIME
In its beginnings (1930s), the fishery 
was in an open-access regime, but 
the fleet was of artisanal character. A 
decade later, industrial vessels entered 
the fishery.
The first TAC regulations were introduced in the early 1980s. In addition, 
restrictions were introduced on fishing gear, and it was established that the trawl net 
must have a mesh size not less than 100 mm in the codend.
Since 1991, new entry of artisanal and industrial vessels to the fishery is closed. 
This has ended the open access regime. In 1995, new management measures affected 
differentially the fishing effort of artisanal and industrial vessels: mandatory use 
of longline or gillnet for the artisanal fishers, and bottom trawl net or longline for 
industrial fishers.
As mentioned above, the fishery has been regulated by catch quotas since 1982, but 
since 1992 the TAC has been divided between the artisanal fishers and the industrial 
fleet (Figure 20).
Two years later, the authority decided to divide the fishing season into two periods: 
January–September and October–December.
By 1997, catch restrictions had been introduced, but in relation to the appearance of 
hake as bycatch of other fisheries (e.g. in the trawl fishery of crustaceans and stripes). 
Regulations indicated that incidental harvest of hake catch could not exceed a certain 
percentage of target species catch.
In 2005, new restrictions on trawling were introduced. For those vessels for which 
hake was the target, a mesh size of 100 mm was established, equipped on the top panel 
of the codend with knotless square mesh and a mesh size of at least 90 mm. Similarly, 
the covered codend was prohibited. For those vessels having other than hake as their 
target, a minimum mesh size of 120 mm was established.
In 1999, as a result of the early exhaustion of the catch quota, there was a set three 
fishing seasons per year: January–September, October and November. As shown in 
Figure 20, since 2001 there has been a TAC for “research fishing”. In 2003, the annual 
TAC was divided in the form of 65 percent for the industrial fleet and 35 percent for 
the artisanal one.
In the case of the industrial fleet, since 2001, a particular management regime, based 
on non-transferable individual quotas, called the maximum catch limit per ship owner 
(MCLS), has been established. The MCLS is the result of multiplying the relative 
coefficient of participation by a ship owner (expressed as a percentage with seven 
decimal places) by the total annual catch quota corresponding to the industrial sector, 
FIGURE 19
Political subdivision in Chile with distribution 
of the regions mentioned in the text
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expressed in tonnes. According to the law of 1991, to determine the relative catch 
participation rate for a ship owner, catches of all vessels licensed to the ship owner 
over a period of two years are divided by the total catches for the same period of all 
licensed ship owners.
For the case of the artisanal fleet, the allocation of the TAC is more complex to 
explain as it is indexed geographically. The administrative figure that governs them 
is called the Artisanal Extraction Regime, that consists of the distribution of the 
FIGURE 20
Historical TAC and total landings of common hake in Chile
TABLE 19
Artisanal fleets targeting hake resources in different coastal regions of Chile
Region Quota (tonnes) Artisanal Extraction Regime by zone Quota (tonnes)
IV CTP IV North CTP IV, North
Centre CTP IV, Centre
South CTP IV, South
V CTP V North CTP V, North
Centre CTP V, Centre
South CTP V, South
VI CTP VI North CTP VI, North
Centre CTP VI, Centre
South CTP VI, South
VII CTP VII North 1 CTP VII, North 1
North 2 CTP VII, North 2
Centre CTP VII, Centre
South CTP VII, South
VIII CTP VIII North CTP VIII, North
Centre CTP VIII, Centre
South CTP VIII, South
IX CTP IX -- CTP IX
XV – X CTP XV - X -- CTP XV – X
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artisanal fraction of the total quota of catch of a certain region, specified for area, size 
of the vessels, cove, fishers organization or individually. This is an additional fishery 
management measure that the authority may establish and that is provided by decree 
and is applied to fisheries that have their access suspended. For the different country 
regions, Regions IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and XV have artisanal fleets targeting the 
hake resource. The artisanal quota is then divided in turn by fishing regions and this 
fraction is subdivided within each region (Subsecretaría de Pesca, 2010; Peña-Torres, 
2002a), as shown in Table 19.
Currently, the Artisanal Extractive Regime by fishers organization is operative only 
for Region V.
On 9  December 2011, the Government admitted in Parliament a number of 
amendments to the Fisheries Law of Fishing, including the elimination of the 
transferability of individual quotas. The quota established for industrial ship owners is, 
at present, non-transferable. This project incorporates aspects such as the transferability 
of fishing rights, a subject already submitted in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 
2000s (Peña Torres, 1996, 2002a, 2002b), following the classic historical development 
observed in other fisheries worldwide (Arnason, 2008), which began by assigning 
individual rights to boats to then evolve to a system based on ITQs.
Throughout this process, the authority has received specialized scientific advice 
(Payá, 2003). It then decides, in coordination with the National Council of Fisheries, 
regulatory measures for managing the hake fishery. However, the industrial sector has 
criticized that independent research sources are excluded from this process.
FISHERY PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLACE
Exclusivity of participation in the fishery
The current fisheries law in Chile allocates 5  miles from the coast for the exclusive 
use of the artisanal fishing. In addition, the common hake fishery is declared in full 
operation and a limited-entry scheme is in place for both industrial and artisanal 
vessels, not allowing new vessel entry to the common hake fishery (Subsecretaría de 
Pesca, 2010). In addition, an MCLS is also in place. By law, a TAC must be defined 
annually to assign 35 percent for the artisanal sector and 65 percent for the industrial 
one. The TAC allocated to artisanal fishing is exclusive for fishers that at the time of 
the declaration of full exploitation were properly registered. The artisanal TAC is then 
subdivided by administrative regions according to the historical participation in the 
catches, and these are divided in subsectors (Figure 20 and Table 19) in accordance with 
the Artisanal Extraction Regime (Subsecretaría de Pesca, 2010; Peña-Torres, 2002a, 
2002b). In the case of the TAC allocated to the industrial sector, it is divided into parts 
that correspond to the historical average participation in the fishery (1999 and 2000).
Duration of the right conferred
In the situation of the industrial sector, the MCLS system establishes that each 
industrial stakeholder will own fishing rights on a fraction of the total TAC, a right 
that in principle expired on 31 December 2011 (Peña-Torres, 2002b; Glaría, 2010), but 
was extended for a year. A new draft law was sent to the Congress on December 2011, 
which could establish another legal figure or a decree to extend the life of the current 
rights-based system.
Security or quality of the title conferred by the rights
The State guarantees the right, but does not assure the existence of a biomass such that 
the assigned quota can be found. In fact, in the last few years, the estimated annual 
TAC has not been caught in its totality (Figure 20).
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Transferability of the rights
The fishing rights on the assigned fraction of the TAC are likely neither to be 
transferred nor to be divided. However, the law states that within the framework of 
Artisanal Extraction Regime, the holders of assignments will be able to yield the tonnes 
assigned for the respective year calendar to another holder of the same region or to 
holders of other regions (Peña-Torres, 2002b). In addition, may hold these legal rights 
on behalf of one or more artisanal fisher registered in the Artisanal Registry.
Flexibility associated with the use of the rights
The Under-Secretary of Fishing, by means of a resolution, authorizes the concessions 
described above. Similarly, industrial stakeholders who are subject to the MCLS 
management regime may yield all or part of the tonnes assigned in the calendar year to 
an artisanal stakeholder registered in that fishery.
Furthermore, artisanal allocation holders, as a result of the Artisanal Extraction 
Regime, may yield the tonnes assigned for the respective year to a stakeholder, 
which must be extracted according to the rules of the industrial sector and within the 
authorized fishery unit. In this case, the allocations will have a limit of 50 percent of 
the tonnes assigned each year. Such assignments must be authorized by resolution 
established by the Under-Secretary of Fishing.
In all the preceding cases, once the allocations are authorized, these are published in 
the registry of the National Fishery Service. In such cases, the corresponding catch is 
charged to the original holder of the allocation.
SPECIFICS OF THE RIGHTS-BASED FISHERY
As mentioned above, for all industrial vessels authorized in the licence of a fishing 
stakeholder the rights are acquired through the observed average catch in the years 
1999–2000 while the norm that originated them remains in effect. In any case, the 
overall TAC for the fishery is determined annually by decree establishing the catch 
maximum limits. In the case of the artisanal fishing, the Artisanal Extraction Regime 
has legal support and is of indefinite character until its modification or elimination.
The annual global quota of fishing (TAC) is divided into an industrial section and 
an artisanal one. Current Chilean legislation indicates the following.
In the case of the industrial quota, the owner of the rights is the industrial 
stakeholder, defined as a person registered in the industrial registry, that on board 
executes by its account and risk an extractive fishing activity or one of transformation 
using one or more fishing vessels or boats of any type, size, design that have to be 
identified and registered in the registries of the maritime administration.
As for the artisanal sector, the quota is divided into individual quotas for each 
artisanal stakeholder. The owner of the right is the artisanal stakeholder, defined as an 
individual who has two small-scale vessels. This stakeholder has a portion of the global 
quota assigned to the artisanal fleet over which the stakeholder has fishing rights. In 
addition, a system of coves was established for those who did not want to adhere to 
the new quota system. Under this additional system, there is specification of what the 
fishers call a “bagging”, which involves a common quota. At present, Region V Centre 
is the only zone that works with this management regime (Table 19).
With regard to which component of the population structure could be subject 
to the rights of fishing, there are no regulations on minimum size of restrictions. 
(Subsecretaría de Pesca, 2010).
According to the Under-Secretary of Fisheries (2010), fishing common hake must 
use a minimum diamond mesh size of 100 mm in the codend of the trawl net, with 
installed square panels of 90 mm of mesh size. The industrial fleet can only operate 
with bottom trawls or longlines, whereas the artisanal fleet can only operate with 
longlines or gillnets.
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TABLE 20
Summary of the rights-based management regime in place for the common hake 
(Merluccius gayi gayi) fishery in Chile
Main attributes of the access 
regime
Description
How the rights are conferred and 
upheld
Rights are acquired through the observed average catch in the years 1999–2000 for 
all industrial vessels authorized while the norm that originated them remains in 
effect.
Exclusivity of participation in the 
fishery
Fishery law allocates 5 miles from the coast for exclusive use of artisanal fishing. In 
addition, the common hake fishery is declared in full operation and a limited-entry 
scheme is in place for both industrial and artisanal.
A maximum catch limit per stakeholder (MCLS) is also in place. By law, a total 
allowable catch (TAC) must be defined annually to assign 35 percent for the 
artisanal sector and 65 percent for the industrial one.
Duration of the rights conferred Each industrial stakeholder owns fishing rights on a fraction of the total TAC, rights 
that in principle expired on 31 December 2011. New laws could establish another 
legal figure or a decree to extend the current rights-based system.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
The State guarantees the right, but does not assure the existence of a biomass such 
that the assigned quota can be found. 
Transferability of the rights The fishing rights on the assigned fraction of the TAC are likely neither to be 
transferred nor to be divided. However, the law states that, within the framework 
of Artisanal Extraction Regime, the holders of allocations are able to yield the 
tonnes assigned for the respective year calendar to another holder of the same 
region or to holders of other administrative regions.
Divisibility of the rights assigned Administrative regions according to the historical participation in the catches 
subdivide the artisanal TAC, and these are divided as well in subsectors in 
accordance with the Artisanal Extraction Regime.
In the case of the TAC assigned to the industrial sector, it is divided into parts that 
correspond to the historical average participation in the fishery.
Flexibility in the use of the rights Industrial stakeholders may yield all or part of the tonnes allocated in the calendar 
year to an artisanal stakeholder registered in that fishery, or a holder that should 
extract it in the unit authorized fishery. In both cases, allocations may be made only 
within the same population unit.
Artisanal holders may yield the tonnes allocated for the respective year to a 
stakeholder, which must be extracted according to the rules of the industrial sector 
and within the authorized fishery unit. 
Actual rights enforceability, and 
corresponding compliance with 
use rights limitations
Enforcement is the responsibility of the National Fisheries Service. It is a major 
challenge to enforce and achieve full compliance in the country’s long coastline 
(> 4 000 km). Monitoring on board the vessels could facilitate controlling discarding, 
transactions at sea, and the use non-authorized landing sites. These issues make it 
difficult to ensure execution of the duties that accompany the rights associated to 
fishing.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear For vessels for which hake is the target, there is a mesh size of 100 mm, equipped 
on the top panel of the codend with knotless square mesh and a mesh size of a 
minimum of 90 mm. Covered codend was prohibited. For those vessels that have as 
a target other species than hake, the minimum mesh size is 120 mm.
When fishing is authorized to take 
place
A scheme exists with three fishing seasons per year: January–September, October 
and November. 
Harvest controls The National Fishery Service (SERNAPESCA) is the state agency responsible for 
controlling harvest.
Monitoring The National Fishery Service (SERNAPESCA) is the state agency responsible for 
monitoring effort and harvest along the Chilean coast.
At present, there is a biological closure between Region IV and parallel 41°S that 
applies between 15 August and 20 September each year, both dates inclusive. In the 
closure period, the catch of common hake as bycatch in other regulated fisheries is 
authorized. In addition, the catch quota is divided into three periods per year: January–
September, October and November (Subsecretaría de Pesca, 2010).
Table 20 presents a summary of the rights-based system in place for the common 
hake fishery in Chile.
DISCUSSION OF THE RIGHTS-BASED FISHERY
In Chile, the main objective of the National Fisheries Authority has been the recovery 
of the common hake stock in order to increase future catches. The collapse of the 
observed catch in the past decade led the authority to propose a new management 
scheme based on the concept of maximum catch per stakeholder. In these terms, the 
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management scheme has prevented the progressive deterioration of the stock size, 
although the recovery has been slow. The slowness in this recovery has been attributed 
to the increased population of the “jibia”, a natural predator of the common hake. 
In fact, various stock assessments indicate that in 2011 the stock is still overexploited 
(Subsecretaría de Pesca, 2010), so that the long-term effect of the property rights 
cannot yet be evaluated on their merit, owing to this effect of the increase in predators, 
which has significantly increased natural mortality of common hake. However, a 
recovery in the juvenile fraction of the resource has been observed (Subsecretaría de 
Pesca, 2010), which is a good sign for stock recovery in the medium term. There have 
not been studies on the effect of hake catch on the ecosystem.
The rights-based scheme under the MCLS concept has not been evaluated from a 
viewpoint of sustained profitability. In fact, there are no available studies that allow 
an evaluation of its benefits from the economic point of view. Above all, the industrial 
sector is reluctant to accept the administrative changes and, initially, the MCLS system 
was not entirely well received. With time, this perception has been smoothed, especially 
in light of possible changes of catch quotas that could eventually be transferable. 
However, the artisanal sector has expressed several objections about how to distribute 
the TAC between it and the industrial sector. In many ways, the artisanal fishers have 
felt harmed, although their main objections are oriented to the disappearance of their 
habits and customs, a critique that points at the disappearance of forms of life and 
culture that they would prefer to keep, which is not reflected in the fisheries legislation. 
In this respect, they argue that there has not been a discussion of which elements of the 
current fishing regime of common hake are to be maintained and which ones modified.
In terms of research, Chile has strong scientific and technical support in the 
evaluation of stocks (Payá, Ehrhardt and Aguayo, 1998; Payá, 2003; Cubillos, Arcos 
and Sepúlveda, 2003), where the role of the Fisheries Development Institute (IFOP) 
and universities has been essential. Fishery management and the corresponding 
enforcement and compliance mechanisms are solid, although with criticism from the 
actors associated to fishing. There are regional and national councils where stakeholder 
consultation takes place concerning management decisions to be implemented. These 
participatory processes seem essential for achieving institutional support for fishery 
management measures. Enforcement is the responsibility of the National Fisheries 
Service. It is a major challenge to enforce and achieve full compliance along the 
country’s long coastline (more than 4 000 km). Monitoring on board the vessels could 
facilitate controlling discarding, transactions at sea, and the use of non-authorized 
landing sites. These issues make it difficult to ensure execution of the duties that 
accompany the rights associated to fishing.
Although it has not been declared a priority by the authority, bioeconomic 
studies are a route of interesting fishery research. As has been shown in other 
national resources, such as nylon shrimp (Pérez, 2005), the limitation of the catches 
is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one to make the use of a fishery resource 
efficient. Indeed, the erosion of the economic benefit in certain conditions is an 
expectable effect of a system of quotas (Caddy and Mahon, 1995; FAO, 1996). In 
terms of sustainability the use of maximum economic yield as a target reference point 
(sensu FAO, 1996), is more precautionary that the maximum sustainable yield 
(Anderson 1977; Anderson and Seijo, 2010).
Finally, there are two challenges for fishery administration:
rTo harmonize the artisanal fisheries right of exclusive use of the first 5  miles 
offshore with the coastal reality of Chile, which has a narrow continental shelf, 
making operations by industrial vessels impractical when targeting certain 
resources. In fact, in Chile, only in Region IV there is harmonic understanding 
between the two sectors (industrial and artisanal) in order to allow the “perforation 
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of 5 miles” in such a way that the industrial fleet can fish within 5 miles resources 
that are not exploited by the artisanal fleet, a reality that is not observed in other 
regions of the country.
rTo balance the interest of the fishing authority for sustainability and resource 
conservation with the interests of the artisanal users of preserving, along with 
the resource, their traditions and way of maintaining their social and cultural 
interactions (Glaría, 2010).
FINAL REMARKS
At the closing of the final edition of this technical paper, a new fisheries law was 
approved by the Chilean Parliament (19  December 2012). This law establishes 
important modifications to national fisheries regimes. However, because of its state 
of collapse, the common hake fishery was excluded from some rules approved in the 
new law, which relate, primarily, to the conditions for the tender of catch quotas. In 
summary, the new legislation:
rdeclares sovereignty by the State on all fishery resources of the country;
rdeclares the maximum sustainable yield as a target reference point, with the 
express purpose of “... to obtain the greatest catches without putting at risk the 
availability of resources in the medium and long term....”
rdeclares the fractioning of the fishing quotas, with 55 percent of the total for the 
artisanal fleet and the remaining 45 percent for the industrial, with the exception 
of some species of crustaceans and cod;
rdeclares the first mile from the coastline for the exclusive operation of boats of less 
than 12 m overall length, while protects five miles for fishing by the artisanal fleet 
(boats up to 18 GRT);
rrequires the certification of landings for all vessels of more than 12 m in length;
rsets a payment of patents for artisanal vessels of larger size;
rsets a term of 20  years for tradable fishing licences (TFLs) for the industrial 
sector, renewable and revocable, while that for the artisanal sector continues with 
indefinite fishing permits;
r for the quota of the industrial fraction of fully exploited fisheries, a TFL is allocated 
and based on the MCLS fishing licences (licence class A). These licences class A 
have a duration of 20 years and are renewable, revocable, divisible, transferable, 
and susceptible to any legal business. Up to 15 percent of these licences can be bid, 
generating licences class B.
In the specific case of the common hake, there will not be an open auction market for 
a period of 5–7 years, which is the estimated period needed for this species, currently 
collapsed, to exceed 90 percent of the maximum sustainable yield. 
A motion of unconstitutionality of the new law has been accepted for processing by 
the Constitutional Court. Depending on the decision of this court, the enactment of 
the new law could be delayed or be modified in its structure. 
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11. Community territorial use rights 
in the Gulf weakfish (Cynoscion 
othonopterus) fishery of the Gulf of 
California, Mexico
FISHERY DESCRIPTION
Small-scale fisheries are sources of income, both cash and in-kind, but they are also 
carried on for other reasons including traditions, recreation, identity and religion 
(Arce-Ibarra and Charles, 2008; Navarro-Smith, Tapia-Landeros and Garduño, 2010; 
Salas et al., 2011).
The fishery of the Gulf weakfish, Cynoscion othonopterus (Jordan and Gilbert), is a 
small-scale fishery located in the Gulf of California, the most productive fishing area 
of Mexico. It is carried on for commercial and subsistence purposes but also as part of 
the ancestral traditions of the Cucapah (Cocopah) indigenous people (Navarro-Smith, 
Tapia-Landeros and Garduño, 2010; ANAD, 2010; Navarro-Smith, 2011). This fishery 
is considered the second-most important finfish fishery of the Gulf of California in 
terms of both volume of landings and economic value (Román-Rodríguez, 2000; IAES, 
2011). 
In particular, the fishery takes place in the upper Gulf of California, a biocultural 
region with two marine natural protected areas: the Biosphere Reserve Upper Gulf 
of California and Colorado River Delta (RBAGDC), and the Vaquita Refuge Area 
(RVM) (Figure  21). Four coastal communities have traditionally participated in this 
fishery, two from Baja California (San Felipe and the indigenous Cocopah fishing 
camp known as “El Zanjón”) and two from Sonora (El Golfo de Santa Clara, and to 
a lesser degree, Puerto Peñasco). In this region, the industry is little developed and, 
therefore, the majority of local people pursue fishing as their only form of livelihood 
(Rodríguez-Quiróz, 2008).
FIGURE 21
Gulf weakfish fishery study area
Notes: (a) Biosphere Reserve Upper Gulf of California and Colorado River 
Delta, and (b) Vaquita Refuge Area. The three communities that participate 
in the Gulf weakfish fishery are also shown (San Felipe, El Golfo de Santa 
Clara, and Puerto Peñasco).
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The Gulf of California is acknowledged for its high biodiversity including a high 
degree of endemism of marine species, some of them having a status of threatened and 
in danger of extinction (DOF, 1994a, 1994b, 2002; IUCN, 2004). One of its endemic 
species is the Gulf weakfish, which was part of the several open-access commercial 
fisheries from this region that posed a risk upon the viability of the populations of 
two endangered species, a marine mammal known as the vaquita (Phocoena sinus) 
and the totoaba (Totoaba macdonaldi) (Rojas-Bracho and Taylor, 1999; IUCN, 2004; 
DOF, 2007b; SEMARNAT, 2008; Barlow et al., 2010). These attributes of the region 
resulted in necessary conservation policies implemented in the area with agreement of 
many scholars and environmentalist NGOs but with insufficient consultation with 
local fishing communities (Ruíz-López, 2009; ANAD, 2010; Navarro-Smith, Tapia-
Landeros and Garduño, 2010; Navarro-Smith, 2011). Therefore, both, conservation 
policies and fishing regulations in place, including spatial management, are not well 
accepted by local fishers, including the indigenous Cocopah people. As a result, this 
fishery is acknowledged by stakeholders as both complex and sensitive given that 
multiple competing management objectives are simultaneously in place (Díaz-de-León 
and Seijo, 1992).
C.  othonopterus is a demersal species with seasonal migrations toward the upper 
Gulf of California area, seeking lower salinity waters at the Colorado River Delta, in 
its reproductive season. It is in its reproductive aggregations that local fishers capture 
this species using gillnets, usually from February to April. This biological attribute 
makes the population of this species as very vulnerable to fishing, as well as a natural 
candidate for potential overfishing. Several studies report that this species is also used 
within a sport fishery that operates in the coastal waters of Baja California.
Brief historic evolution of the fishery
Although there are no fishery statistics prior to the 1990s, Fitch (1949) reports that, 
from 1917 to 1940, this species was caught in the upper Gulf of California by local 
fishers and exported to California, the United States of America. More recently, in the 
early 1990s, just after the crisis of the blue shrimp fishery occurred in this region, the 
Gulf weakfish fishery was established again (Román-Rodríguez, 2000). Therefore, two 
periods are recognized for this fishery, one before 1990s and on from 1990s onwards. 
This study focuses on the latter period.
Time series of reported catch of target species and incidental catch
The target species in this fishery is the Gulf weakfish (C. othonopterus). Other species 
that occur in the incidental catch are the “chano” or Gulf croaker (Micropogonias 
megalops) and several species of sharks (Rhizoprionodon longurio, Alopias  sp., 
Sphyrna  sp., Isurus oxyrhinchus, and Carcharodon carcharias) (Román-Rodríguez, 
2000). In turn, the Gulf weakfish is also a bycatch species in the fishery of the Gulf 
croaker (IAES, 2011).
The time series reported here correspond only to the target species (Figure  22) 
because no time series were found for the incidental catch of this fishery. The data 
shown were taken from Rodríguez-Quiróz (2008), who in turn reports that his data 
were obtained from the fishing offices of SAGARPA of Sonora and Baja California. 
This author also reports that these official fishing data do not take into consideration 
a variable amount of catch that each fisher put aside every fishing trip, a catch that 
could be used either for self-consumption or for later trade. This in turn contributes to 
having unreported catches in this fishery, every fishing season.
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Another source of unreported catch comes from the captures obtained from 
the fishing camp El Zanjon (IAES, 2011), a remote site acknowledged by current 
regulations as an official landing site for the Gulf weakfish (DOF, 2007b). However, 
although Navarro-Smith (2011) reports that Cocopah fishers based therein have 
already started to fill in the form to report their daily catch, its remoteness makes it 
difficult for the fishing authorities to systematically obtain catch records from it. 
This commercial fishery is relatively new, with a time series encompassing about a 
decade. From this short period of reported catch, the only striking characteristic is that 
it peaked in 2002 at 5 169 tonnes (Figure 22). The majority of the reported landings 
come from El Golfo de Santa Clara because it is located closest to the areas wherein 
the reproductive aggregations of this species primarily take place, which are areas with 
the highest fish abundance (Rodríguez-Quiróz, 2008).
Historical evolution of fishing effort
As happens in many small-scale fisheries worldwide, several studies report that 
both fishers with and without a fishing permit participate in this commercial fishery 
(Román-Rodríguez, 2000; Ruíz-López, 2009). However, only the number of fishing 
permits being used per year is known. This data-sparse situation in fishing effort 
contrasts with the time series on catch statistics, which are readily reported by several 
authors.
With respect to an overall evolution of the fishing effort for El Golfo de Santa Clara, 
in 1996, the community had registered only ten fishing cooperatives; however, in 2007, 
this number increased to 64 (Ruíz-López, 2009). In particular, in 2007, there were a 
total of 463 fishing permits issued for finfish fishing, including Gulf weakfish.
At the community of San Felipe, Baja California, in 2006, there were a 
total of 15  fishing cooperatives registered with 315  fishing permits issued for 
finfish. Of this number, 295  fishers belonged to cooperatives and the remaining 
20  to “permisionarios” (i.e. owners of several outboard fishing boats) 
(Rodríguez-Quiróz, 2008).
With respect to Puerto Peñasco, in 2006, the cooperativist fishers held 175 finfish 
fishing permits and the “permisionarios” 24, making a total of 199 permits (Rodríguez-
Quiróz, 2008).
In the literature on this fishery, it was noted that the remote site El Zanjón was the 
location with the fewest data on both catch statistics and fishing effort. According to 
FIGURE 22
Reported catch of Gulf weakfish, 1995–2007
Notes: Time series (in bars) of reported catch to San Felipe, El Golfo 
de Santa Clara, and Puerto Peñasco. Total catch is represented by the 
continuous line.
Source: Catch records obtained from Rodríguez-Quiróz (2008).
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ANAD (2010), in 2008, there were a total of three fishing cooperatives operating at 
this fishing camp using 50 outboard fishing boats, each having its own fishing permit. 
The total number of fishers belonging to these cooperatives who were based at this site 
was 75. The Cocopah fishers acknowledge that their target and most-valued species is 
the Gulf weakfish.
Spatial distribution of target species and port location of fleets targeting the 
species
The spatial distribution of the Gulf weakfish is reported to be from the mouth of the 
Colorado River, to La Paz, Baja California (Román-Rodríguez, 2000). Several studies 
report on the spatial distribution of the fishing fleets targeting this species, which 
slightly varies among authors. However, a general agreement among them is that the 
fishery takes place primarily in the two protected areas, the RBAGDC, and the RVM.
Rodríguez-Quiróz (2008) undertook a social survey interviewing fishers from 
three coastal communities to determine the spatial distribution of their fishing fleets 
targeting Gulf weakfish. The following data were redrawn from this author, and show 
the spatial distribution of the fishing fleets from El Golfo de Santa Clara (Figure 23), 
San Felipe (Figure  24), and Puerto Peñasco (Figure  25), as well as a pooled area 
comprising the fishing fleets from these three sites (Figure  26). Port location with 
respect to target species stock distribution and its corresponding source and sink areas 
are critical for the performance of closed fishing areas in spatial management of fisheries 
(Seijo and Caddy, 2008). 
FIGURE 23
Spatial distribution of the fishing fleet targeting Gulf weakfish 
from El Golfo de Santa Clara
Notes: Dotted lines indicate spatial distribution of the fishing fleet. (a) Biosphere 
Reserve Upper Gulf of California and Colorado River Delta, and (b) Vaquita Refuge 
Area.
Source: Redrawn from Rodríguez-Quiróz (2008).
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Notes: Dotted lines indicate spatial distribution of the fishing fleet. (a) Biosphere Reserve 
Upper Gulf of California and Colorado River Delta, and (b) Vaquita Refuge Area.
Source: Redrawn from Rodríguez-Quiróz (2008).
FIGURE 24
Spatial distribution of the fishing fleet targeting Gulf weakfish from 
San Felipe 
FIGURE 25
Spatial distribution of the fishing fleet targeting Gulf weakfish from 
Puerto Peñasco
Notes: Dotted lines indicate spatial distribution of the fishing fleet. (a) Biosphere Reserve 
Upper Gulf of California and Colorado River Delta, and (b) Vaquita Refuge Area.
Source: Redrawn from Rodríguez-Quiróz (2008).
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Input and output fishery regulations over time
In the early 1990s, no specific regulations had yet been established to this fishery; 
therefore, it was considered an open-access fishery. From 1993 to 2011, several 
regulations were issued, including spatial management established at newly decreed 
protected areas together with fishery regulations (Table 21). Currently, the fishery is 
considered a regulated limited-entry fishery with territorial user rights allocated to 
fishing communities, with a management plan that is under development.
Of the conservation and management regulations in place, the most sensitive 
topic among the fishery managers (federal institutions, including the Procuraduría 
de Federal de Protección al Ambiente [PROFEPA], CONAPESCA, CONANP and 
SAGARPA), and the fishers is spatial management. In particular, the RVM overlaps 
with previous fishing areas acknowledged as important to Gulf weakfish. The debate 
intensifies with the nucleus zone of the RBAGCDRC, located at the mouth of the 
Colorado River. It is an area where most fishing is forbidden, but it is the area wherein 
reproductive aggregations of the Gulf weakfish primarily take place  – it is the area 
with the highest fish abundance (Ruíz-López, 2009; ANAD, 2010; Rodríguez-Quiróz, 
2008; Navarro-Smith, Tapia-Landeros and Garduño, 2010; IAES, 2011). Moreover, 
the Cocopah people also claim this area as their ancestral land in which to fish 
(ANAD, 2010; Navarro-Smith, Tapia-Landeros and Garduño, 2010).
FIGURE 26
A pooled area of the spatial distribution of the fishing fleet targeting 
Gulf weakfish from three communities (El Golfo de Santa Clara, 
San Felipe, and Puerto Peñasco) 
Notes: Dotted lines indicate a pooled area of the spatial distribution of the fishing 
fleet. (a) Biosphere Reserve Upper Gulf of California and Colorado River Delta, and 
(b) Vaquita Refuge Area.
Source: Redrawn from Rodríguez-Quiróz (2008).
TABLE 21
Conservation and management regulations in place in the Gulf weakfish fishery
No. Conservation/management Authority
1 Decree of the Biosphere Reserve Upper Gulf of California and Colorado 
River Delta (RBAGDC)
DOF (1993)
2 Management plan of the RBAGDC SEMARNAP (1995)
3 Closed fishing season for Gulf weakfish DOF (2005a)
4 Agreement to establish the Vaquita Refuge Area (RVM) DOF (2005b)
5 Protection programme for the RVM DOF (2005c)
6 Specific management measures for Gulf weakfish DOF (2007b)
7 Harvest quota set for the 2011–12 season DOF (2011)
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FISHERY PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLACE
Exclusivity of participation in the fishery
User rights help in clarifying both who can go fishing and who is affected by 
management (Charles, 2002). According to the Mexican Official Norm, NOM-063-
PESC-2005, which regulates the exploitation of Gulf weakfish in the natural protected 
areas, three coastal communities have exclusive rights to participate in this fishery. 
These communities are El Golfo de Santa Clara in Sonora, and San Felipe as well 
as some fisher organizations from the Lower Colorado River Area including the 
indigenous Cocopah community from Baja California. However, a literature review 
reveals that, although to a lesser extent, a fourth community (Puerto Peñasco) also 
participates in this fishery.
In particular, the NOM-063 authorizes only three exclusive landing sites for Gulf 
weakfish: El Golfo de Santa Clara, San Felipe and the indigenous fishing camp known 
as El Zanjón (DOF, 2007b). Therefore, this regulation acknowledges a customary and 
implicit right allocated to fishers and their boats based at these three communities.
With respect to the direct users of Gulf weakfish, which is part of the finfish 
multispecies fishery of the Gulf of California, it was found that in Mexico there is no 
finfish species-specific fishing permit. Rather, any fisher with a fishing boat (registered 
at the National Registration of Fishing and Aquaculture) and a fishing permit to 
capture finfish, as well as any permisionario with the same type of permit, is entitled 
to fish for this species. Therefore, each finfish fishing permit of any boat located at the 
three landing sites mentioned above provides a right to participate in this fishery.
The fishers of multispecies finfish including Gulf weakfish are organized as 
follows. Most belong to the social sector, including several types of cooperatives and 
social organizations whose members are locally called “pescadores cooperativados” 
(cooperativist fishers). There is also the private sector, with entrepreneurs called 
permisionarios. These own several boats with fishing gear and, every fishing season, 
they hire fishers to work their boats. Finally, there are “pescadores libres” or “free 
fishers”, who, in contrast to the other two groups, operate without fishing permits and, 
therefore, are engaged in illegal commercial fishing (Ruíz-López, 2009). They are an 
unknown number of “free riders” who contribute to have both illegal and unreported 
fishing.
Duration of the rights conferred
Whenever a fishing permit for finfish is issued for the first time, it has a duration of 
two years. However, it can be renewed “n” number of times, each renewal being valid 
for five years (DOF, 2007c).
Security or quality of the title conferred by the rights
The holders of a finfish permit who have not infringed the fishing regulations in 
place in the period covered by their permit, and who have fulfilled several of their 
obligations, including the delivery of monthly catch records to the local fishing office 
(“Subdelegaciones de Pesca”), have a secure fishing title for the period covered by the 
fishing permit. However, the security of this title would be dependent upon the fishery 
objectives and the guidelines set at the fishery management plan for any species (DOF, 
2007c). More specifically, the stocks of the target species need to be monitored annually 
before new fishing permits are issued. For example, should the technical population 
assessment of the targeted species undertaken by INAPESCA provide evidence that 
there is enough fishing biomass to issue new or to renew the current fishing permits, 
the CONAPESCA would grant them.
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Transferability of the rights
The fishing permit and therefore the fishing right is not transferable except when the 
entitled person or owner dies. Should this happen, the authority (CONAPESCA) in 
charge of issuing permits would give priority to grant an inherited permit to the person 
previously designated by the late owner (DOF, 2007c). This inheritable right scheme, 
if properly promoted among the current entitled persons, could be viewed as a long-
term incentive to small-scale fishers to protect the stock of their target species that 
will be eventually caught using the inheritable permit as a fishing right. Concerning 
divisibility of the rights assigned, in Mexico, rights are assigned through fishing permits 
(DOF, 2007c).
RIGHTS ENFORCEABILITY
Current rights enforceability
In general terms, in Mexico, legislation that regulates the access, use and management 
of the fishery resources lies in the General Law on Sustainable Fishing and Aquaculture 
(or LGAPS). The authority responsible of the application of this legislation is 
SAGARPA (Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, Fishing and Food). To this end, 
INAPESCA and CONAPESCA (two administrative bodies of SAGARPA), undertake 
the several duties, and to some extent enforce the regulations, as stated at the LGAPS, 
on fishing and aquaculture. The former is in charge of coordinating and leading 
scientific and technical research on fishing and aquaculture, and also of devising and 
updating the National Fisheries Charter, a management instrument for fishing and 
aquaculture in Mexico. However, most of the enforcement on fishing regulations is 
conducted by PROFEPA.
To assist in fishery management, the Government of Mexico has also devised an 
instrument called Mexican Official Norms (NOMs) used to regulate the most economically 
valuable fishing resources. In the case of the Gulf weakfish, the NOM that sets the regulations 
on minimum size by species, together with the type of fishing gear authorized to be used, is 
NOM-063-PESC-2005 (DOF, 2007b). Moreover, whenever the management of 
any species is within a natural protected area, as is the case with Gulf weakfish, its 
enforcement falls to both CONANP and PROFEPA. In all enforcement activities, 
the Secretaria de Marina (SEMAR – the navy) assists in monitoring and detecting any 
illegal activity undertaken at sea.
With respect to actual rights enforceability for this fishery, PROFEPA staff have 
been monitoring it so that all fishers are aware that enforcement of the regulations is 
in place (IAES, 2011). However, very often, enforcement had been undertaken in situ 
either at the departure harbour (reviewing the fishing permits) or at the closed areas of 
the RBAGDC; in both cases, with fishers targeting Gulf weakfish outnumbering the 
PROFEPA staff. The latter situation interferes and partially halts the normal progress 
of the fishing season, and fishers become upset (Román-Rodríguez, 2000; IAES, 2011).
Until 2000, there was little control on the finfish landing sites to ensure that the 
exclusivity of landing sites for Gulf weakfish, as specified in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federación (DOF, 2007b), is complied with (Román-Rodríguez, 2000).
Compliance with use rights limitations
For entitled fishers, there are responsibilities as well as fishing rights (FAO, 1995; 
Charles, 2002). In general terms, the commercial fishery of the Gulf weakfish is 
relatively new, with about a decade of commercial boom. In this regard, its fishery 
management system is still under development – a management plan for this fishery is 
about to be published.
Currently, user rights limitations on this fishery comprise biological, ecological, 
spatial and time restrictions, as well as limitations on the fishing gear used. Although 
no in-depth monitoring studies addressing compliance with these limitations have been 
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found, several authors report that the limitation that is least complied with is spatial 
management, represented by two sensitive areas, the nucleus zone of the protected 
area RBAGCDRC and the RVM. With respect to the former, the Cocopah people 
claim that they only have about 50 fishing permits, which allow them to catch about 
5 percent of the catch quota and, therefore, their activity does not pose any risk to the 
stock of the Gulf weakfish (ANAD, 2010). 
The limitation that is the second-least-complied-with is the closed season, which 
should be observed from 1 May to the end of August (DOF, 2005a). However, records 
show that fishing for this species occurs also in May and June.
Specifics of the rights-based fishery
The fishing rights are conferred by the federal government (CONAPESCA) to 
individuals through a fishing permit. However, these people should either be a member 
of a cooperative or be a permisionario. Moreover, the management also states that 
entitled persons should land their fish exclusively either at El Golfo de Santa Clara 
in Sonora, or at San Felipe and the indigenous fishing camp El Zanjón (DOF, 2007b).
In theory, these rights are upheld if the entitled person complies with all the 
regulations devised for the management of Gulf weakfish.
These rights are defined by the federal government (CONAPESCA) and decreed 
by the President of Mexico through the Federal Gazette. However, defining who has 
the right to use the specific finfish resource is a topic that has been rarely addressed in 
official documents in the scholarly literature related to this fishery. The exception to 
this is the Fishing Law or LGAPS, which states that fishing permits (including finfish 
fishing permits) can be an inheritable right. Therefore, any descendant or relative of a 
current fishing permit holder can be considered a person who could potentially be a 
fishing right holder. Apart from this, the internal regulations of the fishing cooperatives 
are the ones that determine whether new members are allowed to in or not. Once 
admitted, a new cooperative member is acknowledged to have the full potential right 
to ask CONAPESCA for a fishing permit.
The fisher with fishing rights on Gulf weakfish is granted the right to fish once 
INAPESCA has set the annual catch quota for this species. This quota is not allocated 
by communities or by any group of users, neither is a quota that could be transacted 
in markets. For the fishing season 2011–12, the catch quota was set at 2 300  tonnes 
live weight (DOF, 2011). However, according to the fishing regulations reviewed, this 
catch quota should be landed exclusively at the above-mentioned three sites.
At the time of landing, the catch of this species should consist of whole specimens 
(i.e. no portion of the body should be missing) of a minimum standard length of 65 cm. 
This minimum size restriction tolerates about 35 percent of specimens below 65 cm 
(DOF, 2007b).
According to NOM-063 (DOF, 2007b), there is no restriction on the size of the 
boat used but only on the fishing gear used, with only one monofilament gillnet 
(with a mesh size of 5.75 inches [14 cm] and 293 m long) per boat on every fishing trip. 
In addition, one handline per fisher in the boat is allowed. In general terms, most of 
the fishers use an outboard boat 7–10 m long, with two or three fishers participating in 
every fishing trip (Rodríguez-Quiróz, 2008; Ruíz-López, 2009).
The fishing trips targeting this species should take place only during daylight with a 
closed season set from 1 May to 31 August (DOF, 2005a, 2007b).
PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS IN THE GULF 
WEAKFISH FISHERY
The designation of three communities as exclusive landing sites for the Gulf weakfish 
is an important start in devising a property rights system to fishers participating in 
this fishery. If the system is well implemented and enforced, it can readily turn an 
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open-access fishery into a limited-entry fishery with territorial user rights allocated 
to fishing communities. The current entitled fishers should be given a certificate as 
“stewards of their right to fish” which, if well administered, will result in several types 
of income, namely cash, in-kind and cultural income. Moreover, they should improve 
the stewardship upon an existing natural capital represented by a dynamic stock of 
Gulf weakfish, which in order to be able to provide any fishing biomass to entitled 
persons needs to emigrate for reproduction, recruitment and growth.
In spite of the many important research efforts undertaken by the INAPESCA and 
the several regional research institutions, the fishery dynamics of Gulf weakfish are 
not yet fully known. Therefore, the management system is still under development 
and is in need of more research. For example, although there has been some progress 
in management with the setting of an annual catch quota, the fishery does not have a 
limit catch level or predetermined harvest control rules (Anderson and Seijo, 2010). 
TABLE 22
Summary of main attributes of rights-based management regime in place for the Gulf weakfish 
(Cynoscion othonopterus) fishery
Main attributes of the access 
regime
Description
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
Fishing rights are conferred by the federal government (CONAPESCA) through a 
fishing permit to individuals, who should either be a member of a cooperative or be 
a “permisionario”. Current management also states that entitled persons should land 
their fish exclusively at three communities (El Golfo de Santa Clara in Sonora, or at 
San Felipe and the indigenous fishing camp El Zanjón, both in Baja California). These 
rights are upheld if the entitled person complies with all the regulations devised for the 
management of Gulf weakfish.
Exclusivity of participation in 
the fishery
Each boat (and therefore fishers) based at the three exclusive landing sites mentioned in 
(i) having a finfish fishing permit has a right to participate in this fishery.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Whenever a fishing permit is issued for the first time, it has a duration of two years. It 
can be renewed “n” number of times, each renewal having a validity of 5 years.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
If the holder of a fishing permit has not infringed the fishing regulations in place during 
the period covered by his/her permit, and provided he/she has fulfilled several of his/
her obligations, he/she has a secure fishing title for the period covered by the fishing 
permit. However, the security of this title would be dependent upon whether there 
is enough fish abundance to comply with the fishery objectives, as well as with the 
management regulations in place. 
Transferability of the rights The fishing permit and therefore the fishing right is not transferable except when 
the entitled person or owner dies. Should this happen, the authority (CONAPESCA) in 
charge of issuing permits would give priority to grant an inherited permit to the person 
previously designated by its former owner.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
In Mexico, fishing rights are assigned through fishing permits that are indivisible.
Actual rights enforceability, 
and corresponding compliance 
with use rights limitations 
Most of the enforcement of fishing regulations falls to a federal institute called 
PROFEPA. However, CONAPESCA also participate in enforcing aspects related to fishing 
permits, and CONANP checks that spatial management at the protected areas is being 
complied with. In all the enforcement activities, the navy (or Secretaria de Marina 
[SEMAR]) assists in monitoring and detecting any illegal activity undertaken at sea. 
Most use rights limitations are complied with except spatial management and, to a 
lesser extent, time regulations (i.e. the closed season). In this fishery, several implicit 
competing management objectives are in place.
Harvesting strategies 
Fishing methods and gear Fishing is done using outboard boats 7–10 m long with two or three fishers participating 
in every fishing trip. There is no restriction on the size of the boat used but only on the 
fishing gear, with only one monofilament gillnet (with mesh size opening of 5.75 inches 
[14 cm] and 293 m long) per boat on every fishing trip. In addition, one handline per 
fisher in the boat is allowed.
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
The fishing trips targeting Gulf weakfish should take place only during daylight with a 
closed season set from 1 May to 31 August.
Harvest controls This fishery is relatively new with about a decade of boom; therefore, it has no limit 
catch level or predetermined harvest control rules yet. Its management plan is still under 
development.
Monitoring The stock of the Gulf weakfish need to be monitored annually to set the catch quota 
as well as to assess whether new fishing permits can be issued. More specifically, should 
the technical population assessment of the targeted species undertaken by INAPESCA 
provide evidence that there is enough fishing biomass to issue new or to renew the 
current fishing permits, CONAPESCA would grant them.
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Moreover, there is a need for target and the limit reference points to protect the stock 
from overfishing (IAES, 2011).
With regard to administration, and given the complexity of this fishery, administration 
could be improved if managed through species-specific permits instead of the current 
general fishing permit scheme (Román-Rodríguez, 2000; Rodríguez-Quiróz, 2008; 
IAES, 2011). Afterwards, a thorough fishery monitoring plan schedule (for stock 
assessment, catch records and enforcement) needs to be devised and agreed upon 
with stakeholders. Finally, a fishery management plan needs to be devised wherein 
the competing fishery objectives should be stated explicitly (Díaz-de-León and Seijo, 
1992).
When properly established, the development of TURFS within local fishing 
communities can lead to effective management control and rights-based operation, 
resulting in successful management (Beddington, Agnew and Clark, 2007; Hilborn, 
Orensanz and Parma, 2005). In addition to the community territorial use rights in 
place, to overcome many of the fisheries management challenges reported in this study 
case, it seems necessary to achieve a genuine participatory process of rights-based 
governance aimed at increasing security and reducing poverty for the fishers involved 
(Allison et al., 2012). 
Table  22 presents a summary of the main attributes of the current rights-based 
regime in place for the Gulf weakfish fishery.
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12. Individual effort quotas of 
artisanal communities in the 
multispecies fishery at Coiba 
National Park, Panama
FISHERY DESCRIPTION
The multispecies finfish fishery at Coiba Island, Panama, is relatively recent. Used as 
a prison from 1912 to 2004 (ANAM, 2009), the island was declared a national park 
in 1991 with legislation increasing its level of protection in 2004. A management 
plan was approved in 2009 (National Gazette, 2009) after the National Authority 
of the Environment (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente [ANAM]), the Panama 
Maritime Authority (Autoridad Marítima de Panamá [AMP]) and MarViva, an 
international NGO, worked together to establish and implement the management 
plan in collaboration with local leaders. After housing about 800 prisoners for almost 
a century, Coiba Island is now uninhabited. The marine area of Coiba National Park 
covers more than 2 000 km2 and the management plan allows artisanal, subsistence and 
sport fishing by mainland users in some areas (ANAM, 2009).
Brief history of the fishery
For many years, artisanal fishers from the mainland have targeted crustaceans 
(e.g. lobster, crab and shrimp), molluscs (e.g. conch and scallop), sharks and finfish 
(e.g. snapper, mackerel, drum, grouper, snook, jack and mullet) in the entire region, 
including the current Coiba National Park buffer zone and marine resources 
management zone (MRMZ). The management plan currently allows artisanal fishers 
to catch all these resources inside the buffer zone, but only finfish can be caught in 
the MRMZ. Previously, the area’s high biological productivity attracted industrial 
fleets from Panama and other Central American countries. These worked the waters 
near Coiba Island, targeting shrimp with bottom trawlers, and sharks and finfish 
with longlines. This ended with implementation of the 2009 management plan, which 
banned all industrial fishing activities inside the protected area.
Landing records are kept by the AMP, but these do not include detailed 
landings records per community in Veraguas and Chiriqui provinces, which impedes 
construction of a landing series data history. Instead, the AMP records landings in the 
principal ports, about 600  tonnes annually for Veraguas and Chiriqui (Maté, 2005). 
Because landing records do not include place of origin, it is currently impossible to 
determine what portion of the catch is from Coiba National Park, other parts of the 
Gulf of Montijo or the Gulf of Chiriqui. Maté (2005) emphasized the need to keep 
detailed, trustworthy and current records to fill the data gaps that prevent effective 
management of area marine resources.
Its high marine biodiversity, presence of top predators and high species richness 
in a variety of marine ecosystems highlight the fact that Coiba is not an isolated or 
unconnected system. Fishers use both the Gulfs of Chiriqui and Montijo, targeting 
several finfish species in different fishing grounds. Strong biological connectivity 
between Coiba marine and coastal ecosystems makes it vital to identify catch origin. 
Rights-based management in Latin American fisheries106
The keeping of catch records for the entire area that include specific area of origin data 
will make it possible to generate population and community indices. These can then 
be integrated into analyses to produce precise stock assessments using an ecosystem 
approach with complementary data on different life-cycle stages and fish assemblages.
History of fishing effort
Artisanal fisheries began in the Coiba area in the 1980s. Fishers caught finfish species 
inside what is now the national park area of influence, including the current marine 
reserve, MRMZ and buffer zone. Fishers from the area of influence continued to 
enjoy essentially open access even after creation of Coiba National Park and up to 
2002 (Crête, 2006). After years of consensus building and social integration of fishing 
regulations, fishers from communities in the area of influence formed the Coiba 
Artisanal Fishers Network, which endorsed and supported the Sustainable Artisanal 
Fishing Subprogramme contained within the Coiba National Park Management Plan 
(ANAM, 2009). This network encompasses fishers from 16  communities in 
Veraguas Province and three in Chiriqui Province. People from these communities 
have fished in the entire area for decades, although pressure is increasing on 
the area’s marine resources as more people shift from agriculture to fishing 
(Crête, 2006). About 400 fishers from 19 coastal villages habitually use the park area 
of influence, that is, the buffer zone. However, the management plan allows only 
47 artisanal boats (235 fishers) to fish the MRMZ. Artisanal fishing in the MRMZ is 
permitted with several restrictions on traditional practices to reduce the impact on 
marine resource populations and ecosystems.
In 2002, Veraguas Province had 44 fishing communities, with 1 108 artisanal fishing 
boats, making it the second-largest artisanal fishing fleet in Panama (Maté, 2005). 
Artisanal fishers wishing to fish in delimited zones must register their boat at the park 
station or the ANAM office in Santiago. Artisanal fishers from the Coiba National 
Park buffer zone use wooden boats with outboard engines. Traditional fishing gear 
includes nylon monofilament, braided nylon cord, fishing nets, gillnets, purse seines, 
harpoons and sticks. Gillnets and harpoons are no longer permitted in the MRMZ.
Target species spatial distribution and port location of fleets targeting these 
species
Coiba National Park is not an independent marine ecosystem. It protects biodiversity 
and remarkably well preserved marine ecosystems that provide large shelter and 
nursery areas for myriad marine species, including highly migratory species such as 
sharks, tuna, and mahi-mahi, and commercially important species such as shrimp, 
snapper, grouper, jack and mackerel. Regional biological and ecological connectivity 
is so high that a significant impact on some “subpopulations” in Coiba National Park 
could affect productivity in the same species outside the park, as well as other species 
groups in the region. In an integrated study, Maté (2005) identified the main occurrence 
areas for the most important commercial fisheries: shrimp, anchovy, herring, lobster, 
squid, demersal fish and general finfish (grouper, snapper, mackerel and mahi-mahi) 
(Figure 27). The presence of all these species in the area suggests the existence of strong 
ecological interactions between multiple groups. These interactions create complex fish 
assemblages, creating favourable conditions for high regional biological productivity 
through strong connectivity. Monitoring these ecological interactions could be done 
using ecological monitoring and modelling to generate estimates for ecosystem 
productivity and surplus fishing production, and thus provide guidance when working 
towards sustainable fisheries. Finally, protection of reproductive stages would require 
documentation of the gonad maturity process in the principal species. 
There are no fishing ports or villages in Coiba National Park; indeed, it is uninhabited 
by law. A key provision when the park protection level was increased via Article 5 of 
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Panama Law No 44 (26 July 2004) was to forbid several activities in Coiba National 
Park, such as human occupation, logging, industrial fishing, hunting, agriculture, 
mining and oil exploration, sewage discharge, introduction of non-native species, and 
building infrastructure other than for scientific purposes or ecotourism activities. The 
ports harbouring the fleets targeting marine species in Coiba National Park are located 
in different corregimientos (municipalities) throughout the buffer zone (Figure  27). 
The most important fishing ports in Chiriqui Province are Pedregal and Remedios, and 
in Veraguas Province they are Mutis, Bahía Honda and Vidal. Other fishing villages 
in the buffer zone include Hicaco, Gobernadora and Leones. Most of the fishers with 
licences for Coiba National Park are from Bahia Honda (187 inhabitants), Isla Managua 
(77 inhabitants) and Isla Canales de Tierra. A survey of fishers in the Gulfs of Montijo 
and Chiriqui found that 100 percent of those from Bahia Honda, Pedregal, Vidal and 
Vacamonte fished in Coiba National Park, while less than 80 percent from other ports 
(e.g. Mutis, Remedios, Pixvae, Gobernadora, Sta. Catalina, Cebaco, Aguadulce and 
Hicaco) used the park. Fishers from ports as far away as Vacamonte, an industrial port 
in the Gulf of Panama 370 km from Coiba, use the park. All the fishers in the area sell 
their catches at Puerto Mutis or Puerto Remedios; which port they use depends on 
their proximity at the end of a fishing trip (Crête, 2006).
FISHERY RIGHTS
The Coiba National Park management plan is primarily intended to conserve and protect 
biodiversity and all ecosystems (marine and terrestrial) in the park. It acknowledges 
the rights of people living in the area of influence, and allows them to engage in 
artisanal fishing and ecotourism in the park. The plan establishes 5  programmes 
and 11  subprogrammes. The Natural and Cultural Resources Programme includes 
four subprogrammes: Historical Resources; Cattle Control; Soil Conservation; and 
Sustainable Artisanal Fisheries.
FIGURE 27
Buffer zone and Coiba National Park polygon
Notes: The marine resources management zone is located between the marine 
reserve, a 1.8 km strip around Coiba and Jicaron islands (diagonal lines), and 
the national park polygon border. Inside the park, a subzone is reserved solely 
for longline fishing of mahi-mahi. The principal ports inside the buffer zone 
are indicated by black points, and finfish species distribution is indicated with 
geometric shapes (triangle = snappers, pentagon = groupers, rhombus = drums.
Source: Modified from Maté (2005).
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The Sustainable Artisanal Fisheries Subprogramme involves fishers from the 
area of influence in the discussion and design of fisheries regulations. One of the 
subprogramme’s main objectives is to guarantee sustainable use of fishing resources 
by issuing licences and permits, establishing catch quotas, effort quotas, no-take zones 
and season closures. Artisanal and sport fishing is allowed only in the MRMZ, located 
between the marine reserve or no-take zone and the park border. Locals are allowed to 
engage in subsistence, artisanal, and sport fishing (recreational and tourist). Regulations 
allow extraction of only three types of target species: snapper (Lutjanus peru, 
L. guttatus, L. colorado, L. argentiventris and L. novemfaciatus); grouper (Epinephelus 
cifuentesis, E. niphobles and Cephalopholis acanthistius); and dolphin fish or mahi-mahi 
(Coryphaena hyppurus). Some Scombridae, Haemulidae, Scianidae and Carangidae 
species are permitted as bycatch; for example, wahoo (Acanthocybium solandri), snook 
(Centropomus  sp.), tuna (Thunnus  sp.), grunts (Haemulon  sp.), jack (Caranx  sp.) 
and eels (Ophidiidae). The three primary closed seasons every year are for snapper 
(1 January–30 April) and mahi-mahi (1 March–31 May, and 1 September–31 October). 
Snapper can only be caught using lines with no more than 15 circle hooks (minimum 
10/0 size). Each fisher can use just one line, with no machinery other than a pulley. 
Groupers can be caught with vertical lines with no more than 15  circle hooks 
(minimum 13/0  size). As with snappers, each fisher can use a single line and only a 
pulley. Mahi-mahi can be caught using longlines with no more than 500 circle hooks 
(minimum 13/0 size). In this case, each boat can use only one longline, and it must be 
anchored to the bottom.
As mentioned, fishing is allowed only in the MRMZ, and it is not permitted in the 
marine reserve or no-take zone. No matter their purpose (artisanal, sport or research), 
all vessels entering park waters must have fishing licences issued by ANAM. Boats 
used for subsistence fishing are not required to have a licence. Every fisher intending 
to use the park must fill out an “Individual Fisher Record” form provided by the 
park administration. Each form is valid for one calendar year (January–December). In 
addition to the licence and form, all boats must request a fishing permit for each trip 
into park waters. Each boat can receive up to two fishing permits per month, each valid 
for a single trip of no longer than ten days.
Exclusivity of fishery participation 
In 2004, the Panama National Assembly created a Council of Directors to govern 
Coiba National Park. The council consists of 12  representatives from institutions, 
local governments, civil society and the scientific community of Panama. ANAM 
chairs the council and manages financial resources in the area. Article 12 of the Coiba 
National Park Law mandates establishment of a Commission for Sustainable Fisheries 
within the MRMZ (Figure  27). Known as the “Fisheries Commission”, its main 
purpose is to prepare fisheries regulations for the MRMZ and define guidelines and 
policies for marine resources conservation and use. After approval by the Council of 
Directors, these regulations, guidelines and policies are included in the management 
plan. The General Office of Marine and Coastal Resources (Dirección General de 
Recursos Marinos y Costeros [DGRMC]) of the Panama Aquatic Resources Authority 
(Autoridad de los Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá [ARAP]), convenes and chairs 
Fisheries Commission meetings. Article 13 of the Coiba National Park Law establishes 
Fisheries Commission membership composition. Of its 11 members, 5 must represent 
fisheries sectors and 3 government agencies (AMP, ANAM and SENACYT).
In 2009, the Council of Directors set the maximum number of boats for fishing 
in the MRMZ at 47. Exclusive fishery rights were then granted via 47 licences issued 
to boat owners who had fished at least once in the park in that year. These 47 boats 
were selected from a list of 140 boats owned by fishers from different villages in the 
park’s area of influence. This baseline was established using fishery data from 2006 
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and 2007, and under the principle that only boats that had previously fished in the 
national park would receive fishing permits. This agreement was ratified by fishers in 
2007. The average number of fishers per boat is five, so 235 fishers are estimated to use 
the park. According to the Coiba National Park Law, licences entitle the holders to 
fish the area only if they know and abide by marine protected area regulations. It also 
guarantees licence holders that no unlicensed fishers will use the area. This principle 
may seem obvious, but is vital considering that small-scale fisheries in the region have 
historically been managed under an open-access system, which still prevails in other 
regional fisheries, including the buffer zone.
When Coiba Island was declared a marine protected area for its valuable 
ecosystems and natural resources located near the mainland, ANAM, 
scientists and MarViva identified the most critical threats to conservation 
as being overfishing and destructive fishing practices, at both industrial and 
artisanal scales. Once the management plan had excluded industrial fishing 
(i.e. vessels > 30 feet [9.15 m] with engines > 55 hp) from the area, the next step was 
to control small-scale fishing. To socially integrate the management plan and involve 
fishers from all regions, the Council of Directors, through the Fisheries Committee, 
organized several workshops. The intention was to demonstrate to artisanal fishers 
the importance of preserving natural capital, and to open discussions about different 
ways to reduce fishing pressure. Initially, the fishers were reluctant to change their 
viewpoints and behaviour. They argued that giving up their traditional methods, such 
as fishing anywhere and anytime without gear restrictions, would negatively affect 
their income. The same argument was given in response to the proposal to reduce 
the amount of gear used and to stop the use of gillnets and harpoons. It took the 
government representative some time to help the fishers understand the benefits of 
the marine protected area regulations. For example, it was explained how no-take 
zones near mangroves and large areas of controlled fishing mortality would function 
as a biological reservoir. This reservoir would provide recruits for portions of the 
area, including those surrounding the buffer zone where fishing is allowed, directly 
benefiting fishers. The social integration process often evolves in unexpected ways, 
leading to concern among marine protected area advocates about the amount of time 
required. Experience shows that the shift from open access to exclusive rights requires 
an adaptation period after which new regulations will be fully understood and adopted. 
Change can be slow in some cases, depending on social conditions and the resources 
available to implement changes. Final results will depend on advocates’ lobbying skills 
and their ability to influence other stakeholders.
Trust and enforcement are fundamental to the success of new regulations. An 
effective enforcement strategy guarantees regulation accomplishment, which ensures 
that fishers follow the guidelines they have agreed to. Substantial enforcement 
resources have been allocated to Coiba National Park, motivating fishers to follow and 
support the regulations. Seven patrol boats make daily trips through the no-take and 
buffer zones. In addition, the limiting of licences to 47 and stiff penalties for infractions 
help to prevent illegal practices and make it very attractive for fishers to request fishing 
permits for the MRMZ. 
The next pending matter for the Fisheries Committee is to use hard data to calculate 
the maximum allowable effort within the national park considering the conservation 
and sustainable use objectives of the management plan.
Duration of conferred rights 
Fishing mortality in Coiba National Park is highly controlled by the issuing of an 
individual, one-year licence per boat. In addition, permits allow for a maximum of 
20 days a month in the park to be used in two 10-day trips. All boats must renew their 
licences annually (calendar year). Depending on demand and availability, new boats 
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can obtain licences and thus maintain maximum allowable effort. Boat owners with 
pending fines or a record of illegal fishing are not allowed to renew the licences for 
their boats. 
Security or quality of the title conferred by the rights
Before the MRMZ management plan was published, ANAM and the fishers were in 
constant conflict. Fishers fished freely in the national park, and ANAM personnel had 
just one boat to patrol the entire park. This thin enforcement coverage left national 
park zoning unclear to fishers, who were unsure as to exactly where fishing was 
banned. In addition, they were uninformed about the regulations and thus unclear 
as to which of their traditional practices were legal and which were illegal. Once the 
MRMZ management plan was endorsed in 2009, the first legal actions against illegal 
fishers demonstrated that sanctions were severe. Fishers understood that the Coiba 
fisheries were in fact organized and controlled. For example, “failure to comply with 
rules results in revocation of a vessel’s fishing licence for ‘a reasonable period of time’, 
which varies according to infraction seriousness” (Crête, 2006). This clear support for 
management plan regulations ensured that licences and permits were perceived and 
functioned essentially as titles guaranteeing the fishing rights of those who held them. 
In conjunction with enforcement, fishing licences and permits in Coiba National Park 
are high-quality management instruments.
Rights transferability 
Fishing rights at Coiba National Park are granted only via licences and permits from 
the AMP to users. Licences are non-transferable between users, and limited to one year. 
User who want to renew a licence once it expires must request a new licence for the 
following year. Permits are also non-transferable and must be requested every time a 
licence holder wants to fish in the park (20 days maximum per month). If a licence or 
permit is revoked due to regulation non-compliance, the vacancy is granted to the next 
registered fisher, pending approval by the Fisheries Committee. Although apparently 
strict, these practices are legitimate and contribute to controlling fishing pressure 
effectively.
Divisibility of assigned rights 
Fishing rights in Coiba National Park are allocated to persons who demonstrate 
legal ownership of a boat, and either fished in the park in 2006 and 2007 or have the 
intention of fishing in the park. Because the Coiba National Park Law assigns all 
licence rights and privileges to the boat owner, there is a shared responsibility between 
boat owner and the fishers onboard. If the fishers do not follow regulations, both the 
fishers and the boat owner will be subject to penalties. However, licences and permits 
also have the effect of protecting the fishers onboard a boat as long as they comply 
with regulations. Given that licences and permits are non-transferable, the rights and 
protections enjoyed by their holders are non-divisible.
Flexibility of rights use 
The fishing rights instrument within Coiba National Park Law is inflexible, as illustrated 
in the above examples. The moral force behind the law and highest legal authority in 
Coiba National Park is the Council of Directors, which is the channel for all conflict 
resolution. Because the Council of Directors and the Fisheries Commission consist 
of representatives from fisheries sectors, institutions, government, civil society and 
academia, the regulations and actions established in the law are accepted and legitimate. 
All legal procedures established in the management plan for the MRMZ provide users 
and authorities with clear rules for the conservation and sustainable use of park marine 
resources. Both park officers and fishers can appeal to the Council of Directors to 
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clarify any possible misinterpretations, constituting a check on any abuse of authority 
against users. Although some fishers do not agree with park regulations because finding 
new fishing grounds outside the park is challenging, they do acknowledge that catches 
had been declining over time before adoption of the management plan. As mentioned 
above, the shift from open access to exclusive fishing rights is not easy for fishers, but 
this will benefit them in the long run by attaining and maintaining sustainable fisheries.
RIGHTS ENFORCEABILITY
Coiba was declared a national park in 1991, but environmentalists considered it merely 
a “paper park” in the next 18 years because of lack of enforcement (AECI, ICONA 
and INRENARE, 1996). ANAM had to struggle with a reduced staff, a single patrol 
boat and limited financial resources to patrol the entire protected area (Crête, 2006). 
Even after the park law was modified to establish fishing regulations and sanctions, 
open-access fisheries prevailed in the protected area and buffer zone. Enforceability 
is key to guaranteeing the success of the controlled effort system, and it must be well 
implemented from the outset. In Coiba, it was not until 2009, when the management 
plan was approved and endorsed, that effective fisheries enforcement truly began in 
the national park.
Current rights enforceability
The Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Programme is the last programme in 
the management plan of the Coiba National Park. It establishes the objectives, specific 
goals and actions needed to implement effective enforcement and indicates the human 
resources, vehicles, boats, equipment, facilities and financial resources available to 
achieve them. Of particular importance is the detailed description of the six marine 
surveillance rounds to be followed by park guards. These rounds were strategically 
planned to fulfil different purposes, including natural resource protection, patrol of 
specific geographic limits, and providing help and support to fishers and visitors. 
Meeting programme goals and objectives depends heavily on the park’s fleet of seven 
boats (one with a 200 hp engine, six with a 100 hp engine), all equipped with a satellite 
navigation system, radios, first-aid kits, and buoys. Programme financing includes 
fleet maintenance and patrol operation costs. It also describes coordination procedures 
with the National Police, National Aeronautical Service and MarViva Foundation. The 
instruments provided for in the Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Programme 
effectively ensure fisher rights (see above).
Compliance with use rights limitations
Before the Coiba Island became a marine protected area, it formed part of a series of 
fishing grounds used by three industrial fleets targeting shrimp, tuna, shark and finfish 
in the Central American Pacific. It was also part of fishing grounds used by a small-scale 
fleet targeting finfish and shark. Industrial fishing is now prohibited in the park by the 
management plan, which allows just 47 small-draft vessels. Penalties for poaching are 
severe, and fines for illegal fishing can be up to US$500 per boat and licence revocation. 
The number of poaching fines has decreased since 2008, indicating that this approach 
has improved regulation compliance. Now that fishers understand that enforcement is 
effective, they make a serious effort to follow park fishing practice recommendations. 
They are also frequently report illegal activities to park authorities. For example, it was 
fishers who in 2008 warned park guards of the presence of industrial tuna vessels. Park 
authorities have since fined several industrial vessels for fishing in the park.
SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE RIGHTS-BASED FISHERY
The Coiba rights-based fishery is perceived as legitimate because fishers and park 
authorities share the management plan vision and mission. Their general concern 
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about fishing resource and biodiversity status in the park led them to adopt a fishing 
rights approach (see above). The resulting fishing rights system arose from active 
interaction between stakeholders with apparently divergent interests: conservation 
vs use. Radical positions and inflexibility could very easily have led to a breakdown 
in negotiations; for example, if conservationists had insisted on an overall fishing ban 
or if fishers had rejected any regulation at all. During negotiations, the starting point 
included both positions, and discussions eventually led the stakeholders involved to 
agree to an intermediate point between the extremes. Both parties acknowledge the 
other’s goals and claims. Both positions were genuine, legal and ethical: conservation 
of unique natural heritage, and historical fishing rights. The rights-based approach 
was a compromise that allowed both parties to be satisfied with the final results. It 
is an example of how to reach a satisfactory solution that meets the end purpose of 
sustainability. This solution relies heavily on enforcement, which is costly, and gives 
highest priority to rights compliance over objectives (Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, 
2004). This is the case despite a negative cost-benefit analysis or if it affects a minority 
(Montenegro, 2007). However, non-market values must be factored into any cost–
benefit analysis of this approach, including prior existence, legacy, indirect use and 
option values. The declaration of the Coiba area as a World Heritage Site in 2005 
demonstrates its importance to Panama, and the world. 
A lack of sufficient data to calculate maximum allowable fishing effort for 
the Coiba area led the Council of Directors to endorse the Fisheries 
Committee’s recommendation to set a maximum number of licences based 
on fishery records. Detailed monitoring of boats fishing in the park in 2006 
and 2007 produced a total of 47  boats, which was fixed as the licence limit 
(see above). Use of the licences and the regulations governing them were agreed to by 
stakeholders. A licence holder may use it for one year and renew it for the following 
year. If a licence holder does not use the licence during this year, the licence cannot 
be renewed for the following year. Non-compliance with regulations leads to licence 
revocation. A boat owner on the waiting list can then apply for the available licence. 
Of the 47 issued licences, 22 are currently for boats out of Chiriquí and 25 for boats 
from Veraguas (Montenegro, 2007). Fishing effort in the park will probably decline 
gradually over the next 20 years, as people shift economic strategies from fishing to 
tourism (Montenegro, 2007). Given this process, fishing rights in the park can be 
considered a response to fisher interests and their existence in the area.
Use rights for specific finfish resources are assigned by boat, the basic fishing effort 
unit in the area. The number of fishers (five), amount of gear, number of trip days 
and species quotas are quantified by boat. Thus, the five fishers on a boat can use 
the fishing rights assigned to that boat, whether or not the owner is on board. The 
Fisheries Committee establishes fishing techniques, gear and maximum quotas per 
species, according to average fish weight and size, seasonality and fishing areas. Legal 
definition of the boat as the unit of fishing effort allows authorities better control of 
fishing effort and mortality.
Species quotas do form part of the management plan, but establishing them is 
an ongoing process. No legal minimum sizes have been established for any species. 
Instead, this is managed through gear and access restrictions designed to protect 
juvenile finfish stages, particularly those of snappers and groupers. In the past, the 
high operational costs of fishing in the park drove fishers to take as much of as 
many size classes as possible. Market conditions also rewarded taking of smaller 
snappers as prices were PAB1.5/lb for fish of 1–2  lbs (<  40  cm length), while 
PAB0.8/lb was paid for larger snappers. The minimum reproductive size for snapper 
is 55–60  cm (both males and females) (Vega, 2007). To avoid overexploitation of 
immature snappers, park regulations established a minimum hook size of 10/0; 
although Vega (2006) states that a more suitable hook size is 11/0. In addition, 
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banning gillnets considerably reduces juvenile mortality and bycatch. The no-take 
zone (1.8  km strip around Coiba Island from shore to sea) is mainly intended to 
protect mangrove and other essential marine habitats vital to larvae and juvenile fish 
development. Park zoning and season closures also protect adult stages, particularly 
in reproduction sites. For example, there are two season closures (March–May 
and September–October) designed to protect mahi-mahi reproductive processes, 
and one to protect snapper (January–April). Groupers can be caught all year. Other 
no-take zones in the management plan include Banco Anibal, Montuosa and Isla 
Brincanco. These appear to be effective as most surveyed fishers stated that they had 
maximum finfish catches near these no-take zones, mostly from October to December 
(Montenegro, 2007).
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL EFFORT QUOTA FOR IMPROVING 
INCENTIVES FOR STEWARDSHIP, CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINED 
PROFITABILITY
For more than 20 years, Coiba area finfish resources were subjected to uncontrolled 
exploitation. A lack of historical data and research means there is no way of proving 
resource overexploitation. Nonetheless, available fishery landing records suggest it is 
a very productive zone, and, therefore, a precautionary approach needs to be applied 
to promote sustainable use of the area’s marine resources. When the new regulations 
were implemented, fishers were affected in two main ways: those who benefited from 
the licences had to adjust their effort (i.e. their costs) to maintain profits, while those 
without licences experienced a significant reduction in profits (Crête, 2006). Because 
of effective enforcement and temporal restriction (one year) of fishery rights, licence 
holders reap significant benefits. This provides significant incentive for licence holders 
to use better fishing practices and maintain accurate records.
Fishers who have been excluded from fishing access at Coiba have been pressing 
authorities for compensation for loss of these fishing grounds. Mitigation of this 
impact of the management plan has come in the form of development and retraining 
projects. In 2006, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) approved a 
six-year project, Multiphase Sustainable Development for Chiriqui Province Program 
(UNDP Project No.  52224 [UNDP, 2102]), with funding (USD29  647  561) from 
multiple sources (Panama Government, Panama Canal Authority, Inter-American 
Development Bank, UNDP funds and Spain UNDP funds). Its main objective is to 
create balanced development in Chiriqui Province, and it focuses on all the productive 
sectors in Chiriqui, including fisheries. In 2011, the national Agricultural Development 
Ministry granted USD570 000 to 30 fishers who had lost their jobs as a result of fishing 
effort restrictions in Coiba National Park. This programme is intended to retrain 
those affected in alternative livelihoods, such as ecotourism or other small ventures. In 
2012, the national government announced additional grants to fishers in the form of 
USD750 000 to develop more retraining projects within this programme.
Both the Council of Directors and Fisheries Committee expect fisher profits to 
improve if fishing trips are well planned. As they no longer feel the pressure to catch 
all sizes classes indiscriminately in order to attain a profitable catch, they can maximize 
their catch and reduce costs, generating increased profits, even with gear restrictions. 
Montenegro (2007) projected that over the next 20  years the number of licensed 
boats will decrease, CPUE will increase, fishing trip costs will drop and fish prices 
will rise. Over this period, this scenario represents a net revenue increase per boat of 
more than 130 percent (t1 = 23 percent, t2 = 12 percent, t3 = 8 percent, t4 = 7 percent ... 
t20 = 4 percent). Because profits will increase most in the first three years (t1 = 23 percent, 
t2 = 12 percent, t3 = 8 percent), it is expected that licence holders will actively defend 
their fishing rights.
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Target species and ecosystem effects of current rights-based system
The new rights-based management system in Coiba National Park contributes to 
maintaining healthy ecosystems. Organization of fishing resources reduces fishing 
pressure, allowing stock restoration. Significant reductions in finfish landings from 
essential habitats, and controlled fishing mortality in other areas, will help to rebuild 
stocks and ecosystems. Market prices are usually highest for top predators, particularly 
in tropical ecosystems. Excessive extraction of these taxa affects other taxa with 
ecological interactions such as predator–prey or competition, eventually producing 
trophic cascade effects. In a comparison of seven reef systems in the Mexican Caribbean, 
Rodríguez-Zaragoza and Arias-González (2008) demonstrated that changes caused 
by fishing in coral reef ecosystems modified food-web size components, resulting in 
habitat loss and compromising ecosystem resilience. In areas where fishing intensity 
was highest, the food web was compressed, reducing species richness and diversity 
indices. As more-profitable top predator species are depleted due to overexploitation, 
fishers increasingly target less-valuable species in lower trophic levels, such as generalist 
piscivores, omnivores, herbivores, zooplanktivores and/or benthivores. The ecosystem 
then begins to degrade rapidly.
The current rights-based system in Coiba National Park promotes fish assemblage 
restoration, and thus supports healthy ecosystems. The system also generates a source–
sink dynamic in which protected areas export fish to other areas (in or outside the park) 
where fishing is permitted, providing direct benefits to fishers. This is supported by 
fisher reports of high catches near Coiba National Park protected areas (see above).
Implications for fisher distribution
Although the rights-based system in Coiba National Park is producing ecological 
and economic benefits, it has also apparently had a significant effect on fishing 
effort distribution through a reduction in the fishing fleet exploiting the area. About 
700 fishers used the area in the past, but this has dropped to 235 after implementation 
of the rights-based system – a 66 percent reduction. If the number of jobs produced 
by the fishery is considered a social benefit, this reduction in fishers can appear to be 
a rather serious impact of transition to the new system. However, a fishery’s social 
benefits extend beyond job creation to aspects such as profits and job quality. Open 
access generally leads to profit reduction in fisheries owing to excessive investment in 
fishing effort; in other words, labour overcapacity leads to a deterioration in labour 
conditions.
Fishers in the buffer zone have used the waters around Coiba Island for more than 
30 years, during which time the number of fishers in the Coiba National Park buffer 
zone have increased (Crête, 2006). This has been a disorderly increase, with very few 
data on fish stock status being collected in this period. Within this historical context, 
the redistribution of fishing effort begun by implementation of the rights-based fishery 
is more a removal of excess effort than a policy of systematic exclusion. Limiting of 
access logically raises the question of who has the right to participate in the Coiba 
National Park fishery. Historical rights are the most common way of addressing 
this challenge, but these had not been established for the Coiba National Park area. 
The solution was to create historical rights by documenting use in 2006 and 2007 
(see above). The fact that the rights-based system redistributed fishing effort, affecting 
66  percent of former users, has been acknowledged and the national government is 
addressing this effect by offering credit for retraining fishers in alternative economic 
activities (see above). However, there is the risk of this subsidy system becoming 
distorted if appropriate training and mentoring are not provided.
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OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS: RESEARCH, ENFORCEMENT, ADMINISTRATION 
AND CURRENT FISHING OPERATIONS
When the Government of Panama and NGOs decided to promote significant changes 
to Coiba National Park management practices in order to begin recovering its valuable 
ecosystems, they faced daunting challenges, including social opposition, administrative 
inertia, fishing sector interests and limited funds. 
TABLE 23
Summary of main attributes of rights-based management regime in place for the multispecies fishery at 
Coiba National Park
Main attributes of the access 
regime
Description
How the rights are conferred 
and upheld
All vessels entering park waters must have fishing licences issued by the National 
Authority of the Environment (ANAM). The maximum number of boats per year is 
47. These boats are selected from a list of 140 boats owned by fishers from different 
villages in the park’s area of influence. Fishing rights in Coiba National Park are 
allocated to persons who demonstrate legal ownership of a boat, and either fished 
in the park in 2006 and 2007 or have the intention of fishing in the park. Licences 
entitle holders to fish the area only if they know and abide by marine protected area 
regulations. 
Exclusivity of fishery 
participation
Exclusive fishery rights are granted via licences issued to boat owners who fished in the 
park at least once in the previous year. Limiting participants makes it very attractive 
for fishers to request fishing permits for the marine resources management zone 
(MRMZ). Support for management plan regulations ensures that licences and permits 
are perceived and function essentially as titles guaranteeing the fishing rights of those 
who held them.
Duration of the rights 
conferred
Individual boat licences are effective for one calendar year (January–December). In 
addition, permits allow for a maximum of 20 days a month in the park to be used in 
two 10-day trips.
Security or quality of the title 
conferred by the rights
In conjunction with enforcement, fishing licences and permits in Coiba National Park 
are high-quality management instruments. Trust and effective enforcement strategy 
guarantee regulation accomplishment, which ensures that fishers follow the guidelines 
they have agreed to. 
Rights transferability Licences are non-transferable between users. Users wanting to renew a licence once 
it expires must request a new licence for the following year. Permits are also non-
transferable, and must be requested every time a licence holder wants to fish in the 
park. If a licence or permit is revoked due to regulation non-compliance, the vacancy is 
granted to the next registered fisher, pending approval by the Fisheries Committee.
Divisibility of the rights 
assigned
Licences and permits are non-transferrable; the rights and protections enjoyed by their 
holders are non-divisible.
Actual rights enforceability, 
and corresponding compliance 
with use rights limitations 
Substantial enforcement resources have been allocated to Coiba National Park, 
motivating fishers to follow and support the regulations. Seven patrol boats make 
daily trips through the no-take and buffer zones. Enforceability is key to guaranteeing 
the success of the controlled effort system, and must be well implemented from the 
outset.
Harvesting strategies
Fishing methods and gear Fishing is allowed only in the MRMZ, and it is not permitted in the marine reserve 
or no-take zone. Authorized traditional fishing gear includes nylon monofilament, 
braided nylon cord, fishing nets, purse seines, and sticks. Gillnets and harpoons are 
no longer permitted in the MRMZ. The numbers of gear are restricted per group of 
species: Snapper can only be caught using lines with no more than 15 circle hooks 
(minimum 10/0 size). Each fisher can use just one line, with no machinery other than 
a pulley. Groupers can be caught with vertical lines with no more than 15 circle hooks 
(minimum 13/0 size). As with snappers, each fisher can use a single line and only a 
pulley. Mahi-mahi can be caught using longlines with no more than 500 circle hooks 
(minimum 13/0 size). In this case, each boat can use only one longline, and it must be 
anchored to the bottom.
When fishing is authorized to 
take place
The three primary closed seasons every year are for snapper (1 January–30 April) and 
mahi-mahi (1 March–31 May, and 1 September–31 October).
Harvest controls Fishing control is highly effective in Coiba National Park. However, although the 
fisheries subprogramme suggests the use of licences, permits, catch quotas, effort 
quotas, no-take zones and season closures, there have not been sufficient data to 
implement all of them. This is the case of catch and effort quotas.
Monitoring Landing records are kept by the Panama Maritime Authority (AMP), but these do 
not include detailed landings records per community, which impedes construction 
of a landing series data history. Because landing records do not include place of 
origin, every fisher must fill out an “Individual Fisher Record” form provided by the 
park administration. Each form is valid for one calendar year (January–December). 
It is necessary to promote studies independent of the fishery, as well as ecological 
monitoring.
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Within this context, the fishing sector played an important role in shaping the new 
rights-based system. Advocates knew that insufficient financial support could threaten 
the initiative and its commitments. Creating the Coiba National Park management 
plan required more than three years of hard work and substantial financial resources. 
The core element of the plan is the spatial analysis, consisting of numerous charts 
specifying activity areas. This is directly supported by the programmes and detailed 
activities descriptions within each programme. The management plan provides detailed 
descriptions of its goals and terms, and the resources needed to meet them. For example, 
the overall estimated budget for the next five years is USD11  253  150, of which 
USD1  023  953 is for research and USD3  148  422 for monitoring and enforcement. 
Estimated total revenues for the Coiba National Park fishery sector for the next five 
years are USD32 868 143, with net revenues of USD7 737 943 (Montenegro, 2007). If 
the research and enforcement budget for the park were applied exclusively to fishing 
activities and accounted for these financial resources to ensure economic benefits, the 
net profit in the fishery would be USD3  565  568, a positive value in a benefit–cost 
analysis. Indeed, fishery profits are expected to increase over time as fishing costs 
decrease. The Coiba National Park management plan is an example of the investments 
required to achieve sustainability in this kind of context, which include but are not 
limited to political will, commitment, accountability, transparency, liability and 
fulfilment. A summary of the main attributes of the rights-based system currently in 
place in Coiba National Park are presented in Table 23.
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13. Summary of finfish case studies 
reported
Table  24 summarizes the main attributes associated to the exclusivity, duration, 
security, transferability and divisibility of the rights-based system in place reported for 
the four finfish fisheries of this study. Additional sets of fishery regulations are also 
established in each of the fisheries reported.
The four case studies reported in Part II show different institutional arrangements 
indicating that rights-based finfish fisheries management in Latin America is evolving 
with a diversity of schemes responding to local fisheries contexts, resource and 
ecosystem dynamics, and governance capacities in place. They report a diversity of 
management experiences including: (i) IVQs combined with spatial quota allocation 
rights; (ii) individual quotas; (iii) rights of access to particular fishing areas or territories 
(TURFS), which allocate units of space to cooperatives or individual fishers from 
artisanal communities; and (iv) IEQs of artisanal fishers in a multispecies fishery at 
Coiba National Park, Panama. Non-transferability of rights seems to be the common 
denominator at this stage of establishing rights-based schemes in Latin America. It 
also reflects the concerns for potential concentration of fishing rights in a few hands, if 
transferability is put in place.
TABLE 24
Attributes of the rights-based finfish fisheries of this study
Rights-based 
fishery
Exclusivity Duration Security Transferability Divisibility
Individual vessel 
quota (IVQ) of the 
anchovy fishery of 
Peru
Granted to industrial 
vessel targeting 
anchovy for indirect 
human consumption 
outside the 5 mile 
allocated to artisanal 
vessels 
10 years Contract warrant Non-
transferability 
independent 
of vessel unit
Allowed to 
substitute capacity 
of individual vessel 
removed from 
fishing
Individual 
stakeholder quota 
(ISQ) of the hake 
fishery of Chile
Limited entry with 
exclusive fishing 
rights allocated to 
stakeholders
Annual with 
renewability
State guarantees 
the right to a 
fraction of the 
total allowable 
catch (TAC), 
subject to biomass 
accessibility
Non-
transferable 
Non-divisible
Community 
territorial use 
rights in fisheries 
(TURFs) of Gulf 
weakfish of Gulf of 
California, Mexico
Coastal community, 
exclusive territorial 
fishing rights with 
limited entry
2 years Secure fishing 
title rights for the 
period covered by 
the fishing licence
Non-
transferable 
Non-divisible
Individual effort 
quotas (IEQs) in 
the multispecies 
fishery at Coiba 
National Park, 
Panama
Exclusive fishing rights 
through individual 
vessel quotas granted 
to fishers of 47 small-
scale boats
Annual with 
renewability 
Secure rights as 
long as there is full 
compliance with 
regulations of the 
Coiba National 
Park
Non-
transferable
Non-divisible
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ANNEX TO PART I
Administrative and legislative 
frameworks
Country Case Agencies Pertinent legislation
Argentina 6: Patagonian 
scallop industrial 
fishery 
Consejo Federal Pesquero [CFP] 
[www.cfp.gob.ar/]
Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca 
y Alimentación [SAGPyA] [www.minagri.
gob.ar/site/pesca/_subsecretaria_de_pesca/
index.php]
Instituto Nacional de Investigación y 
Desarrollo Pesquero [INIDEP] [www.inidep.
edu.ar/]
Ley Federal de Pesca N° 24.922 and 
Decreto Reglamentario N° 748/99
Argentina 
(Chubut 
Province)
4: San José Gulf 
scallop diving fishery
10: Algal concessions
Secretaría de Pesca, Chubut Province 
[http://organismos.chubut.gov.ar/pesca/]
Subsecretaria de Turismo y Áreas 
Protegidas, Chubut Province [conservation]
Administración Área Natural Protegida 
Península Valdés [www.peninsulavaldes.
org.ar/es/index.php] [conservation]
Ley Provincial XVII Nº 86 [regulates 
artisanal fisheries in the province]
Decreto Nº 1899, Poder Ejecutivo, 
Provincia de Chubut [artisanal fisheries]
Ley XVII-Nº 6 and Decreto 
reglamentario XVII – Nº 759/81 [algal 
concessions]
Brazil 15: Brazilian marine 
RESEXs
Ministério da Pesca e Aquicultura  
[MPA] [www.mpa.gov.br]Instituto Brasileiro 
do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais 
Renováveis [IBAMA] [www.ibama.gov.br] 
[environmental authority]
Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação 
e Biodiversidade[www.icmbio.gov.br] 
[implements the SNUC]
Lei da Pesca e Aquicultura Nº 11.959 
[regulates fisheries in the country]
[www.mpa.gov.br/#legislacao/Leis/
leis2009]
Lei Nº 9985 and Decreto Nº 4340 [last 
modified: October 2005] [regulates the 
National System of Nature Conservation 
Units, SNUC, including RESEXs] 
Chile 2: Chilean sea urchin 
fishery
3: Juliana clam 
fishery
7: AMERBs
12: Juan Fernández 
I. Lobster Fishery
13: The “parcelas” 
system of algal 
harvests
16: EMPCO
Subsecretaría de Pesca [SUBPESCA] 
[www.subpesca.cl] [fisheries authority]
Servicio Nacional de Pesca [SERNAPESCA, 
enforcement] [www.sernapesca.cl]
Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo 
Indígena [CONADI]
[www.conadi.gob.cl/] [Implements the 
EMPCO]
Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura 
[LGPA] [last modified: December 2010] 
[www.subpesca.cl/controls/neochannels/
neo_ch617/neochn617.aspx]
Reglamento sobre Áreas de Manejo 
y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos 
[last modified: April 2010] [regulates 
AMERBs]. [www.subpesca.cl/controls/
neochannels/neo_ch761/neochn761.
aspx]
Colombia 16: Blood cockle 
fishery, Afro-
Colombian 
communities
Dirección de Pesca y Acuicultura  
[www.minagricultura.gov.co/08cifras/08_
Misi_Pesca.aspx]
Estatuto General de Pesca (Ley Nº 13, 
1990) and its Reglamento (Decreto 
Reglamentario Nº 2256) [regulates 
fisheries in the country] [www.incoder.
gov.co/normatividad.cfm]
Ley Nº 70 [known as “Ley de 
Negritudes”, introduces collective rights 
for afro-descendent communities]
Ecuador 1: Galapagos Islands 
diving fishery
Subsecretaria de Recursos Pesqueros 
[www.subpesca.gob.ec]
Instituto Nacional de Pesca
[www.inp.gob.ec/]
Ley de Pesca y Desarrollo Pesquero and 
its Reglamento [regulate fisheries in the 
country]
[www.inp.gob.ec/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=116&Itemid=67]
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Country Case Agencies Pertinent legislation
Mexico 8: Concessions 
from Central Baja 
California (Mexico)
9: Predios of 
sustainable use 
(Mexico)
11: Lobster 
concessions of Punta 
Allen (Mexico)
14: Seri Indian 
benthic fishery 
(Mexico)
Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganadería, 
Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación 
[SAGARPA] [www.sagarpa.gob.mx/ 
Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca 
[CONAPESCA] [www.conapesca.sagarpa.
gob.mx]
Instituto Nacional de Pesca [INAPESCA] 
[www.inapesca.gob.mx/portal/]
Procuraduría Federal de Protección al 
Ambiente [PROFEPA] [protected areas] 
[www.profepa.gob.mx/ [enforcement]
Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos 
Naturales 
[SEMARNAT] [www.semarnat.gob.mx]
Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales 
Protegidas [CONANP] [protected areas] 
[www.conanp.gob.mx/]
Instituto Nacional de Ecología [INE] [www.
ine.gob.mx/]
Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura 
Sustentables (LGPAS) and its 
Reglamento [regulate fisheries in the 
country]. 
[www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx/wb/
cona/cona_leyes_]
[www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx/wb/
cona/cona_reglamento_de_la_ley_de_
pesca ]
NOM-PESC-006-1993 and later 
modifications, http://www.conapesca.
sagarpa.gob.mx/wb/cona/cona_normas 
[lobster fishery regulations]
Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico 
la Protección al Ambiente (LGEEPA, 
last modified: August 2011) and its 
Reglamento [regulate protected areas]
[www.biblioteca.semarnat.gob.mx/
janium/Documentos/Ciga/agenda/
DOFsr/148.pdf]
[www.biblioteca.semarnat.gob.mx/
janium/Documentos/Ciga/agenda/DOFsr/
DO2016.pdf]
Ley General de Vida Silvestre [last 
modified: September 2010] and its 
Reglamento [regulate the use of species 
listed under special protection].
NOM-059-ECOL-1994 and subsequent 
modifications.
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